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[N]obody would seriously dispute the proposition that living standards
today are higher than in the eleventh century primarily because we
know more than medieval peasants. [...] The central phenomenon of
the modern age is that as an aggregate we know more.
Mokyr (2002, Chapter 1)
Preface
In developed economies, the exponential growth of productivity and of the standard of living is
typically attributed to technological progress through innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1992;
Romer, 1986, 1990). Stimulating and facilitating innovative processes is thus a first-order
concern for social welfare in the medium and long run.1 In a competitive market, however,
economic theory predicts an underprovision of ideas and inventions, which constitute a costly,
intangible, and non-excludable good. For technologies that cannot be protected by trade se-
crets, inventors may lack incentives to develop socially beneficial products. Even when the
social value exceeds an invention’s development cost, private returns may not cover R&D ex-
penditures if ideas can readily be copied or if the inventor is unable to capture a sufficient share
of the invention’s value for follow-on innovation (Nordhaus, 1969; Scotchmer, 1991). To alle-
viate such inefficiency, most countries resort to the provision of patents, granting a temporary
exclusion right to the inventor of a novel technological product or process.2
Patent rights entail an inherent trade-off (Nordhaus, 1969). On the one hand, they provide
ex-ante incentives to innovators, allowing them to appropriate a larger share of the social
benefits they create, either through exclusive use of the invention, through licensing, or by
sale. Besides, public disclosure of the invention, sufficient for reproduction by a person skilled
in the art, is a requirement for patentability. Hence, patents in principle promote the diffusion
of knowledge, technological transfer, and commercialization. On the other hand, strong patent
protection may lead to monopolistic market structures and deadweight loss. In view of this
trade-off, the optimal design of patent rights with respect to protection length and scope has
been a traditional focus of the literature (Eckert and Langinier, 2013; Williams, 2017).
The efficiency and the effectiveness of the patent system, however, depend on systemic
processes beyond the basic trade-off (cf. Hall and Harhoff, 2012; Eckert and Langinier, 2013):
(i) First, patents have economic implications which extend beyond their nature as an exclu-
sion right for the focal invention. For instance, if each new invention builds on previous
discoveries (“cumulative innovation”), existing patent rights may stifle inventive activ-
1“Innovation” is in this context defined as the union of invention and effective (commercial) diffusion among
its users and consumers.
2The formal requirements for an invention to be patentable are fairly consistent across jurisdictions: novelty,
involvement of an inventive step, i.e., non-obviousness to a person skilled in the art, and industrial applicability.
Nonetheless, the scope of the “invention” definition varies, e.g., concerning software, business models or plant
varieties.
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ities if efficient agreements with the patent holder cannot be attained by all potential
follow-on innovators.
(ii) Second, the use of the patent system depends on the administrative procedures inside
the patent office, which govern the application process, the examination phase, and va-
lidity challenges by third parties. The institutional setup, the fee structure, and internal
staff assessment schemes determine the incentives and the behavior of applicants, com-
petitors, and examiners. In consequence, the design of patent office procedures impacts
the quantity and the quality of applications and granted patents.
(iii) Third, the institutional setup and the usage of the legal system determine in how far
patents facilitate the appropriability of returns to invention. Unless the exclusion right
is enforceable in court, a patent does not benefit its holder, neither through exclusive
use of the invention nor through an improved bargaining position as a licensor. Be-
sides enforcement, litigation may serve as a means to revoke unduly granted patents
that restrict other inventors’ freedom to operate. To assess costs and benefits of patent
litigation, it is important to understand the incentive structure for the involved parties
and the selection mechanisms that regulate which disputes are litigated.
This dissertation sheds light on three such determinants of innovation outcomes beyond the
basic patent trade-off, each in a self-contained chapter. The first chapter studies the causal
effect of patent invalidation on follow-on invention by third parties. It thus examines how
patents interact with cumulative innovation – a process ubiquitous in modern industrial inno-
vation. Thereby, the chapter addresses a patent’s repercussions beyond the protected invention
(category i). The second chapter examines how the invalidation of marginally valid patents
in opposition impacts affected inventors’ subsequent patenting. Opposition proceedings allow
for challenges to the validity of granted patents without the involvement of courts. Within
the context of the institutional procedures at the patent office (category ii), the chapter thus
adds to the understanding of social costs and benefits of post-grant review. Besides, in study-
ing implications of marginal patents for the original innovator, it touches upon category (i).
The third chapter develops and calibrates a model of the selection of patents for litigation. It
characterizes the patent litigation system (category iii), and assesses the prevalence of latently
invalid patents. To this end, it examines how patent heterogeneity interacts with incentives
for dispute.
Chapter 1, which is based on joint work with Fabian Gaessler and Dietmar Harhoff
(Gaessler, Harhoff, and Sorg, 2017), uses large-scale data on patent opposition at the Eu-
ropean Patent Office (EPO) to investigate the effect of patent invalidation on follow-on in-
vention. Building on previous inventions, or “cumulative innovation,” is crucial to modern
innovative processes and has therefore become the core of endogenous growth theories (e.g.,
Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Necessary knowledge spillovers can be facilitated
2
PREFACE
by the disclosure of inventions in patent publications (Scotchmer and Green, 1990). How-
ever, as pointed out by Scotchmer (1991), if appropriate incentives need to be provided for
both the original and follow-on inventors, designing optimal patent rights necessarily involves
balancing a conflict of objectives, which can be resolved only partially. If bargaining between
the parties is efficient, follow-on invention may not be blocked (Green and Scotchmer, 1995).
In the presence of transaction costs, however, efficient coordination, e.g. through licensing
agreements, may not be attained.
In how far and under which circumstances the existing patent design facilitates or impedes
cumulative innovation is ultimately an empirical question. The extent may differ by technol-
ogy area, the competitive environment, and the firm sizes of the original and the follow-on
innovator. On the one hand, the invalidation effect could be more pronounced in technol-
ogy areas where patent thickets, overlapping claims, and fragmented ownership could lead to
bargaining failure. Efficient licensing agreements might be elusive, especially for small firms
lacking a patent portfolio for cross-licensing deals (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Cock-
burn et al., 2010). On the other hand, the gain in freedom to operate following invalidation
is largest in “discrete” technology areas, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, with a one-
to-one correspondence between patents and products. In “complex” technologies, such as the
ICT sector, where a multitude of patents protect the same product market, the invalidation of a
single patent may not give competitors sufficient incentives to invest in follow-on innovation.
In addition, the effect might be moderated by complementary assets held by the focal patent
holder. Generally, invalidation should have a stronger impact where appropriability heavily
relies on patent rights, such as in chemistry (cf. Hall et al., 2014).
Post-grant opposition at the EPO constitutes a unique setting for the purpose of our study.
It is frequent and occurs early and only once in a patent’s lifetime. In contrast to litigation set-
tings, the vast majority of opposition outcomes is observable, since settlement rates are min-
imal. This allows us to construct a large, comprehensive dataset of around 33,000 opposed
patents which are still far from expiration. The main empirical challenge is the endogeneity
of the opposition outcome. For valuable patents, parties will employ larger financial resources
and modify the probability of invalidation. At the same time, it is reasonable to expect more
subsequent invention. For the purpose of causal inference, we therefore introduce a new in-
strumental variable for patent invalidation, which leverages the participation or absence of
the patent’s examiner in the opposition proceeding. We show that the instrument has a highly
significant impact on the outcome of opposition and thus a strong first stage: Examiner partic-
ipation decreases the probability of invalidation by around 6.6 percentage points. Exogenous
to our estimating equation, participation is driven by the availability of other suitable exam-
iners. To measure subsequent innovation, we use forward citations generated by EPO search
examiners. European examiner citations are independent of strategic citation behavior of the
applicant. Hence, they constitute a less biased proxy for measuring innovative activity than
other approaches.
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We find that patent invalidation leads to a highly significant and sizeable increase of for-
ward citations. While this is in line with previous studies (e.g., Galasso and Schankerman,
2015), disentangling the effect leads us to results that stand in contrast to some of the liter-
ature. We find that the effects are most pronounced for patents in discrete technology areas,
for areas where patent thickets are absent, and for patents which are not protected by “patent
fences.” Moreover, the effect is particularly strong for small patent holders facing small follow-
on innovators. We are able to confirm our results within technology-specific subsamples and
by a series of robustness tests, most prominently by a replication with US citation data.
We contribute to the growing literature assessing the effect of patent rights on cumulative
innovation in several ways. First, we present causal estimates of the effect of patent invalida-
tion on follow-on invention based on a new source of exogenous variation in patent rights. We
conjecture and show that in our opposition sample, conclusions concerning the heterogeneity
of the effect with respect to technology areas and firm sizes diverge from what has previously
been found in litigation settings (Galasso and Schankerman, 2015). In addition, we explore
heterogeneity with respect to the prevalence of patent thickets and fences, patent age, and
indicators of patent value.
Second, our study stands out in the scope and scale of the underlying data. In comparison
to the litigation settings studied in prior work, our study allows for causal inference on a much
less selective sample of patents, for which we observe invalidation at a considerably earlier
and less heterogeneous point in their lifetime. While a patent can be litigated multiple times,
opposition occurs at most once. Concerning technological scope, large parts of the literature
focus on specific product technologies, such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, or chemicals
(Moser and Voena, 2012; Williams, 2013; Sampat and Williams, 2018), or the ICT sector
(Watzinger et al., 2017). Our study comprises patents across all technology areas.
Third, we are the first to provide an instrumental variable for patent invalidation at the
European Patent Office. Patenting outcomes at the EPO, which grants patents for 38 member
states with a total population of more than 450 million, have substantial economic impact,
and should be at least as important to the involved parties as the corresponding decisions at
the USPTO. Nonetheless, the European context has so far been understudied.
Finally, we alleviate key concerns revolving around the use of forward citations as a proxy
for cumulative innovation. The fine-grained EP citation data allow us to identify citations
added by the patent examiner, which are not biased by the applicant’s potentially strategic
disclosure of prior art (cf. Alcacer et al., 2009; Sampat, 2010), as in the US system. Besides,
their technological relevance appears to be higher (Breschi and Lissoni, 2004).
Chapter 2, which is based on joint work with Markus Nagler (Nagler and Sorg, 2018), stud-
ies patent invalidation from a different perspective. It is less concerned with hurdles for cumu-
lative invention, but investigates how the invalidation of a marginally valid patent impacts the
original innovator’s subsequent patenting activities. As such, it illuminates social costs and
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benefits of post-grant review. Understanding the implications of invalidation is particularly
relevant for marginal patent rights whose legal admissibility is disputable – and thus within
the range of policy adjustments.3 Prior empirical work has shown that post-grant opposition
procedures may serve as substitutes for litigation: For patents litigated in the US, European
equivalents are often invalidated or amended in post-grant opposition at the EPO (Graham
and Harhoff, 2014). At the same time, opposition comes at substantially lower cost. Whereas
US litigation can involve private costs above one million dollars per case (Bessen and Meurer,
2005; American Intellectual Property Law Association, 2017), costs for opposition cases in
Europe are typically below 50,000e (MacDougall and Hamer, 2009). It is hence natural to
expect post-grant review to entail large welfare gains relative to litigation. Nonetheless, inval-
idation in opposition may be associated with social costs (Shane, 2009). In particular, the loss
of patent protection may impact the original innovator, reduce her innovative activities and
decrease her propensity to disclose inventions in patent applications (Galasso and Schanker-
man, 2015). Depending on the characteristics of subsequently undeveloped or undisclosed
inventions, such outcomes can be socially undesirable and counteract the disclosure function
of the patent system (cf. Williams, 2017).
This chapter examines how the invalidation of marginal patents during opposition influ-
ences affected inventors’ subsequent supply of ideas to the patent system. Invalidation in
opposition could impact subsequent patenting for several reasons. First, losing a patent has
been shown to adversely affect firm success, especially for small ventures (Farre-Mensa et al.,
2017; Gaulé, 2018; Galasso and Schankerman, 2018). Due to resulting capital restrictions,
inventors may be forced to limit the scope and to change the direction of their inventive activ-
ity. Second, firms and patent attorneys may adjust their filing strategy. For instance, patenting
could be shifted to substitute authorities or towards secrecy (Hall et al., 2014). Third, inval-
idation may serve as a negative signal at the inventor or the invention level (cf. Chan et al.,
2014; Azoulay et al., 2015, 2017). If invalidation is informative about inventor or idea qual-
ity, firms may adjust the allocation of resources towards other inventors or technology areas.
Finally, invalidation may impact inventor mobility (Melero et al., 2017), which may in turn
affect subsequent productivity (Hoisl, 2007, 2009).
We build a panel dataset of more than 65,000 inventors, which covers the ten years before
and after their first opposition outcome at the EPO. For causal identification, we leverage the
examiner participation instrument of Chapter 1, while controlling for inventor fixed effects.
3Comparing the framing of the first two chapters, the marginal nature of complier patents – to which instru-
mental variable estimates correspond (“local average treatment effect”) – is less emphasized in Chapter 1. We
thereby adhere to the common terminology in the cumulative innovation literature. Moreover, marginality in
terms of legal stability is not necessarily related to technological utility for follow-on work by third parties. In
contrast, for the discussion in Chapter 2, examining the invalidation of opposed marginal patents to assess the im-
pacts of post-grant review is of particular relevance. They constitute potent exclusion rights, with implications for
social welfare, whose legal status can be shifted by the institutional setup of the opposition proceeding. Besides,
signals and financial implications associated with the invalidation of a marginal patent might differ from those of
an average patent – at least relative to the assignee’s or the inventor’s expectation.
5
PREFACE
The sample of opposed marginal patents, for which we estimate local average treatment ef-
fects, is particularly interesting. On the one hand, the legal admissibility of marginal patents
is within the range of policy reform. On the other hand, Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) show that
opposed patents are more valuable than the average patent. Patent rights of high value likely
constitute efficient exclusion rights in economically interesting markets. As such, they are
particularly prone to create economically relevant uncertainty for competitors and to impede
follow-on innovation.
We find that following invalidation, inventors file significantly fewer patent applications.
This result cannot be explained by a shift of patenting to the national patent offices or the
World Intellectual Property Organization, where applicants might hope to avoid centralized
opposition at the EPO. Instead, the effect is driven by a reduction of applications associated
with novelty-threatening prior art. Invalidation thus deters filings of questionable novelty or
inventive step.
The chapter’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, it adds to the nascent litera-
ture studying procedures of post-grant review. Despite substantial interest in such institutions,
empirical evidence on their consequences remains scarce. Most of the literature has discussed
potential costs and benefits conceptually (e.g., Hall and Harhoff, 2004; Shane, 2009). Em-
pirical work has examined characteristics of opposed patents (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004) and
has compared opposition outcomes to litigation (Graham and Harhoff, 2014). Overall, the
literature lacks empirical results on the impact of post-grant review on innovation.
Second, the chapter contributes to the growing literature studying the effect of patent in-
validation on subsequent innovation and productivity. Prior work has so far mostly focused
on firm outcomes (Farre-Mensa et al., 2017; Gaulé, 2018; Galasso and Schankerman, 2018).
While it is informative to understand the implications of patent grants for firm success, further
insights are needed on a more granular level. From an innovation perspective, it is important
to know to what extent patent invalidation impacts inventors and their supply of ideas to the
patent system. In view of recent results by Bhaskarabhatla et al. (2017), this gap is partic-
ularly evident. While inventor fixed effects explain 23-29% of patenting performance, firm
heterogeneity only accounts for 3-5% of the variance. We are the first to show the impact of
invalidation on subsequent patent applications of individual inventors.
In summary, the chapter contributes to a better understanding of the patent system’s social
costs and benefits. Within the framework of patent opposition at the EPO, our setup illuminates
disciplinary effects of patent office decisions. In reaction to invalidation, affected inventors
appear on fewer applications associated with novelty-threatening prior art. Post-grant review
may therefore promote application quality in the long run.
Chapter 3 takes up the discussion on granted patents of questionable validity by studying
the prevalence of low-quality patents and their dispersion throughout the litigation system. It
thus addresses the extent of potential consequences, rather than their nature. It characterizes
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the patent litigation system and assesses the distribution of quality in the patent population.
There is an extensive literature discussing potential repercussions of unduly granted, low-
quality patents.4 Patents of insufficient inventive step or indeterminate scope may create un-
certainty for competing innovators. In particular, substantial risk may arise from unjustified in-
fringement suits. Furthermore, unnecessary costs associated with licensing, inventing around,
or increased search efforts can become economically relevant. Despite substantial interest
and controversial discussion, results on the extent of the issue remain scarce. This pertains
in particular to the distribution of quality in the patent population. While invalidation rates
are easily observable for patents litigated in annulment proceedings, rates of latent invalidity
in the full population cannot be inferred in a trivial way: Only around 1% of all patents ever
become subject of an annulment suit. Consequently, there is room for substantial selection.
The high invalidation rates observed in court rulings may thus be a poor estimator for quality
in the patent population.
To extract information from the characteristics of litigated patents, I develop a divergent
expectations model for the selection of patents for litigation. In the model, patent hetero-
geneity is represented in a multi-dimensional fashion, through continuous notions of both
legal stability and value. A patent holder, whose intellectual property grants him exclusion
rights in a Cournot product market, is faced with a symmetric competitor. While monopoly
and duopoly rents are known, the parties observe the focal patent’s inventive step with error,
leading to value-dependent divergent expectations concerning its validity. In a first stage, the
potential infringer decides whether to enter the market protected by the focal patent. Disputes
are thus endogenous. In a second stage, which is based on the divergent expectations frame-
work developed by Priest and Klein (1984), the two parties either settle their dispute, or enter
litigation if expectations diverge sufficiently given the commercial value of the patented inven-
tion. Courts then reveal the true inventive step and decide on the patent’s validity. Depending
on the outcome, the resulting market structure is either a monopoly or a duopoly.
To characterize the actual state of the patent litigation system, I leverage the structure
imposed by the model. I calibrate its parameters such that it reproduces litigation and invali-
dation rates observed for German (DE) patents and the German components of European (EP)
bundle patents. Of the around 1% of DE and EP patents which become subject to an annul-
ment suit at the German Federal Patent Court, more than 75% are judged fully or partially
invalid (Hess et al., 2014).
The key results are fourfold. First, latent invalidity is found to be considerably lower in the
patent population than among settled and litigated patents (around 40% vs 90% and 75%).
More specifically, the potential infringer’s entry decision is identified as the driver of selection
with respect to validity. In contrast, the selection of highly valued patents for litigation is
4See for example Federal Trade Commission (2003); Lemley and Shapiro (2005); Jaffe and Lerner (2007); Far-
rell and Shapiro (2008); Bessen and Meurer (2008); Hilty (2009); Mann and Underweiser (2012); Schankerman
and Schuett (2016); Henkel and Zischka (2016)
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regulated by negotiations between patent holder and infringer. Second, raising the courts’
validity threshold is, ceteris paribus, effective in stimulating entry to otherwise monopolistic
markets. Third, adverse effects of such reform can be mitigated by raising court fees in a
feasible manner. Fourth, the calibrated model exhibits substantial selection with respect to
patent value. Selection is most pronounced for litigated patents, which are around nine times
as valuable as the average patent. This is in line with findings in the empirical literature, which
has found similar orders of magnitude (cf. Harhoff et al., 2003a).
The chapter’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, it complements prior work
on the economics of the patent litigation system (e.g., Crampes and Langinier, 2002; Bessen
and Meurer, 2006) by characterizing the system’s latent properties and the resulting selection
mechanics. In contrast to previous studies, which have mostly focused on either theoretical
modeling or descriptive empirics, this chapter develops a structural model that can reproduce
empirical outcome rates of patent disputes. It provides new insights on how selection into
litigation is driven by patent quality. At the same time, it confirms well-established empirical
findings identifying patent value as a driver of litigation propensity (Lanjouw and Schanker-
man, 2001, 2003; Harhoff et al., 2003a). Moreover, the model allows to disentangle origins of
selection. The calibration results suggest that different stages drive the selection with respect
to validity and value.
Second, the chapter contributes to the literature investigating repercussions of low-quality
patents. In prior work, consequences of exclusion rights with questionable legitimacy have
primarily been discussed conceptually. In contrast, findings concerning the extent of the prob-
lem remain scarce (Schankerman and Schuett, 2016; Henkel and Zischka, 2016). To narrow
this gap, the chapter suggests a novel approach to estimate the rate of latent invalidity in the
patent population.
In summary, this dissertation sheds light on implications of the patent system that lie be-
yond the inherent trade-off between innovation incentives, deadweight losses, and disclosure.
It investigates hurdles for cumulative invention, discusses the role of post-grant review in en-
suring patent quality, and examines the prevalence of low-quality patents and their dispersion
throughout the legal system. Providing new insights on the economics of intellectual property
systems, this dissertation may contribute to refine their role as an important determinant of
innovative activity, technological progress, and economic growth.
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Patents and Cumulative Innovation
Evidence from Post-Grant Patent Opposition
1.1 Introduction
Patents are considered a key policy instrument to spur innovation and technological progress.
With a patent grant, inventors receive temporary exclusion rights in return for the creation and
disclosure of their inventions. Inventions are rarely stand-alone achievements, but build to a
large extent on previous discoveries – “cumulative invention” has become a dominant charac-
teristic of the modern industrial innovation apparatus. But the cumulative nature of technical
progress may also cause major impediments for research and development. When inventions
build on each other, exclusion rights on a preceding invention may limit the attractiveness of
follow-on inventive steps. Whether such distortions of research incentives exist, is ultimately
an empirical question. This paper contributes to the literature on cumulative invention by
providing an econometric analysis of patent invalidation at the European Patent Office (EPO).
If patent invalidation is followed by additional research and patenting activity, then this can
be taken as evidence for the existence of such impediments. Our empirical results allow us
to identify situations in which the effects of patents on cumulative innovation are particularly
pronounced.
Cumulative innovation and the underlying knowledge spillovers form the nucleus of the
recent macroeconomic literature on innovation and endogenous growth, e.g., Grossman and
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Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012). However, a
number of theoretical contributions have illustrated that the incentive created for one inven-
tion via a patent right may have a delaying or cost-increasing effect on follow-on inventions
(see Hall and Harhoff (2012) for a literature survey). In general, the patent publication pro-
vides valuable information that allows follow-on inventors to build upon the protected inven-
tion. The disclosure and the resulting knowledge spillovers are commonly seen to facilitate
cumulative invention (Scotchmer and Green, 1990). But intellectual property rights on exist-
ing technologies require coordination between original and follow-on inventors (Scotchmer,
1991), which often takes the form of licensing agreements. In the absence of transaction costs,
the parties involved in a cumulative invention process could reach a licensing agreement such
that cumulative innovation is not blocked. In the presence of transaction costs, however, such
negotiations may not succeed. Even if the involved parties find an agreement, inefficiencies
associated with the licensing outcome may limit the attractiveness of inventive efforts. In such
cases, we would expect to see detrimental effects on technological progress and, ultimately,
on economic growth.
Patent thickets and fragmented patent ownership have been identified as potential imped-
iments to efficient licensing agreements and causes for bargaining failure (Heller and Eisen-
berg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001; Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; Bessen
and Maskin, 2009). Follow-on innovation is particularly prone to patent blockage in industries
with complex and modular technologies and among small firms and market entrants that lack
leverage for cross-licensing deals (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Cockburn et al., 2010).
Hence, one may expect a positive effect on follow-on innovation by others when patent inval-
idation occurs in industries characterized by complex products and in cases where follow-on
inventions would come from small players (Galasso and Schankerman, 2015).
However, this argument does not take into account the possibility of strategic patenting
and differences in the effectiveness of patent rights across technologies (Teece, 1986; Ziedo-
nis, 2004; Harhoff et al., 2007). Moreover, as Cohen et al. (2000) have argued, cases in which
one patent protects one product (“discrete” technologies) are rare. Inventions in “complex”
technology areas are often protected by multiple patents, so that the reduction in protection
from losing one patent could be relatively small compared to losing a patent in discrete tech-
nology areas. Furthermore, large patent portfolios with overlapping claims and dense patent
thickets could marginalize the gain from the invalidation of a previous patent. Leaving aside
the size of the patent portfolio, there are other complementary assets that may determine a
firm’s ability to exclude other parties. As the existence of complementary assets is likely corre-
lated with the size of the patent holder, large patent holders should bemore able to compensate
for the loss of patent protection.
Hence, the gain in freedom to operate and to conduct R&D following patent invalidation
could be larger in discrete technology areas and in cases where the focal patent holder cannot
maintain protection with the help of overlapping patent claims or other complementary assets.
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We thus argue that the effect of invalidation on follow-on research by third parties should then
be strongest where appropriability heavily relies on patent rights.
Several empirical studies as to whether and where patents hinder follow-on innovation
have been undertaken recently (see Table 1.1 for an overview). The identification strategies
in these studies primarily exploit quasi-exogeneous variations in patent protection over time
under the assumption that follow-on inventors would require a license from the upstream
patent holder as long as the patent is enforceable. Since licensing agreements usually re-
main undisclosed, measures of follow-on innovation have had to rely on references to the
focal invention in subsequent work. Commencing this stream of literature, Murray and Stern
(2007), Huang and Murray (2009), and Williams (2013) focus on IP in biotechnology and
analyze whether the protection of a particular genome sequence has any effect on follow-on
activities, witnessed by either scientific studies, patents, or product development. Murray and
Stern (2007) and Huang and Murray (2009) use difference-in-differences estimation models
on a sample of patent-paper pairs, exploiting the grant of patent protection as variation over
time and gene sequences. Yet only a subset the control sequences become the subject of a
patent application in the first place. Both studies conclude that patent protection on genes
impedes subsequent research. Huang and Murray (2009) find this blocking effect to correlate
with patent scope, patent thickets, and fragmented patent ownership. The results of Williams
(2013) suggest that (non-patent) IP rights on a specific set of genes led to a 20-30% decrease
in subsequent scientific research and product development. Sampat and Williams (2018) fur-
ther investigate the relationship of patent rights and follow-on innovation on human genes
by comparing citations to successful and unsuccessful patent applications filed at the USPTO.
To avoid issues arising from the presumable endogeneity of the patent grant event, they em-
ploy an instrumental variable based on the leniency of the respective patent examiner. The
results of their analyses do not provide evidence for a blocking effect of human gene patents
on follow-on innovation.
The exclusivity of patent protection is effectively limited in a compulsory licensing regime.
Moser and Voena (2012) and Watzinger et al. (2017) each focus on cases where a set of patent
rights became de facto ineffective in excluding others due to compulsory free licensing. Notably,
Moser and Voena (2012) find an increase in innovation from compulsory free licensing in the
chemical sector. Watzinger et al. (2017) study Bell Labs patents and find that compulsory free
licensing particularly favored follow-on inventions by small and young firms. Both studies
focus on specific technologies and use historical data. Given recent changes in patent systems
and technology, not all of the results may apply to the current context.
Most similar to our study, Galasso and Schankerman (2015) investigate the effect of patent
invalidations by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) on follow-on innova-
tion. They address endogeneity of the patent invalidation event by exploiting the randomized
allocation of judges at the CAFC to identify judge fixed effects. In a complementary study,
Galasso and Schankerman (2018) use the same empirical setting to analyze the effect of patent
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Table 1.1: Prior empirical studies on patent rights and cumulative innovation
Study Dependent variable Identification Technology Sample
Patent grant
Murray and Stern (2007) Scientific citations DiD estimation Biotech 169 patent-paper pairs
Huang and Murray (2009) Scientific citations DiD estimation Biotech 1,279 patent-paper pairs
Sampat and Williams (2018) Scientific citations IV (examiner fe) Biotech 292,655 patent-gene pairs
Patent invalidation
Galasso and Schankerman (2015) Patent citations IV (judge fe) All 1,357 patents
Galasso and Schankerman (2018) Patents IV (judge fe) All 1,469 patents
Compulsory licensing
Moser and Voena (2012) Patent citations DiD estimation Chemistry 130,000 patents
Watzinger et al. (2017) Patent citations DiD estimation IT 4,509 patents
Notes: DiD = difference-in-differences; fe = fixed effects (or similar).
invalidation on subsequent research activities of the focal patent holder.1
Results of the two approaches to identification are not fully comparable as the quasi-
experimental settings differ in an important aspect. In the studies focusing on compulsory
licensing events, many patents lose their function as an exclusion right simultaneously. Re-
leasing a large set of patent rights into a compulsory licensing regime – and that at a price
of zero – must have very different effects than the invalidation of a single patent right. One
would expect that interactions between patent rights – as caused by thickets and fences – do
not play a major role in the former scenario, but limit the effect of invalidation of individual
patents in the second case, where the contextual restrictions from overlapping claims would
largely be maintained.
With the present study, we contribute to this emerging stream of literature and investigate
the causal effect of a patent’s invalidation on follow-on innovation, using a relatively large
dataset on opposition to patents granted by the European Patent Office. The EPO provides
a harmonized application procedure for patent protection in one or more member states of
the European Patent Convention (EPC). By now, the EPO grants patents for 38 countries,
covering a population of more than 450 million. Hence, patenting decisions by the EPO are
economically at least as important to patent-owners and their rivals as corresponding decisions
made by the USPTO. In the first nine months after grant, third parties can challenge the validity
of a European patent at the EPO by filing an opposition against the granting decision.2 The
1The focal patent holder’s activities are at the center of attention in several other studies (e.g., Baten et al.,
2015; Farre-Mensa et al., 2017; Gaulé, 2018).
2The opposition procedure at the EPO can be compared to the Post Grant Review (PGR) at the US Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO). PGR represents an option to challenge validity administratively at the USPTO
(hyperlink) during the first 9 months after grant without involvement of the judiciary.
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opposition procedure represents the last opportunity to centrally invalidate an EPO-granted
patent before it is disassembled into national patent rights. With total costs between 6,000e
and 50,000e, the opposition procedure is relatively cheap compared to – sometimes inevitably
duplicative – patent revocation proceedings at the national level (Mejer and van Pottelsberghe
de la Potterie, 2012). As a result, opposition is a relatively frequent event with a historical
opposition rate of about 6%whichwell exceeds litigation rates in Europe (Cremers et al., 2017)
and the US (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Bessen and Meurer, 2013). Oppositions should
also be less prone to settlements given the short time horizon available for negotiations and
given the possibility of the EPO pursuing an invalidation even after the parties have withdrawn
the case. For these reasons, our data should be less selective than data for decisions at the CAFC
as used by Galasso and Schankerman (2015).
In line with previous studies we use post-opposition forward citations as a proxy for follow-
on innovation. To address endogeneity issues concerning the outcome of opposition, we in-
troduce a new instrumental variable. We exploit exogenous variation in the participation of
the patent’s granting examiner in the opposition division, which decides on the grounds for
opposition against the patent’s validity. Although the rules and regulations of the EPO allow
some personnel overlap in the examination and opposition procedure, they do not require the
involvement of the examiner. In fact, the examiner participates in about 68% of all opposi-
tion proceedings covered by our dataset, with variation over time and technology field. This
variation appears to primarily be a function of the non-availability of other examiners with
expertise in the particular technology area.
According to our baseline specification, patent invalidation leads to a highly significant
increase of other party and total forward citations, whereas the effect is insignificant for self
citations. While this is in line with previous studies, disentangling the effect leads us to re-
sults that stand in stark contrast to the literature. We find that the effect is most pronounced
for discrete technology areas such as chemistry, for areas where patent thickets are absent,
and for patents which are not protected by similar applications by the same applicant (patent
fences). Besides, the effect is relevant mostly for small- and medium-sized patent holders and,
to a lesser extent, for large patent holders facing large follow-on innovators. We do not find
a significant effect on follow-on invention by small- and medium-sized applicants if the focal
patent holder is large. In summary, our results challenge the view that bargaining failure and
its typical determinants constitute a sufficient explanation for the effect of patent invalidation
on follow-on innovation. In our robustness tests, we can show that the impact of relative
size, thickets, and fencing is visible even when we perform estimation for separate technolo-
gies. Hence, cumulative research is impacted through multiple channels in the aftermath of
invalidation.
Galasso and Schankerman (2015) focus on the causes for bargaining failure and their im-
plications, but give less consideration to factors that determine the effectiveness of patent
rights in excluding others. Furthermore, the findings for the highly selective sample of liti-
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gation cases at the appellate court for patent disputes cannot be extrapolated to the patent
population in a straightforward fashion, because the selection mechanisms may substantially
influence the composition with respect to a variety of both observable and unobservable char-
acteristics beyond the commercial value of the patent.3 In fact, cases reaching a decision by
the CAFC represent only a small share of litigation cases – the settlement rate of first instance
patent litigation in the US is in excess of 90% (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004) –, which
in turn represent only a small share of all granted patents. Moreover, it is unclear to which
extent first instance rulings impact expectations of market participants.
Our study contributes to the growing literature on the effect of intellectual property rights
on cumulative innovation in several ways. First, compared to previous work, our study stands
out in the scope and scale of the underlying data. Variation in patent rights that can be used
to study causal effects is scarce. So far, variation comes primarily from cases where patents
are invalidated in court – as illustrated, a highly selective and small sample of patents that
can be very heterogeneous in age. Looking at post-grant opposition at the EPO, we exploit
an institutional device to challenge validity that is more frequently used than patent litigation
before ordinary courts. With more than 33,000 observations at the patent level, we capture
a sample of patent invalidations that exceeds prior studies by more than an order of magni-
tude, although we restrict ourselves to a relatively short and recent time frame. Furthermore,
with a narrow time window of 9 months right after grant, oppositions occur relatively early
in patent life and are far less spread out across a patent’s lifetime than patent litigation. As
each patent can be subject to only one opposition proceeding, we have no observations where
the same patent is litigated more than once. We also focus on the first decision on validity for
the granted patent, for which, in contrast to cases heard by appeals courts, there is no prior
decision that may blur the causal link between invalidation and follow-on innovation. Since
the outcome of opposition proceedings can be appealed, we perform related robustness tests,
but given the low reversal rate we expect the first outcome to give follow-on inventors a trust-
worthy indication whether or not to re-engage in research on the subject matter. An additional
aspect worth highlighting concerns technological scope. While large parts of the literature are
limited to patents in discrete product technologies such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology,
or chemicals (Moser and Voena, 2012; Williams, 2013; Sampat and Williams, 2018), or the
IT sector (Watzinger et al., 2017), our dataset comprises patents across all technologies – an
advantage we share with the study by Galasso and Schankerman (2015).
Second, the fine-grained EP citation data used in this study alleviate a key point of criticism
concerning the analysis of cumulative innovation proxied by forward citations. On the one
hand, potential bias in citations may emerge if applicants can strategically disclose or withhold
relevant prior art (cf. Alcacer et al., 2009; Sampat, 2010). In contrast to the US patent system,
3For instance for complex technologies, selection may single out patents which are not embedded in a dense
thicket that could compensate for the loss of one exclusion right. In consequence, the invalidation effect for
complex technology patents would be overstated.
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in Europe citations are made by EPO personnel during the search and examination phase
and not by the applicant (Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008). Furthermore, our dataset includes
information on the origin of the citation, which allows us to exclude citations stemming from
patents belonging to the applicant herself. On the other hand, it is unclear whether the subject-
matter of the citing patent falls within the scope of the cited patent in the first place. The fact
that a license may not be required to use the cited technology, independent of the cited patent’s
invalidation, may blur the estimated effect of the focal patent right on follow-on innovation
(cf. Sampat and Williams, 2018). With no obligation of the applicant to disclose prior art,
the average number of EPO patent citations is lower, whereas their technological relevance
appears to be higher (Breschi and Lissoni, 2004).
Third, we employ an instrumental variable which is new in that it represents the first
instrument for patent invalidation in the context of the European patent system, which lacks
the randomized administrative processes that allow for a proper identification of fixed effects
as used by Galasso and Schankerman (2015). Instead, we focus on the event of administrative
personnel overlap in the examination and opposition procedure. Although well established,
the literature on oppositions at the EPO focuses primarily on the determinants of opposition
(Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004; Schneider, 2011; Harhoff et al., 2016) and opposition as an error
correction mechanism (Burke and Reitzig, 2007; Graham and Harhoff, 2014). We complement
this literature, for the first time providing causal evidence for the effect of oppositions on
subsequent innovative behavior.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 1.2 describes the institutional
framework of patent opposition at the EPO. Section 1.3 provides details on the dataset, the de-
pendent and independent variables, and shows descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 then presents
the econometric analysis and a discussion of the results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Setting
The European Patent Office provides a harmonized application procedure for patent protection
in one or more member states of the European Patent Convention (EPC). As of now, a patent
application granted by the EPO does not lead to a single “European patent.” Instead, it is
split into a bundle of national patent rights, each entering the patent system of the respective
member states. As these rights exist independently of each other, the invalidation of a national
patent in one country has no effect on its counterparts in other countries.
However, in the first nine months after grant, third parties can challenge the validity of
a European patent at the EPO by filing an opposition against the granting decision. Since its
outcome is binding for all designated states, the centralized opposition procedure represents
the only option to invalidate a patent right with coverage of multiple European countries in a
single, relatively inexpensive step.4
4See Figure A.1 in the appendix for a timeline of events for the average patent in our sample.
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1.2.1 Examination Procedure
Themajority of patent applications at the EPO are based on national first filings or international
PCT filings (see Harhoff and Wagner (2009) for a detailed description). Only a small share of
filings takes the EPO as its priority office. Publication of patent applications occurs at the EPO
(as in many other patent authorities) exactly 18 months after the priority date; the publication
of the patent document is acccompanied by the EPO Search Report. In the case of PCT filings,
which are published by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), an International
Search Report is generated by an International Search Authority (ISA). Most International
Search Reports are actually generated by the EPO. While the original patent application may
contain many references to prior art inserted by the applicant, only the prior art listed in the
search report is relevant for the examination process. The examiner has full control over the
selection of prior art references already listed by the applicant for inclusion into the search
report, while also generating references via own search efforts.
Within six months after the publication of the search report compiled by the patent office,
the patent applicant has to request the examination of the patent application. If the applicant
fails to do so, the application is deemed to be withdrawn. With the end of the search pro-
cedure, the responsibility for examining the application passes internally from the receiving
section to an appointed examination division, which consists of a primary examiner, a sec-
ondary examiner, and the chairman. The primary examiner assesses whether the application
and the invention meet the requirements of the European Patent Convention and whether the
invention is patentable based on the search report. The primary examiner then either grants
the patent directly, contingent on the approval by the other two members of the division, or
requests a reply from the applicant within a certain time period that addresses the objections
raised in the search report. If the objections are successfully overcome by the applicant, the
primary examiner sends the version in which he intends to grant the patent, including his own
amendments, to the applicant. After the applicant’s approval and the completion of formal-
ities, such as the payment of fees, the provision of translations, etc., the grant of the patent
is published. The publication date of the EPO B1 document is the official grant date of the
patent.
Currently, it takes on average more than four years from the filing of the application to
the final decision on the grant of the patent (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009). Since the grant
comes along with validation fees and costly translations into national languages, some appli-
cants deliberately delay the examination process. However, in order to make complementary
investment decisions or to claim injunctive relief before court, some applicants are interested
in fast resolution of the patent examination and file a request for accelerated examination
(Harhoff and Stoll, 2015).
16
1. PATENTS AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION
1.2.2 Opposition Procedure
The grant decision of the examination division is subject to a post-grant review mechanism,
which is initiated by filing a notice of opposition within nine months after the publication of
the mention of the patent grant. Oppositions can be filed by any party except the patent holder
herself.5 Receiving the notice of opposition, the primary examiner informs the patent holder
and checks whether the grounds for opposition are admissible. Oppositions may be filed on
the grounds that the subject-matter is not new or inventive, the invention is not sufficiently
disclosed, or the granted patent extends beyond the content of the application as filed.
Consisting of three technically qualified examiners, the appointed opposition division has
to decide whether the raised objections compromise the maintenance of the patent. If nec-
essary, the opposition division invites patent holder and opponent to file observations on the
other party’s communications. During this exchange of communications, the patent holder can
amend the description, claims and drawings of the patent. An oral proceeding is summoned if
requested by one of the parties, including the opposition division itself. Despite being optional,
the oral proceeding before the opposition division is a rarely omitted part of the opposition
procedure.
The opposition division usually states its decision verbally at the end of the oral proceeding.
The conclusion of the oral proceedings is either the invalidation of the patent in its entirety,
the maintenance of the patent as is, or the maintenance of the patent in amended form. A
written decision, including the opposition division’s reasoning, typically follows one to six
months afterwards. If no oral proceeding was requested, the opposition division simply issues
its decision in writing. Patent applicant and/or opponent may appeal against the decision of
the opposition division. The involvement of the opposition division ends after the opposition
phase. Appeal proceedings are heard by judges forming the Boards of Appeal, a separate and
independent decision-making body within the EPO.
Withdrawals of oppositions may occur at any stage prior to the decision, but do not neces-
sarily terminate the opposition proceedings. The opposition division has the option to continue
the proceeding on its own motion (EPC Rule 84) and make a decision on the patent’s valid-
ity based on the grounds of opposition previously stated. Since the opposed patent may still
end up being invalidated, settlements between opponent and patent holder are relatively rare
events. More than 85% of all oppositions conclude in a decision by the opposition division.6
1.2.3 Appointment of Examination and Opposition Division
Technically qualified examiners are assigned to technical art units, so-called directorates.
Patent applications are allocated to technical art units according to the application’s underlying
5In case of multiple independently filed oppositions, all objections are dealt with in one combined proceeding.
6According to our data (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix), the patent holder surrenders the opposed patent in
about 5.1% of all oppositions, whereas opponents withdraw their notice without continuation in about 7.7% of all
oppositions.
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technology.7 The examination division regularly consists of the previous search examiner as
first member and two examiners appointed by the director as second member and chairman.8
The opposition division consists of a first examiner, a minute writer and a chairman. The
director appoints the members of the opposition division under consideration of the technical
qualifications relevant to the patent. The opposition division may be enlarged to a fourth
member with a legal background, if there are complex legal questions to be resolved.
As substantive examiners with the necessary technical qualification, the members of the
examination division are natural candidates for the opposition division. Concerning the par-
ticipation of the grant examiners in the opposition proceeding, Article 19(2) of the European
Patent Convention states the following:
“An Opposition Division shall consist of three technically qualified examiners, at least
two of whom shall not have taken part in the proceedings for grant of the patent to
which the opposition relates. An examiner who has taken part in the proceedings for
the grant of the European patent may not be the Chairman.”
Statements of interviewed EPO officials and our empirical findings show that the primary ex-
aminer of the examination division frequently participates in the opposition proceeding of the
same patent. Case law has established that the patent holder and the opponent cannot object
the director’s decision regarding the appointment of a particular examiner in the opposition
division. The opposition division’s decision can in principle be appealed on the ground of sus-
pected lack of impartiality among the division members. However, there are only very few
cases where this has occurred; the precedent cases that we are aware of refer to different
allegations than the involvement in the previous grant decision.9
1.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
We use data on opposed patents granted at the EPO between 1993 and 2011 to empirically
analyze the causal effect of patent invalidation on follow-on invention. 1993 is taken as the
starting point of our data collection as this is the year when the members of the opposition
division were – for the first time – explicitly listed in the rulings of the opposition divisions. In
order to allow for a sufficiently large time span of 5 years for citations to occur, 2011 marks the
last opposition decision year of our data set. This section provides detailed information on our
data sources, a discussion of the variables we derive, and a selection of descriptive statistics.
7The technical art units are based in Berlin, Den Haag and Munich.
8The primary examiner used to be different from the search examiner. This has changed due to the “BEST”
(“Bringing Search and Examination Together”) initiative, with the goal to have search report as well as examination
decision made by the same examiner.
9For instance in the case G 0005/91 with a decision from May 5, 1992, a patent holder’s objection originated
from a former employment relationship between examiner and opponent.
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1.3.1 Data Sources
We construct a sample of all patents granted between 1993 and 2011 that became subject to
an opposition by drawing on several distinct patent data sources. For each granted patent
at the EPO we first observe in the EPO PATSTAT Register whether an opposition was filed
within the statutory period of nine months after the grant date.10 Via the patent application
number, we gather all relevant document files concerning the examination and the opposition
procedure from the online file inspection system of the European Patent Register.11 We read
out documents on the grant decision, the oral proceedings and the opposition decisions in
order to extract the names of the examination and the opposition division members, since this
information is not available from patent data providers.12 We elaborate on our read-out and
parsing efforts in Appendix A.6.
We rely on the procedural steps data in the EPO PATSTAT Register to determine the result
and date of the first instance as well as the final decision of the opposition proceeding.13 Fur-
thermore, the EPO PATSTAT Register provides us with information on the name and address of
the opponents. For bibliographic data on the opposed patents, the patent holders, and forward
citations, we again use the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database. A few important as-
pects of the examination process, such as the assigned technical art unit and the examination
location, are not covered by any of the above patent databases. We obtain those details from
the EPO’s administrative database EPASYS (April 2015).
1.3.2 Dependent Variable
A common way to capture a technology’s dependence on a past technology is to use citation
data. This approach assumes that a cited patent represents the exclusion right that is important
when determining the scope of patent protection of the citing patent application. To measure
follow-on invention to a focal patent, we therefore look at its number of forward citations in
a fixed time window after the opposition outcome. We discuss potential weaknesses of this
approach below. As we are most interested in analyzing the effect of the patent’s invalidation
on follow-on invention, we distinguish citing patents by their filing date relative to the date of
invalidation. In order to link the effect to inventive activity and not to application behavior,
we use the earliest application date within the DOCDB family of the citing patent. This is also
10Unless otherwise noted below, we use the EPO PATSTAT Statistical Database – 2016 Spring Edition for the
selection of patent filings and for extracting citation information.
11See https://register.epo.org/regviewer?lng=en. The European Patent Register provides access to digital doc-
uments in the public part of a patent file (also known as online file inspection or “file wrapper”). The documents
are grouped by procedural stage and include the full written correspondence between the EPO, the applicant,
and the opponent. Outgoing communications become available online the day after the dispatch date; incoming
communications become available once the EPO has coded the filed document.
12For PCT patent applications with a filing date from 2011 onwards, the WIPO patent database contains infor-
mation on the examiner.
13The EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database represents an alternative data source. However, it contains
only final opposition outcomes with limited means to reconstruct the result of reversed first instance decisions.
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the priority date of subsequent filings, and thus closest to the actual date of invention of the
presumed follow-on invention.
We further categorize forward citations by the citing party. Comparing names of the citing
applicant with the focal patent holder and the opponent, we distinguish between citations
from patents by the patent holder itself (“self citations”), and citations by third parties (“other
citations”). In contrast to the US patent system, most citations of European patent applications
are generated by the examiners during the search and examination phase and not by the
applicant (Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008). We restrict the citations to those included in the
EPO Search Report or the International Search Report generated by the EPO as International
Search Authority. These citations are fully under the control of the examiner. Thus, by design of
our dependent variable, we avoid the use of measures impacted by (strategic) citation patterns
which may occur when using US citation data (cf. Alcacer et al., 2009; Sampat, 2010).14
While we maintain that EPO citations should be more suited to our analysis, it would
be comforting to obtain qualitatively similar results when using USPTO data. Therefore, we
replicate our empirical analysis on the basis of USPTO citations and present the results in the
appendix. As information on the origin of citations is only available for citations made from
2001 onwards, we include both examiner and applicant citations published by the USPTO.
Moreover, even the distinction available after 2001 may not be fully satisfactory, since US
examiners add missing references, but do not mark applicant-generated references as relevant
or not. The European-type search report provides that information.
1.3.3 Independent Variables
The independent variables used in the main empirical analysis capture characteristics of the
opposition proceeding, the involved parties, and the focal patent.
Opposition variables
The decision of the opposition division may have three mutually exclusive results for the op-
posed patent: “valid” (opposition rejected), “valid in amended form”, and “invalid”. We op-
erationalize the decision in line with Galasso and Schankerman (2015). Our “invalidated”
indicator variable equals 1 for the outcomes “invalid” and “valid in amended form” and 0 for
the outcome “valid”. The decision of the opposition division can be subject to appeal. In fact,
almost half of all decisions in our sample are appealed. However, the reversal rate of the
Boards of Appeal is very low and skewed; that is, pro-patent holder outcomes are more likely
14A prominently raised limitation of citation analyses is the lack of distinction between citations where the
citing patent is within the scope of protection of the cited patent, and citations where the citing patent is beyond
the scope of protection (cf. Sampat and Williams, 2018). In the latter case, a license to use the technology is
not required, independent of the cited patent’s invalidation – blurring the causal effect of patent rights on follow-
on invention. With no obligation of the applicant to disclose prior art relevant for the examination at the EPO,
the average number of patent citations is lower in comparison with US patent citations, while the technological
relevance appears to be higher (Breschi and Lissoni, 2004).
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to be overruled in favor of the opponent than vice versa.15 As appeals considerably delay the
final outcomes of opposition proceedings to the effect of substantial truncation in our sample,
we focus on the first decision of the opposition division. We expect that potential bias from
disregarding appeals – if at all – understates the effect of invalidation.16
Patent holder, opponent and third party variables
Prior literature has found that the risk of bargaining failure between patent holder and po-
tential licensees varies by the vertical position and the size of the parties. Furthermore, the
country of residence may influence patenting and appropriation strategies. Hence, the selec-
tion of patents into opposition, as well as the effect of the opposition outcome on follow-on
invention, is likely a function of patent holder, opponent, and third party characteristics.17 In
line with previous work (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004), we include the sector (corporate entity
or not), the country of residence, and the patent portfolio size of each entity as independent
dummy variables. See the explanations below for details on coding.
Patent and procedural variables
We include patent value indicators and technology controls to reduce asymptotic variances
and to mitigate bias. To preempt endogeneity issues, we focus on patent value indicators that
are set at a very early stage of the patent application and are thus independent of the exam-
ination and opposition proceedings. We include a dummy variable for international patent
applications (PCT) and count variables for DOCDB patent family size, IPC subclasses, claims,
applicants, inventors, and patent as well as non-patent backward citations. We include pre-
opposition self and other citations restricted to the first three years after filing as further proxy
variables for patent value.
We assign each patent to a technology area by mapping the IPC classes according to the
concordance table developed by the Fraunhofer ISI and the Observatoire des Sciences et des
Technologies in cooperation with the French patent office (cf. Schmoch, 2008). The IPC codes
are grouped into 34 technology areas,18 each belonging to one of fivemain technological areas:
(a) electrical engineering, (b) instruments, (c) chemistry, (d) mechanical engineering, and (e)
other fields.
In our empirical analysis, we further aim to account for contextual factors of the focal
patent. We employ a time-variant variable that measures the density of patent thickets in the
focal patent’s technology area (cf. von Graevenitz et al., 2011). The focal patent may also be
15Which is in line with the established view that arguing against already identified novelty destroying prior art
is considerably more challenging than presenting new subject matter.
16A further reason to focus on the opposition outcome is the fact that our instrumental variable has a direct
effect on first instance outcomes, but merely an indirect effect on appeal outcomes.
17Harhoff et al. (2016) argue that non-corporate applicants hold on average patents of lower commercial value
and higher novelty, with implications for the selection into opposition.
18The original classification’s areas ‘21 Surface technology’ and ‘22 Nanotechnology’ are merged into one area.
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part of a “patent fence” consisting of several similar patents held by the patent holder. With the
help of a novel approach that calculates a measure of similarity using a sophisticated semantic
comparison of patents’ full texts (abstract, description, claims, and title) (cf. Harhoff, 2014),
we count the number of patents that are highly similar to the focal patent and belong to the
patent holder’s portfolio.
In order to show randomness of our instrumental variable, we test correlations with a
set of further variables specific to the patent examination process. These variables include
the duration of examination, the language of the proceeding, and the granted request for
accelerated examination.
1.3.4 Instrumental Variable
The opposition division consists of three technically qualified substantive examiners, of which
at least two must not have taken part in the examination of the opposed patent. Opposition
cases are decided by a vote of all three members of the opposition division.19 It seems like
a natural assumption that the examiner who granted the patent is generally more inclined to
be in favor of the patent holder than of the opponent, who dissents with the examiner’s prior
decision. Given that this pro-patent holder effect exists, two requirements must be fulfilled
so that we can exploit the participation of the examiner in the opposition proceeding as an
instrumental variable. First, we need perpetual variation in examiner participation across time
and within cohorts. Second, we must be able to exclude any endogeneity in the determination
whether the patent examiner participates in the opposition division or not.
We conducted interviews with EPO officials to explore the process by which opposition
divisions are formed. These discussions revealed that the reasons for the participation of the
examiner are primarily found in the non-availability of other examiners with expertise in the
particular technology area. If the number of substantive examiners relative to oppositions is
large, the granting examiner is less likely to take part in the opposition proceeding as the third
member of the division. The supply of substantive examiners depends inter alia on the labor
market – staff shortage induces the granting examiner to become indispensable for the opposi-
tion proceeding. Figure 1.1 shows that the average participation rate is well above 60% before
2003, but then declines to an average rate of about 55% with increasing variations between
technology main areas. This drop is caused by a sharp increase in the number of substan-
tive examiners eligible to participate in opposition proceedings in the course of the “BEST”
initiative.20 We conclude that the event “examiner participation in opposition proceeding” is
exogenous and frequent, yet does by far not always occur – with perpetual variation within
cohorts and technology areas.
19Voting follows a simple majority. In case of parity (when a fourth legal member is present), the vote of the
chairman is decisive.
20The “BEST” (“Bringing Search and Examination Together”) initiative had the goal to have the search report
and examination decision made by the same examiner. For this purpose, search examiners were – on a large scale
– trained and promoted to substantive examiners.
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Figure 1.1: Annual rate of examiner participation in opposition proceeding
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Notes: This graph shows the annual rate of examiner participation in opposition proceedings by technology main
area. The sample includes oppositions with first outcome after 2011.
To further argue against potential endogeneity, we discuss the instrument’s randomness
and its adherence to the exclusion restriction. In Table A.6, we show that common patent
value indicators as well as characteristics of the patent holder and opponent do not show any
significant effect on the likelihood of the examiner’s participation in the opposition proceeding.
This supports the view of EPO officials and patent attorneys that the participation or absence
of the examiner is independent of the opposed patent and beyond the influence of the patent
holder or the opponent. However, one legitimate concern is that the duration of examination
may affect the likelihood of examiner participation as well as follow-on citations. An applicant
with a considerable pipeline of follow-on inventions may be interested in having the patent
granted as quickly as possible. As prior empirical analyses (e.g., Harhoff and Wagner, 2009)
have shown, the duration of examination is not perfectly exogenous, because the applicant can
speed up or delay the examination process. This may present a problem to the instrumental
variable if the duration of the proceeding affects the examiner’s availability to participate in the
opposition proceeding. For instance, the granting examiner may become unavailable due to
retirement, promotion, or transfer to a different technical art unit. However, our sample does
not show any effect of examination length on the likelihood of the examiner’s participation
in the opposition proceeding. Accelerated examination constitutes an additional issue. Even
when controlling for length of examination, the request of accelerated examination positively
affects the participation dummy. We assume this is due to the fact that the accelerated exami-
nation request releases the examiner from further duties and provides him with a free schedule
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to participate in the opposition proceeding. To underline the robustness of our instrument, we
remove cases with accelerated examination (about 11% of the sample) in a robustness test,
yet we find no significant changes throughout our results.
A random instrument could still violate the exclusion restriction if the outcome is affected
through different ways than just the first stage.21 This would be the case if the applicant
foresaw whether the examiner is part of the opposition proceeding before the decision on the
patent’s validity, providing her with enough time to adjust her behavior accordingly. However,
this seems very unlikely. While the composition of the division is set at the beginning of the
opposition proceeding, all correspondence between the applicant or the opponent and the EPO
is channeled through the formalities officer. Only at the time of the oral proceeding, which
usually ends in a decision on the case, the opposition division members become known to
the parties.22 The applicant may also be able to foresee whether the examiner is part of the
opposition proceeding if examiner-specific participation rates are concentrated at zero or at
one. As can be seen from Figure A.3, this concern is unfounded.
1.3.5 Descriptive Statistics
We count 49,938 patents granted between 1993 and 2011with opposition at the EPO. Since the
composition of the examination and opposition board is essential to construct our instrumental
variable, our sample is limited to those patents where we are able to gather the names of the
examiners involved in the grant and opposition decisions. For several reasons outlined in Table
A.1, we are forced to exclude about 17% of patents, leading to a sample size of 41,358 patents.
We assume that this selection has little relevance to our subsequent analysis. The fact that the
excluded patents are equally distributed over time (cf. Figure 1.2) supports this view.
A second sample restriction comes into play when constructing the follow-on citation vari-
ables. To mitigate truncation effects for more recently invalidated patents, we exclude patents
with a first instance opposition decision after 2011. This reduces our main sample of analysis
to 33,075 observations at the patent level.
Opposition proceedings usually result in one of three distinct outcomes for the opposed
patent: valid, amended, or invalid. In line with prior analyses of oppositions at the EPO, we
find fairly equal shares across the three outcomes. Yet, time trends appear to exist in our
sample (see Figure 1.3a): invalidations have seen a moderate increase over the last 20 years,
whereas fewer patents survive opposition perfectly unscathed.
The opposition rates across technology fields differ substantially (Harhoff et al., 2016).
These rates hardly correspond to recent technology-specific estimates of weak patents granted
by the EPO (de Rassenfosse et al., 2016). Since patent invalidation is ex ante uncertain and its
benefits often difficult to internalize, potential opponents may be reluctant to invest in a post-
21This concern follows a similar argument raised and discussed in Farre-Mensa et al. (2017).
22In those cases where applicant and opponent waive the oral proceeding, the parties learn about the identity
of the opposition division members only through the published decision.
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Figure 1.2: Annual number of opposed patents and sample rate
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Notes: This graph includes all opposition proceedings (at the patent level) with grant date between 1993 and
2011. The low sample rate in the first year is due to the fact that the EPO introduced the grant document type
that contains examiner names only in mid of 1993. The used sample includes oppositions with first outcome after
2011.
Figure 1.3: Time trends in oppositions
(a) Opposition outcomes over time
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(b) Oppositions over time by technology area
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Notes: Both graphs include all opposition proceedings (at the patent level) which are part of our main sample of
analysis. Grant year 2010 includes only 21 opposition proceedings and is not displayed.
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grant validity challenge. This public good problem weakening the error correction mechanism
is most prevalent in complex technology areas with a low concentration of patent ownership
and a high density of patent thickets (Harhoff et al., 2016). In line with this, Figure 1.3b shows
that with negligible variation over time the predominant share of oppositions in our sample
are filed against patents in the technology areas “Chemistry” and “Mechanical Engineering.”
We present the summary statistics of patent and procedural characteristics in Table 1.2.
Among the patent characteristics, we distinguish between self/other forward citations within
three years after filing and self/other forward citations within five years after the opposition
decision. While the latter represent our dependent variables of interest, we include the for-
mer, which are independent of the subsequent opposition proceeding, as control variables. As
further exogenous patent value indicators we draw on the DOCDB family size and counts of
applicants, inventors, claims, IPC subclasses, and backward references. With application filing
years between 1981 and 2008, the average patent has spent about 4 years in examination and
is close to 9 years old when the opposition division decides on its validity. That is, opposition
outcomes occur relatively early in patent life and are far less spread across a patent’s lifespan
than the outcome in patent litigation (see Figures A.1 and A.2).
Concerning the opposition proceeding, the average participation rate of an examiner in the
opposition division is about 68%, with considerable variation over time and technology areas
as already elaborated in Section 1.3.4. Almost half of all opposition decisions are appealed
before the EPO’s board of appeals. However, the reversal rate (computed as the share of all
cases where the appeal outcome is different from the opposition outcome) stands at mere 7%.
Moreover, appeals initiated by the patent holder, for which the decision in first instance was
rather in favor of the opponent, are even less commonly reversed than vice versa (see Table
A.2).
Oppositions are mostly filed by corporations and directed at corporate patent holders. Ta-
ble 1.3 shows that 94% of patent holders and 98% of opponents are companies with practically
no involvement of parties from the academic or the non-profit sector.23 The opposition pro-
ceeding may consolidate multiple notices of opposition that were filed during the nine months
window after grant. On average, about 1.3 parties represent the validity challenging side. We
account for cases with more than one opponent in our subsequent empirical analysis.
The distribution of the patent holders’ countries of residence is very similar to the overall
distribution among all granted patents. Naturally, as the grant of EP patents affects primarily
companies active in EPC countries, the share of opponents with residence in one of these coun-
tries is considerably higher in comparison. To capture effects varying with the patent holder’s
size, we classify the patent holder as either small, medium or large according to his patent
portfolio. This measure seems less appropriate to proxy the opponent’s size. For instance,
oppositions against pharmaceutical patents are frequently filed by generic drug companies
23EPO caselaw has rendered the use of a “straw man” representing the real party interested in the opposition
eligible. In those rare occasions, our data reference a law firm or a single patent attorney as opponent.
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Table 1.2: Patent and procedural characteristics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Patent characteristics
Self forward citations (3 years after filing) 0.39 0.99 0 20
Other forward citations (3 years after filing) 0.87 1.85 0 84
Self forward citations (5 years after decision) 0.14 0.52 0 10
Other forward citations (5 years after decision) 0.80 1.47 0 34
Age of patent (yr) 8.84 2.47 3 26
DOCDB family size 10.75 10.56 1 263
No of patent holders 1.07 0.32 1 13
No of inventors 2.61 1.76 1 21
No of claims 13.12 10.05 0 329
No of IPC subclasses 2.74 2.45 1 56
No of patent backward references 6.31 4.82 0 128
No of non-patent backward references 1.15 3.39 0 110
PCT application (d) 0.44 0.50 0 1
Year of application filing 1996.22 4.71 1981 2008
Year of grant decision 2001.01 4.62 1993 2010
Patent technology main area
Electrical Engineering (d) 0.10 0.31 0 1
Chemistry (d) 0.39 0.49 0 1
Instruments (d) 0.13 0.33 0 1
Mechanical Engineering (d) 0.31 0.46 0 1
Other Fields (d) 0.06 0.24 0 1
Examination proceeding
Duration filing to examination (yr) 1.72 1.22 0 18
Duration of examination (yr) 3.98 1.80 0 16
Accelerated examination (d) 0.11 0.31 0 1
Opposition proceeding
Examiner participation (d) 0.68 0.47 0 1
Outcome: valid (d) 0.29 0.45 0 1
Outcome: invalid (d) 0.71 0.45 0 1
Appeal (d) 0.46 0.50 0 1
Outcome reversal (d) 0.07 0.26 0 1
Observations 33,075
Notes: This table presents characteristics of the patent and examination as well as opposition proceeding at the
level of opposition cases.
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of patent holder and opponent
Patent holder Opponent
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Number of parties 1.07 0.31 1 11 1.28 0.76 1 19
Sector
Company (d) 0.94 0.25 0 1 0.98 0.15 0 1
Country of residence
EPC (excl. GB) (d) 0.58 0.49 0 1 0.83 0.37 0 1
GB (d) 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.04 0.20 0 1
US (d) 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.10 0.29 0 1
JP (d) 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.02 0.14 0 1
Other (d) 0.03 0.16 0 1 0.01 0.10 0 1
Size
Large (d) 0.38 0.49 0 1 –
Medium (d) 0.28 0.45 0 1 –
Small (d) 0.34 0.47 0 1 –
Observations 33,075 33,075
Notes: This table presents characteristics of the patent holder(s) and the opponent(s) at the level of opposition
cases. In case of multiple patent holders / opponents, we give preference according to the ordering of sector,
country of residence, and size. Size categories are proxied by the number of patents (incl. applications) filed
during the last five years prior to the opposition decision (large: 200 and more patents, medium: 20 and more
patents, small: fewer than 20 patents).
that hold few if any patents. As we are more interested in the size of firms with innovative
follow-on activities, we disregard this aspect of the opponent.
We capture follow-on inventions by the number of forward citations the focal patent re-
ceives within the first five years after the opposition outcome. In line with prior empirical
analyses, we distinguish between “self citations”, where the citing applicant and the focal
patent holder are the same entity, and “other citations”, where the citing applicant and the
focal patent holder are different entities. We focus on forward citations linking two patent
families on the basis of patent applications published by the EPO or the WIPO. The EPO/WIPO
citation data are unusually rich, letting us distinguish between citations by the applicant and
the examiner and providing information on the technological relevance of the cited patent.
As can be seen from Table 1.4, citation characteristics differ between self citation and other
citations. If the citing applicant is also the holder of the cited patent, the citation is more likely
to originate from herself than from an examiner.24
24This suggests that citation data based on applicant information only may be prone to substantial bias.
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Table 1.4: Characteristics of EP/WO forward citations by relationship to cited patent
Self citations Other citations
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Publication authority
EPO 0.45 0.50 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1
WIPO 0.55 0.50 0 1 0.55 0.50 0 1
Citation characteristics
Citation lag (yr) 10.18 2.71 1 22 10.44 2.88 1 25
DOCDB family size 6.79 5.64 1 85 5.92 5.50 1 254
Sector (citing applicant)
Company (d) 0.98 0.15 0 1 0.92 0.28 0 1
Country (citing applicant)
EPC (excl. GB) (d) 0.64 0.48 0 1 0.57 0.49 0 1
GB (d) 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1
US (d) 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
JP (d) 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.09 0.29 0 1
Other (d) 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
Size (citing applicant)
Large (d) 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1
Medium (d) 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1
Small (d) 0.21 0.40 0 1 0.43 0.50 0 1
Observations 4,139 25,413
Notes: This table includes examiner forward citations for patents subject to opposition proceedings in our main
sample of analysis. The unit of observation is the citation. We only consider citation links established in search
reports issued by the EPO. In case of multiple citations coming from the same patent family, we keep the earliest
citation. In case of multiple citing applicants, we give preference according to the ordering of sector, country,
and size. “Country” refers to the country of residence. Size categories are proxied by the number of patents (incl.
applications) filed during the last five years prior to the opposition decision (large: 200 and more patents, medium:
20 and more patents, small: fewer than 20 patents).
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1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Baseline Specification and Identification Strategy
Our data on oppositions is a cross section where the unit of observation is the opposition
proceeding involving the unique patent p. Our main empirical specification is
log (Forward citationsp) = β1 Invalidatedp +β2 Patentp + β3 Patent holderp +
+ β4 Opponentp + β5 Agep + β6 Yearp + β7 Techp + εp.
The coefficient β1 captures the effect of invalidation on subsequent forward citations the op-
posed patent receives. If patent rights have a positive or no impact on follow-on innovation,
we would expect β1 ≤ 0. Vice versa, a finding of β1 > 0 would suggest that patents block
follow-on innovation.
Our dependent variable captures the number of forward citations within the first five years
after the opposition outcome. We distinguish between forward citations in total, those from
patents held by the focal patent holder herself (“self citations”) and those from patents held by
others (“other citations”). To control for heterogeneity in the value that the patent has for the
patent holder and follow-on inventors, we include patent value indicators, such as the number
of claims and the number of self citations and other citations received within the first three
years after filing as covariates in the regression. We also include age, grant year, decision year,
and technology field dummies to control for additional heterogeneity that may correlate with
the court decision and subsequent citations.
As previous studies have amply illustrated, our main empirical challenge is the endogeneity
of the opposition division’s decision to invalidate the patent. More valuable inventions may
lead to more forward citations, but may also induce the patent holder to heavily defend the
patent. This negative correlation, biasing the OLS estimate of β1, renders this specification
inappropriate to estimate causal effects. To address this endogeneity, we need an instrument
that affects the likelihood of patent invalidation, but does not belong directly in the citations
equation, hence creating exogenous variation in patent invalidation.
We construct our instrument around the participation of the primary examiner in the op-
position proceeding – an approach new to the literature, which has focused on the use of
decision maker fixed effects (Galasso and Schankerman, 2015; Sampat and Williams, 2018).
Following the basic intuition that the primary examiner is more likely to come to the same
conclusion concerning the validity of the patent as in the examination proceeding than an ar-
bitrary examiner, namely a confirmation of the patentability of the subject matter, we expect
his participation to negatively affect the probability of invalidation. To verify this, we use pro-
bit estimation models to regress the binary opposition outcome variable “Invalidated” on the
“Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables x,
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Prob (Invalidatedp) = Φ (γ1Examiner participationp + γxp)
→ Predicted probability of invalidationp . (1.1)
We find strong evidence that examiner participation indeed has an effect on the opposi-
tion outcome (p-value < 0.001). More importantly, we use the probit regression to obtain a
fitted probability (propensity score) of invalidation for each observation, which we use as our
instrument throughout the paper. We then apply standard Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
regression analysis, instrumenting the dummy of the opposition outcome with the predicted
probability,25
Invalidatedp = α1 Predicted probabilityp +αxp + up
log (Forward citationsp) = β1 ÛInvalidatedp +βxp + εp . (1.2)
In Table 1.5, Columns (1) and (2), we report detailed results of the probit regression
models of the invalidation dummy on the examiner participation dummy. The estimated effect
in Column (1) indicates that examiner participation is associated with a decrease of about 6.6
percentage points in the likelihood of invalidation. The results are similar when we add the full
set of control variables (cf. Column (2)) – examiner participation is associated with a highly
significant decrease of about 4 percentage points in the probability of invalidation. We also
find that patents with a larger number of claims are more likely to be invalidated, whereas
variables concerning the time until grant have no significant effect.
Column (3) explores the interrelation of the observable control variables with examiner
participation to provide some additional perspective concerning the exogeneity assumption.
Variables with the potential to raise concerns have statistically insignificant coefficients close
to zero. For a more detailed overview, especially concerning patent characteristics, see Table
A.6 in the appendix.
For a regression-based comparison of patent characteristics (analogous to simple t-tests)
with respect to the opposition outcome and with respect to the examiner participation instru-
ment, see Tables A.4 and A.5 in the appendix, respectively. Invalidated opposed patents are
found to have significantly larger DOCDB family sizes, a larger share of PCT applications, more
inventors, more claims, more patent literature references andmore forward citations than non-
invalidated opposed patents, underlining the necessity of an instrumental variables approach.
In contrast, patents with and without examiner participation do not differ in a significant way.
Note that weak identification is never an issue in the 2SLS regressions in the following, with
heteroskedasticity-robust first-stage F -statistics ranging from >70 for one of the considered
subsamples to 500 for the full sample.
25The resulting estimator is asymptotically efficient in the class of estimators where the instrumental variables
are functions of all exogenous variables (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 939, Procedure 21.1).
31
1. PATENTS AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION
Table 1.5: Examiner participation and opposition outcome (EP/WO citations)
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit
Dependent variable Invalidated (d) Invalidated (d) Examiner participation (d)
Exam. participation (d) −0.066∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
log(No of claims) 0.039∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.006 0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) −0.006 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Duration of examination (yr) −0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.007)
Duration of wait (yr) 0.009 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Year effects No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects No Yes∗ Yes∗
Technology effects No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics No Yes∗∗∗ Yes†
Patent holder characteristics No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗
Opponent characteristics No Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Model degrees of freedom 1 111 110
χ2-statistic 154.3 1,812.5 2,772.1
Pseudo-R2 0.004 0.061 0.073
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075
Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: The probit regressions in Columns (1) and (2) illuminate the relevance of the “Examiner participation”
dummy for the outcome of the opposition proceeding. The invalidation predictions of the probit regression in
Column (2)—or equivalent predictions for subsamples and other citation measures—are used as the instrument in
the 2SLS instrumental variables regressions throughout the paper. Column (3) shows the probit regression of the
“Examiner participation” dummy on the other exogenous variables. One is added to all citation variables before
taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. A comprehensive list of the control variables
contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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1.4.2 Results and Discussion
In Table 1.6 we examine how patent invalidation or partial invalidation in an opposition pro-
ceeding affects the number of subsequent EP/WO forward examiner citations. Column (1)
shows the baseline OLS regression of the logarithmized number of forward citations of par-
ties other than the focal patent holder within five years after the opposition decision on the
invalidity dummy and an extensive set of control variables. The correlation between patent
invalidation and future citations is insignificant and close to zero. In contrast, turning to the
2SLS instrumental variables regression in Column (2), we find a highly significant positive
coefficient. The obvious discrepancy from the OLS estimate is in line with the expected endo-
geneity of invalidation, a suspicion confirmed on the 5% level by a test of endogeneity. The
estimated coefficient implies that patent invalidation causes a significant increase in citations
by other parties in the five years following the opposition outcome. Note that the instrument
explains a sizable part of the variation in patent invalidation, which is underlined by the first
stage heteroskedasticity-robust F -statistic of 500 – a value that easily exceeds the Stock and
Yogo (2005) (i.i.d. error) critical values for weak identification tests. Column (3) presents the
results of the same baseline specification, however, with the dependent variable restricted to
citations from patents held by the focal patent holder herself. We find a weakly significant, pos-
itive effect of invalidation on the focal patent holder’s follow-on inventive activity.26 Column
(4) presents the results of the baseline specification on the total number of citations. While
these positive average effects over the whole sample for “other” as well as “total” citations are
in line with the findings of Galasso and Schankerman (2015), the results concerning the origin
of the effect stand in stark contrast.
The following four tables disentangle the average effect on other citations by technology
area, complexity of the technology, and size of both the focal and the citing patent holder.
First, Table 1.7 lists the estimation results on subsamples defined by technology main area.
While the coefficients for “Electrical Engineering”, “Instruments”, and “Chemistry” are all pos-
itive, the latter is the only one with statistical significance. It appears that the effect of inval-
idation on citations by others is most coherent in “Chemistry” – an area which is commonly
associated with discrete technologies, while “Electrical Engineering” and “Instruments” pre-
dominantly encompass complex technologies.
Second, given that the fairly large standard errors for “Electrical Engineering” and “Instru-
ments” hint at potential heterogeneity in the effect of invalidation on citations, in Table 1.8
we split the sample based on the nature of the underlying technology and based on the size
of the focal patent holder. In Column (1) we restrict our sample to complex technology areas,
resulting in no significant effect of invalidation on forward citations by others. In contrast,
the subsample of patents in “discrete” technologies in Column (2) shows a highly significant
26Note that the measure used here is distinct from those used in Chapter 2. Forward “self” citations measure
follow-on (or cumulative) invention of the opposed patent’s holder and hence are not representative of her overall
patenting activity.
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Table 1.6: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.008 0.292∗∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.074) (0.033) (0.077)
log(No of claims) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.130∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.005† 0.127∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.019∗ 0.020∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 221.8 221.8 221.8
Weak identification test 504.8 504.8 504.8
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) provide a comparison between the OLS and the 2SLS regressions for the impact of
invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations to patents held by other parties than the focal patent owner, as measured
by EP/WO examiner forward citations in a 5-year window following the decision of the opposition proceeding.
Columns (2)–(4) show 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation on the number of follow-on patents held
by other parties than the focal patent owner, on the number of follow-on patents held by the focal patent owner
herself and on the total number of follow-on patents, respectively. One is added to all citation variables before
taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated”
dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner
participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are
the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported
by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the
indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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Table 1.7: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – technology main areas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Technology area Electr Eng Instruments Chemistry Mech Eng
Invalidated (d) 0.183 0.308 0.299∗∗ 0.055
(0.194) (0.248) (0.102) (0.166)
log(No of claims) 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.140∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.012)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.085∗∗ 0.023 0.005 0.034∗
(0.031) (0.024) (0.011) (0.016)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes†
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes∗∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Underidentification test 32.5 50.8 122.3 43.0
Weak identification test 75.5 64.0 256.4 77.0
Observations 3,432 4,220 13,011 10,384
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Columns (1)–(4) show the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner forward citations to patents held
by parties other than the focal patent holder for the technology main area subsamples Electrical Engineering,
Instruments, Chemistry and Mechanical Engineering, respectively. One is added to all citation variables before
taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated”
dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner
participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are
the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported
by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the
indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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positive invalidation effect. These results go hand in hand with the common perception of the
difference between complex and discrete technologies. While the protection of an invention
in discrete technologies is concentrated in a single patent, resulting in profound consequences
for the IP landscape in the case of an invalidation, inventions in complex technologies are
typically spread across two or more patents, rendering the implications of an invalidation less
severe and more heterogeneous. We further explore this channel in Table 1.10. Column (3)
and Column (4) concern the size of the focal patent holder. We find a much stronger and
highly significant effect of invalidation on citations by others if the focal patent holder is small
or medium-sized. This result is difficult to align with the findings of Galasso and Schankerman
(2015), who find that the effect of invalidation on forward citations is larger if the holder of
the invalidated patent is large. According to our results, bargaining failure, which presumably
blocks follow-on innovation as long as the patent remains in force, is considerably less likely
in negotiations with large patent holders. We investigate this channel in more detail in Table
1.9.
We include both aspects, complexity and size, in the subsample definitions used in Column
(5) and Column (6). While there is a positive, insignificant coefficient for the subsample
that includes all complex patents and/or large focal patent holders, we find estimates more
than twice as large in magnitude and highly significant for the subsample based on patents in
discrete technology areas which are held by non-large patent holders.
Third, motivated by our findings on patent holder size, in Table 1.9 we further explore
the heterogeneity of the invalidation effect with respect to the differences in size between
the owner of the citing (dependent variable) and the owner of the focal patent (subsample).
Columns (1) and (2) show the effects of invalidation of a large holder’s patent on forward
inventive activity by large and non-large patent holders, respectively. While the coefficient
for large follow-on holders is marginally significant and positive, the coefficient for small-
and medium sized owners facing a large focal patent holder is insignificant. In contrast, for
Columns (3) and (4), which display the corresponding effects for the invalidation of a patent
held by a non-large owner, we find highly significant coefficients. More specifically, the ef-
fect on non-large other parties appears stronger than the one for large other parties. These
results imply an ordering with regard to bargaining failure in the presence of a patent right.
Frictions aremost pronounced for non-large focal patent holders and non-large follow-on inno-
vators (4), significant for non-large original applicants and large subsequent innovators (3),
marginally significant for large focal patent holders and large follow-on innovators (1) and
close to zero for large original applicants and non-large subsequent applicants (2). This is
consistent with intuition: While small firms struggle to efficiently negotiate a path for follow-
on innovation building on a second small firm’s patented invention, they are free to operate
after an invalidation (4). However, small firms are unable to profit from the invalidation of a
patent held by a large company which is able to retain protection of its invention by further
patents or by other means (2). Although this logic may apply to large focal patent holders
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Table 1.9: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – sizes of focal and citing patent holders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExa. . . Post5Other) Large Non-large Large Non-large
Patent holder subsample Large Large Non-large Non-large
Invalidated (d) 0.159† −0.067 0.190∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗
(0.085) (0.127) (0.050) (0.078)
log(No of claims) 0.013† 0.039∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.023∗ 0.002 0.023∗∗ 0.017†
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes Yes∗∗ Yes
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes∗
Underidentification test 63.9 63.9 171.0 171.0
Weak identification test 147.1 147.1 350.9 350.9
Observations 11,038 11,038 22,037 22,037
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table explores the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations with respect to the differ-
ences in size between the holder of the citing patent (dependent variable) and the holder of the focal patent
(subsample). Columns (1) and (2) show the effect of invalidation on citations to patents held by large and non-
large patent owners, respectively, for the subsample of patents held by large patent owners, Columns (3) and (4)
analogously for the subsample of patents held by non-large patent owners. One is added to all citation variables
before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated”
dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner par-
ticipation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are
the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported
by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the
indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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facing small follow-on innovators, it seems to be less applicable for those faced with a large
competitor, where the invalidation does not have a coherent effect (1). Finally, although non-
large original applicants enjoy some protection against large follow-on innovators as long as
the patent right is in place (3), it is not as effective as against small subsequent innovators. It
seems that large follow-on innovators can more confidently rely on being capable of building
on an invalidated patent when the original applicant is small (1 vs 3).
Fourth, to further inquire into the findings for complex technologies (Table 1.8), we discuss
the invalidation effect in the presence of patent thickets and patent fences in Table 1.10. In
Columns (1) and (2) the sample is split into technology areas with and without patent thickets,
respectively. Consistent with intuition we do not find a significant effect of invalidation in
areas with thickets, but a positive and significant effect for those without. Similarly, there is
no significant effect for patents protected by a fence, i.e., those protected by the presence of
one or more similar patents filed by the focal patent holder before the opposition proceeding
of the focal patent. In contrast, there is a strong and highly significant effect in the case of the
absence of a protecting fence.
Fifth, in order to examine potential differences in the invalidation effect with respect to
patent age and value, Table 1.11 shows the results for sample splits at the age median of 8
years and the DOCDB family size median of 8. The effect seems to be primarily driven by
younger and more valuable patents.
1.4.3 Robustness Tests
Robustness across main technology area subsamples
To verify that the results reported in Tables 1.9 and 1.10 are not exclusively driven by a sin-
gle technology area, we report analogous regressions for the chemistry and the electrical en-
gineering / instruments subsamples in Tables A.9 to A.12, finding qualitatively very similar
coefficients.
Exclusion of particular cases
Table A.13 shows that our results are not merely artifacts of very particular patents or final
outcomes. In Column (1) we exclude “dead” patents, i.e., patents solidified in the opposition
proceeding which lapse prior to the end of the citation window 5 years after the opposition de-
cision. Column (2) presents the results with patents with accelerated examinations excluded,
to rule out the possibility that the effect is solely driven by patents of special interest to the ap-
plicant. To mitigate concerns addressing the use of the opposition decision instead of the final
outcome of a potential appeal, in Columns (3) and (4) we exclude all cases in which an appeal
leads to a reversal of the opposition decision and in which any appeal is filed, respectively.
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Table 1.10: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent thickets and patent fences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Thicket No thicket Fence No fence
Invalidated (d) −0.031 0.229∗∗ 0.195 0.369∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.082) (0.135) (0.086)
log(No of claims) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.129∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.028 0.011 0.013 0.038∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes† Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes†
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 64.4 179.7 68.8 171.7
Weak identification test 81.0 425.5 116.7 392.0
Observations 3,239 28,494 8,826 24,233
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table explores the different effects of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations in the presence or
absence of patent thickets and patent fences. Columns (1) and (2) represent a sample split with respect to the
presence of a patent thicket in the focal patent’s technology area. We consider a thicket to be present if the
area triples variable derived by von Graevenitz et al. (2011) lies at or above the 90th percentile in the full sample.
Columns (3) and (4) show the effect of invalidation for a sample split with respect to the presence of a patent fence
erected by the holder of the focal patent. We consider a fence to be present if we find at least one similar patent by
the focal patent owner prior to opposition. The similarity measure we use is sensitive to the title, the claims, the
technology area and the full text of the patent. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm
to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented
with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all
other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM andWald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum
et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table
A.3 in the appendix.
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Table 1.11: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent age and value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Younger Older Smaller family Larger family
Invalidated (d) 0.242∗ 0.144 0.129 0.330∗∗
(0.119) (0.103) (0.100) (0.106)
log(No of claims) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.172∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.033∗∗ 0.005 0.030∗ 0.015
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes Yes Yes∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗∗ Yes†
Underidentification test 93.1 129.3 38.7 155.7
Weak identification test 182.4 255.9 205.9 249.8
Observations 16,981 16,094 17,188 15,880
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: In this table we explore the differences of the invalidation effect with respect to the age of the focal patent
at the time of the opposition division’s decision and with respect to the size of its DOCDB family, a common patent
value indicator. In Columns (1) and (2) we split the sample at the age median (8 years), where “Younger” refers to
patents of age ≤ 8 years and “Older” refers to patents of age > 8 years. In Columns (3) and (4) the sample is split
at the median DOCDB family size (8 members), “Smaller family” referring to patents with a family size≤ 8, “Larger
family” referring to patents with a family size> 8. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm
to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented
with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all
other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM andWald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum
et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table
A.3 in the appendix.
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Focus on the extensive margin
Additionally, we limit our count of forward citations to the first of each unique follow-on
innovator within the respective time frame. This operationalization allows us to estimate the
effect of invalidation on the extensive margin of follow-on innovation. The results are very
similar to the ones in our main section (see Table A.15).
Bootstrapped standard errors
In analogy to Table 1.6, Table A.14 shows bootstrapped instead of robust standard errors. The
bootstrapping procedure includes both the probit invalidity probability prediction stage and
the subsequent 2SLS instrumental variable estimation. Bootstrapped and robust standard er-
rors are quantitatively very similar, leading to identical conclusions concerning the significance
levels of the invalidation coefficient.
Dummy citation variables
The regressions of Table A.16 follow our baseline specification with all citation variables re-
placed with the corresponding dummy variables indicating that at least one citation has been
made. The results closely reproduce the findings of Table 1.6.
Alternative definition of opposition outcome
We further test whether the results are robust to an alternative operationalization of our in-
dependent variable of interest, “invalidation.” Instead of treating all patents subject to an
amendment as invalidated, we choose a demarcation based on the relative loss of patent scope
due to opposition. Patents that lose a smaller number of claims relative to the median of all
amendment cases (N = 5,415) are treated as remaining valid. The coefficients are quite sim-
ilar to the ones when using the standard operationalization but less precisely estimated (see
Table A.17 and A.18).
Exclusion of citations by focal patent’s examiner
To rule out potential concerns that the involvement of the focal examiner in the opposition
proceeding may modify his powers of recall, we include only those citations, for which we can
exclude that they were made by the focal patent’s examiner (Table A.19). Due to resulting
data restrictions we have to limit the sample to patents with an application filing year ≥ 2001.
Despite a substantial reduction in the number of observations and in the citation count, the
results closely resemble those of Table 1.7. We can hereby rule out potentially modified powers
of recall (when a focal examiner involved in the opposition proceeding is compiling subsequent
search reports) as a main driver of the observed effect.
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Figure 1.4: Timing of the invalidation effect
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Notes: Blue points depict the coefficients of invalidation resulting from IV regressions for each year after oppo-
sition outcome. The dependent dummy citation variable indicates whether or not a patent has been cited in the
respective time span. The usual independent citation control variables (Pre3Self and Pre3Other) are also replaced
by dummies. Error bars show the corresponding lower and upper 95% confidence limits. The significance levels
are indicated by stars below each parameter estimate.
US citations
Tables A.21 to A.26 demonstrate that all findings are qualitatively similar when using US ci-
tations. This alternative measure of follow-on innovation results in a dependent variable with
much higher variation and more non-zero observations (see Figure A.4 in the appendix). Be-
sides, we are able to rule out the citation behavior of EP/WO examiners as the key driver of
the effect.
Timing of the invalidation effect
Figure 1.4 provides some insights into the timing of the invalidation effect. For each year
after the opposition outcome, we run IV regressions with a dummy dependent citation vari-
able indicating whether or not a patent has been cited in the respective time span. Significant
coefficients of invalidation are only found starting from the third year after opposition, with
the third and the sixth year showing particularly large effects. This supports the interpreta-
tion that a true change in inventive behavior underlies the increase in the citation likelihood.
Conversely, it further attenuates the potential concern that the effect is mainly driven by the
examiners’ increased attention and memory for invalidated patents when searching prior art
for subsequent inventions, which one would expect to set in immediately. Figures A.5 and A.6
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show the corresponding results for the chemistry and the electrical engineering / instruments
subsamples.
Local average treatment effect
In a potential-outcomes framework, IV estimates of the invalidation coefficient can be inter-
preted as the local average treatment effect on “complier” patents, i.e., patents whose invali-
dation status can be changed by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Tables A.7 and
A.8 explore the size and the characteristics of the complier patent subpopulation. Depending
on the (binary) instrument, complier patents are estimated to constitute a share of around
6% to 20% of the patent population. The composition of the complier subpopulation is found
to be very similar to the composition of the entire sample with respect to a diverse range of
characteristics.
1.5 Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the causal effect of a patent’s invalidation on follow-on inventions.
Our empirical setting is the opposition procedure at the European Patent Office. Opposition
allows rivals and other third parties to invalidate patents centrally, before they are converted to
a bundle of national patent grants in up to 38 signatory states of the European Patent Conven-
tion. In order to take the presumably endogenous nature of opposition outcomes into account,
we introduce a new instrument that exploits the presence or absence of the focal patent’s ex-
aminer, who granted the patent in the first place, in the opposition proceeding. Participation
of the examiner in the opposition division is associated with a significant reduction of inval-
idation outcomes. Since opposition is relatively frequent with around 6% of granted patents
being attacked, we are able to compile a dataset of more than 33,000 opposed patents to study
the impact of invalidation on post-opposition citations. In line with the results presented by
Galasso and Schankerman (2015), our baseline model shows that patent invalidation overall
leads to a highly significant increase of other party and total forward citations. Forward cita-
tions by others increase by about 23% following an invalidation. At the same time, we do not
find evidence that follow-on inventive activity by the holder of the focal patent is negatively
affected.
However, concerning the origin of the invalidation effect, our results strongly contradict
previous findings. First, the positive effect of invalidation on subsequent citations is confined
to discrete technology industries. Second, it is most pronounced for small and medium-sized
patent holders and, to a lesser extent, for large patent holders facing large follow-on inno-
vators. Finally, the effect is limited to areas where patent thickets are absent and to patents
which are not protected by “patent fences”, i.e., similar applications of the same applicant.
We probe the robustness of our results in various ways. In the relatively large subsamples of
chemistry and electrical engineering / instruments patents, we confirm that invalidation does
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not lead to a coherent or significant increase in citations when thickets or fences are present.
In a second round of robustness tests we use USPTO citations and confirm for most cases the
results obtained with EP/WO citations.
Our results for chemistry are in line with those of Murray and Stern (2007), Huang and
Murray (2009), and Williams (2013), who focus on IP protection in genome analysis. More-
over, Moser and Voena (2012) find an increase in innovation from compulsory free licensing
in the chemical sector. We do not obtain a strong result for electrical engineering and instru-
ments patents per se, but identify a positive effect of invalidation on subsequent citations for
small and medium-sized patent-holders and same-size follow-on inventors. These results are
broadly in line with findings by Watzinger et al. (2017).
In the study most similar to ours, Galasso and Schankerman (2015) obtain very different
results. In their regressions, the invalidation of chemistry patents by the CAFC does not result
in an increase of forward citations, while they do find such an effect for computers, electronics,
and medical instruments (pooled with biotechnology). They also find that the strongest effect
emerges when patents of large firms are invalidated. In contrast, in our EPO opposition sample
the invalidation of patents of small- and medium-sized firms leads to a particularly strong
increase in subsequent forward citations, especially for citations coming from other small- and
medium-sized applicants. Our results are in line with the view that bargaining problems are
particularly pronounced between small players, while having a large player on either or both
sides of the negotiation table helps to alleviate the bargaining problems. We find this view
more appealing than one in which the presence of large players causes bargaining problems.
Nonetheless, the differences are intriguing. They may suggest new avenues for exploring
the nature of cumulative effects in invention processes. We speculate that the samples used
here differ in more ways than we initially anticipated. Opposition is far less selective than
selection into cases heard at the CAFC. This allows us to work with a much larger number of
observations, but the nature of the cases may differ as well. Presumably, the CAFC cases are
both particularly valuable and particularly uncertain, to an extent that prevented the parties to
achieve some form of settlement. In the case of oppositions, settlements are discouraged by in-
stitutional means, reducing ex ante selection effects, but increasing the heterogeneity of cases
in the sample. The comparatively low costs of opposition work in the same direction. To fully
explain the differences, further insights illuminating the context-specific selection mechanisms
are needed. One way of resolving the issue might be to extend studies of US litigation data
to cases that reached a final conclusion (invalidation or rejection thereof) at a litigation stage
prior to the CAFC. A second approach would be to restrict the European opposition sample of
this study in a way that mimics US selection to the CAFC. Leaving the differences in recent
results aside, our estimates clearly support the view that the invalidation of patents does – in
the aggregate – lead to a rekindling of inventive processes.
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Marginal Patents and the Supply of Ideas
The Impact of Post-Grant Review
2.1 Introduction
Marginally valid patents are a prime concern for the social value of the patent system, caus-
ing, inter alia, tremendous litigation costs that run in the billions of dollars every year (e.g.,
Hall and Harhoff, 2004, 2012; Bessen and Meurer, 2012). To alleviate these negative conse-
quences of marginal patents, many patent systems rely on centralized opposition procedures.
In contrast to litigation, which easily generates costs above one million dollars per case in the
US (Bessen and Meurer, 2005; American Intellectual Property Law Association, 2017), op-
position procedure costs in Europe range between 6,000 and 50,000 euros (MacDougall and
Hamer, 2009; Mejer and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2012). Therefore, post-grant review
is thought to generate large welfare gains and to ensure patent quality (Hall et al., 2004). In
the United States, the America Invents Act of 2011 has established a post-grant review process
following the calls of various scholars (e.g. Lemley et al., 2005; Farrell and Shapiro, 2008). In
Europe, the European Patent Office (EPO) has long been using a centralized opposition pro-
cedure. Empirical evidence on the social costs and benefits of post-grant review still remains
scarce, however.
In this paper, we analyze how the invalidation of marginal patents during opposition influ-
ences affected inventors’ subsequent patenting. We study post-grant opposition at the Euro-
47
2. MARGINAL PATENTS AND THE SUPPLY OF IDEAS
pean Patent Office, which constitutes a unique setting for our analysis. In the first nine months
after a patent grant, any third party can challenge the validity of an EPO patent by filing op-
position against the decision. Opposition thus occurs early in the patent’s lifetime, in contrast
to court proceedings previously used for identification (e.g., Galasso and Schankerman, 2015,
2018). The opposition procedure is relatively inexpensive and is the only centralized possibil-
ity to invalidate EPO patents on a transnational level.1 As a result, with a rate of around 6-7%,
opposition is a relatively frequent event: Our sample contains around 65,000 inventors first
involved in around 30,000 oppositions filed between 1994 and 2010. In comparison to prior
work, this should make our sample less selective regarding patent quality and, in particular,
patent value.2 An “opposition division” comprising three qualified patent examiners decides
on the outcome of the opposition proceeding. According to Art. 19(2) EPC, the examiner who
granted the patent initially may be part of this committee.
The identification of causal effects of patent invalidation poses an empirical challenge.
For example, an inventor who increasingly targets incremental rather than radical innovation
will on average file patent applications of lower quality or of a reduced inventive step, thus
increasing the probability of invalidation. At the same time, it is coherent to expect her to apply
for a larger number of patents in any given time period in the future. Thus, any correlation
between the loss of patent protection and the propensity to file patent applications does not
have a causal interpretation.
We exploit the random allocation of the original examiner to the opposition division as an
instrumental variable for the invalidation of opposed patents, as first suggested in Chapter 1
(Gaessler, Harhoff, and Sorg, 2017). We therefore estimate local average treatment effects:
The invalidation coefficients reflect differences in subsequent patenting for inventors whose
opposition outcome is shifted by the instrumental variable. The corresponding patents are
marginal in patentability because the participation of the original examiner in the opposition
division alone determines whether they are invalidated.3 The instrument provides a strong
first stage: When the granting examiner is part of the opposition division, the likelihood of
invalidation decreases by around 6 percentage points. Importantly, the allocation of examiners
to opposition divisions is as good as random. Participation of the original examiner is primarily
driven by the availability of other suitable examiners.4 Besides, neither the patent holder nor
1Once an EP application has split into national patent rights, invalidation requires separate proceedings at the
national courts, which is a substantially more costly avenue to pursue. Besides, differences in outcomes across
countries can be substantial (Cremers et al., 2017)
2In comparison to the litigation setting studied by Galasso and Schankerman (2015, 2018), the opposition
procedure is also less prone to unobserved settlement for two reasons: (i) because of the short time frame for
filing an opposition and (ii) because the EPO can continue the proceeding on its own motion, independent of the
party that initially filed opposition.
3This does not imply that these patents are not valuable. In fact, if marginal patents were not valuable, they
would not pose a problem for cumulative innovation or the patent system. Marginal patents are valuable because
they still deter competitors from innovating (cf. Chapter 1).
4This is corroborated by the substantial decrease in the rate of granting examiner participation after an EPO
initiative promoted search-only examiners to substantive examiners (see Figure 1.1). Only the latter are eligible
as members of the opposition division.
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the opponent can influence the composition of the opposition division.
Invalidation in opposition could impact subsequent patenting for several reasons. First,
losing a patent has been shown to adversely affect firm success, especially for small ventures
(Wagner and Cockburn, 2010; Farre-Mensa et al., 2017; Gaulé, 2018; Galasso and Schanker-
man, 2018). Due to resulting capital restrictions, inventors may be forced to limit the scope
and to change the direction of their inventive activity. Second, inventors or their firms and
patent attorneys may adjust their filing strategy. For instance, patenting could be shifted to
substitute authorities such as the national patent offices or the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization (WIPO) to avoid centralized opposition at the EPO. More importantly, inventions
could be kept secret instead of being disclosed in a patent application. However, secrecy is
differently viable across technology areas (Hall et al., 2014) and may only be a worthwhile al-
ternative to patenting for substantial technological advances, where competitors would learn
much from disclosure (Anton and Yao, 2004; Zaby, 2010). Third, invalidation may serve as a
signal at the inventor or the invention level (cf. Chan et al., 2014; Azoulay et al., 2015, 2017).
If invalidation is informative about inventor or idea quality, firms may adjust the allocation of
resources towards other inventors or technology areas. Finally, invalidation may impact inven-
tor mobility. Melero et al. (2017) show that inventors respond to patent grants by becoming
less mobile, especially between firms in the same technology area. Mobility decisions may in
turn affect subsequent productivity (Hoisl, 2007, 2009).5
We find that in the ten years after patent invalidation, inventors file on average 0.5 or
around 20% fewer applications annually than comparable inventors whose patents were also
opposed, but not invalidated. The effect starts to materialize around three years after the
decision to invalidate the patent. Inventors are 15 percentage points less likely to file for
a patent in the ten years after invalidation. These effects also appear when using citation-
weighted patent applications. We do not observe increases in national patenting or substitution
towards the transnational WIPO procedure. We can thus rule out that our findings only reflect
shifts to alternative patent application authorities. The overall effect is primarily driven by a
decrease in patent filings which search examiners associate with “novelty-threatening” prior
art. In EPO search reports, examiner categorize references by whether they challenge the
application’s novelty or the existence of an inventive step (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009). In
our data, patent filings without such novelty-threatening references, if anything, even slightly
increase. In reaction to an invalidation in opposition, inventors hence file fewer applications
that are at the margin of being patentable.
We further explore these effects by constructing alternative dependent variables and by
analyzing the heterogeneity of effects along inventor and applicant characteristics. First, the
effects on patent filings in the same technology area as the invalidated patent are similar to
those in other areas. Second, inventors who experience an invalidation in their expert area
5Similar effects may arise from changes to the inventors’ stream of income (Harhoff and Hoisl, 2007; Toivanen
and Väänänen, 2012) following invalidation.
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show comparable effects to those who experience an invalidation outside their central field of
expertise. Third, using median splits along several applicant characteristics such as the size of
the patent portfolio, revenue, and profitability, we do not find significant differences in effect
sizes. Fourth, using median splits along several inventor characteristics such as tenure, the
number of prior applications, and the prior number of technology areas in which applications
were filed, we also do not find strong heterogeneities. If anything, the effects seem to be less
pronounced for inventors with fewer prior applications and applications in fewer technology
areas.
While we cannot disentangle the underlying mechanisms directly, these results do not
support some of the explanations proposed in the literature as potential drivers behind our
effects. First, if the effect was a consequence of firm success or exit, heterogeneity across
applicant characteristics would be likely. However, we do not find substantial differences in
coefficients. Second, if the effect was driven by inventor mobility, a reduced stream of income,
or learning about inventor or idea quality, experienced inventors should be less impacted. Yet,
if anything, we find that the effect is less pronounced for inventors with few prior applications.
Third, if a general shift to secrecy was the driver, the effect would not be concentrated in
applications that constitute a minor departure from prior art. While such patents might be
valuable as exclusion rights, they should reveal little information to competitors. However, we
mainly find a reduction of applications with novelty-threatening references after invalidation.6
This paper contributes to the nascent literature analyzing the impacts of post-grant review.
Although these procedures have gained substantial interest, there is little empirical evidence
about the consequences of establishing such institutions. Most of the literature has outlined
potential costs and benefits theoretically (e.g., Hall and Harhoff, 2004). Empirically, Harhoff
and Reitzig (2004) show that patents in the EPO’s post-grant review system are associated with
higher measures of patent value, such as forward citations.7 Graham and Harhoff (2014) show
that for patents which are litigated in the US, the European counterparts are often revoked
or amended in the EPO’s post-grant process. This suggests high social welfare gains from an
opposition system, relative to litigation. Nonetheless, such procedures might be associated
with social costs (Shane, 2009). Overall, there is a lack of empirical evidence as to how post-
grant reviews affect innovation.
This paper also contributes to an emerging literature investigating the impact of patent
invalidation on subsequent innovation and productivity, which has so far mostly focused on
firm outcomes. Galasso and Schankerman (2018) use the random allocation of judges to com-
mittees deciding on the invalidation of litigated patents to find that small firms decrease their
inventive activity in response to an invalidation. Gaulé (2018) and Farre-Mensa et al. (2017)
use prior examiner leniency and find that venture-capital backed start-ups fare substantially
6More generally, a decrease in patent filings is not necessarily equivalent to a decrease in inventive activity.
However, given that one of the main goals of the patent system is to encourage the disclosure of ideas (Williams,
2017), we believe that our results are interesting even if the effects were merely reflecting shifts into secrecy.
7Love et al. (2018) analyze the determinants of invalidation in the US post-grant review system.
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better when being granted a patent.8 Implications of patent grants for firms’ follow-on inno-
vation, firm behavior, and firm success have thus been studied to some extent. From an inno-
vation viewpoint, it is however important to know whether inventors stop patenting altogether
or whether they just continue inventing for other companies. The relevance of inventor-level
output is corroborated by the recent finding that firm heterogeneity only explains around 3-
5% of the variance in inventors’ patenting performance. In contrast, inventor fixed effects
explain 23-29% of innovative performance, with inventor productivity being highly correlated
over time (Bhaskarabhatla et al., 2017). In light of this result, it is surprising just how little is
known about whether and how patents affect the performance of individual inventors. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to show that patent invalidation affects the subsequent
patent filings of individual inventors.
In summary, this paper thus contributes to a better understanding of the social costs and
benefits of the patent system. In the context of post-grant review, our setup allows us to
examine how decisions of the patent office affect the supply and disclosure of ideas: Inventors
stop filing applications that are at risk of not being patentable, as indicated by potentially
novelty-destroying search report references. Invalidation in post-grant review may therefore
help to ensure the quality of patent applications in the long run.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe our setup,
our data, and our empirical specification. In Section 2.3, we present and discuss our results.
Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Setup, Data, and Empirical Strategy
In this section, we describe the empirical setting of our study, the patent opposition procedure
at the EPO. We then describe our panel data set of inventors, which comprises the ten years
before and after an inventor’s first opposition procedure. Finally, we outline our instrumental
variables strategy.
2.2.1 Patent Opposition at the EPO
The EPO provides a harmonized application procedure for patent protection in one or more
member states of the European Patent Convention (EPC).9 Patent applications granted by the
EPO disperse into a bundle of national patent rights, each entering the patent system of the
respective member state. Thus, the invalidation of a national patent through litigation in one
country’s courts has no effect on its counterparts in other countries. However, in the first
nine months after grant, third parties can challenge the validity of a European patent issued
by the EPO by filing an opposition against the granting decision. The centralized opposition
8There is an ongoing discussion about the identifying assumption behind using patent examiner leniency for
identification (cf. Sampat and Williams, 2018; Righi and Simcoe, 2017).
9See Chapter 1, Section 1.2, for a more extensive description.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline for the average opposed patent in our sample
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Notes: The inventor panel is constructed using applications filed within ± 10 years around the first outcome of
the respective inventor’s first opposition proceeding.
procedure, the outcome of which is binding for all designated states, represents the only option
to invalidate a patent right covering multiple European jurisdictions in a single, relatively
inexpensive step.10 Because it is a centralized, low-cost procedure, it is a frequent event. In
total, around 6-7% of all granted patents are opposed before the EPO. Constructing a sample
based on oppositions thus compares favorably with similar, more selective litigation setups
such as the one by Galasso and Schankerman (2015, 2018). Figure 2.1 displays the timeline
for the average opposed patent in our sample.
Oppositions may be filed by any party (except the patent holder herself) on the grounds
that the subject matter is not new or inventive, that the invention is not sufficiently disclosed,
or that the granted patent extends beyond the content of the application as filed. Consisting
of three technically qualified examiners, the appointed “opposition division” has to decide
whether the raised objections compromise the maintenance of the patent.11 Typically, an oral
proceeding before the opposition division is an integral part of opposition procedures, although
being optional and dependent on a request. The opposition division usually states its decision
verbally at the end of the oral proceeding.12 Thus, the decision of the opposition division is
not known to the parties until the day of the oral hearing. The conclusion of an opposition
procedure is either the rejection of the opposition and hence the maintenance of the patent
as is, the maintenance of the patent in amended form, or the invalidation of the patent in its
entirety. Patent applicants and/or opponents may appeal against the decision of the opposition
10Currently, it takes on average more than four years from the filing of the application to the final decision
on the grant of the patent (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009). However, in order to make complementary investment
decisions or to claim injunctive relief before court, some applicants are interested in fast resolution of the patent
examination and file a request for accelerated examination (Harhoff and Stoll, 2015).
11If necessary, the opposition division invites patent holder and opponent to file observations on the other party’s
communications. During this exchange of communications, the patent holder can amend the description, claims,
and drawings of the patent.
12If no oral proceeding was requested, the opposition division simply issues its decision in writing. A written
decision, including the opposition division’s reasoning, typically follows one to six months later.
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division.13 Withdrawal statements can be made at any stage prior to the decision, but do not
necessarily terminate the opposition proceedings. The opposition division has the option to
continue the proceeding on its own motion (EPC Rule 84) and to make a decision on the
patent’s validity based on the grounds of opposition previously stated. Since the opposed
patent may still end up being invalidated, settlements between opponent and patent holder
are relatively rare events. More than 85% of all oppositions conclude with a decision by the
opposition division. Since there are few settlements, almost all outcomes can be observed.14
The opposition division consists of a first examiner, a minute writer, and a chairman. The
director of the patent’s technical art unit appoints themembers of the opposition division under
consideration of the technical qualifications relevant to the patent.15 As substantive examiners
with the necessary technical qualification, the members of the examination division are natural
candidates for the opposition division.16 Concerning the participation of the grant examiners
in the opposition proceeding, Article 19(2) of the European Patent Convention states that at
least two of the members of the opposition division must not have taken part in the original
examination and that the original examiner may not be the chairman of the opposition divi-
sion. As shown in Chapter 1, the primary examiner frequently participates in the opposition
proceeding of the same patent. Case law has established that patent holder and opponent
cannot object to the director’s decision regarding the appointment of a particular examiner to
the opposition division.17
2.2.2 Data and Summary Statistics
We build a panel data set of opposed inventors’ patenting activity using the European Patent
Office’s 2018 spring release of PATSTAT. Our panel of individual inventors covers 10 years
before and after their first opposition decision at the EPO. Because we observe the universe of
patent applications, we assign a value of zero patents to years in which inventors do not appear
in the data. We identify inventors in two separate ways: (a) by their doc_std_name, correcting
obvious errors using string similarity metrics, and (b) using the disambiguation provided by
Morrison et al. (2017) for robustness. For our primary dataset, we obtain information on
65,415 inventors associated with 29,009 first oppositions filed between 1994 and 2010. Our
data on oppositions is largely based on Chapter 1. As described in Section 1.3, the sample
comprises (almost) all patents granted between 1993 and 2011 that became subject to an
13The involvement of the opposition division ends after the opposition phase. Appeal proceedings are heard by
judges forming the Boards of Appeal, a separate and independent decision-making body within the EPO.
14The remainder consists predominantly of cases where the patent holder abandons the patent prior to the
decision.
15The opposition division may be enlarged to a fourth member with a legal background, if there are complex
legal questions to be resolved.
16The entire examination division regularly consists of the previous search examiner as first member and two
examiners appointed by the director as second member and chairman.
17In principle, the opposition division’s decision can be appealed on the ground of suspected lack of impartiality
among the division members. However, there are only very few cases where this has occurred (see Chapter 1,
Section 1.2.3).
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opposition. For each patent granted by the EPO, the PATSTAT Register database allowed to
extract information on whether an opposition was filed within the statutory period of nine
months after grant and to identify the corresponding decision of the opposition division. For
full information on the data construction process of the instrumental variable, especially the
extraction of the examination and the opposition division members, see Section A.6 in the
appendix.
Our main dependent variable is the number of patent applications that inventors file.18
We further construct a dummy variable indicating whether inventors patent in a given year
and compute the log of the number of patent applications in our main analysis to account for
outliers. In addition, we distinguish subsequent applications by their technology area (same
vs. different area than the invalidated patent) and split the sample by whether the invalidation
occurred in the inventor’s field of expertise (defined as the area in which she has filed most
patents prior to her first opposition outcome). Besides, we analyze whether there has been a
shift to national patenting or to WIPO applications. We also provide evidence on the impact
of patent invalidation on the quality of subsequent applications. To this end, we use citation-
weighted patent applications.
We additionally distinguish patents with and without novelty-threatening prior art, as indi-
cated by so-called X-, Y-, and E-references in the EPO search reports. The reports classify prior
art by their relevance for the patentability of the focal application. According to the EPO’s ex-
amination guidelines (EPO, 2017), X-references indicate prior documents that are “such that
when taken alone, a claimed invention cannot be considered novel or cannot be considered to
involve an inventive step”. Analogously, category Y indicates threats to patentability due to a
combination of prior documents. Finally, category E labels prior patent documents that may
conflict with the application, but were not disclosed at the time of filing.19 This detailed infor-
mation about the content of patent applications is an important advantage of using EPO data
over data from other jurisdictions that do not contain reference types: We have an additional
and interesting measure for patent quality.
The decision of the opposition division may have three mutually exclusive results for the
opposed patent: “opposition rejected” (patent valid as is), “valid in amended form”, and “in-
valid”. Following the prior literature (Galasso and Schankerman, 2015, 2018) and Chapter 1,
we classify the outcomes “invalid” and “valid in amended form” as an invalidation.20 Follow-
ing Chapter 1, we construct our analysis around the first decision of the opposition division,
18Throughout the paper, we construct all variables on the patent family level instead of using single patent
applications.
19While the latter category is different in that the applicant could not have known this prior art from patent
documents, in practice there are very few such references. We include this category because we believe this still
reflects patents that are marginal in the sense that their patentability is threatened.
20Our results are robust to only coding “invalid” as an invalidation.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
N Mean SD p10 p50 p90
Inventor level
Inventor tenure at opp outcome date (yr) 65,415 10.675 5.050 5.892 9.046 18.204
No of app (pre av, per year) 65,415 0.577 0.892 0.100 0.300 1.300
No of app with XYE ref (pre av, per year) 65,415 0.418 0.685 0.000 0.200 1.000
No of app without XYE ref (pre av, per year) 65,415 0.159 0.294 0.000 0.100 0.400
No of cit5 weighted app (pre av, per year) 42,390 1.800 3.731 0.000 0.600 4.400
No of co-inventors (pre av, per year) 65,415 1.601 3.459 0.100 0.600 3.800
No of technology areas (pre av, per year) 65,415 0.378 0.417 0.100 0.200 0.800
1(Opposition in expert area) 65,415 0.770
Opposition level
1(Invalidated in opposition) 29,009 0.705
1(Examiner on opposition board) 29,009 0.681
DOCDB family size 29,009 10.258 9.101 4 8 18
App filing year 29,009 1996.5 4.897 1990 1997 2003
First outcome year 29,009 2004.2 4.961 1997 2005 2011
Notes: p10, p50 and p90 denote the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile, respectively. For indicator variables only the
mean is shown. For the number of applications, (non-) XYE-referenced applications, citation weighted applications,
co-inventors, and technology areas, inventor means are calculated over relative years prior to opposition outcome.
The number of citation weighted applications counts the forward citations in a 5-year window after application
filing, accumulated over all applications of the inventor in the given year relative to opposition outcome. It is shown
for fewer inventors, since inventor-years are excluded for which the full 5-year citation window is not observable
and inventors are only included in the panel regressions if they appear in at least five post periods. 1(Invalidated
in opposition) denotes the endogenous variable of interest, 1(Examiner on opposition board) is the corresponding
instrumental variable for examiner participation. Applications are counted on the DOCDB family level.
not the final outcome of a potential appeal.21
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics of our sample. The upper panel shows descriptive
statistics on the inventor level. At the date of the opposition outcome, the mean inventor in
our data has been patenting at the EPO for more than ten years, filing a yearly average of 0.6
applications in 0.4 technology areas and working with 1.6 co-inventors per year. Inventors in
opposition are therefore among the more productive. For over three quarters of inventors we
observe the first opposition in the technology area they are most active in, which we refer to
as the inventor’s “expert area.” The bottom panel contains descriptive statistics on the level
of the opposed application. In over two thirds of oppositions, the original examiner is in the
opposition division. Around two thirds of opposed patents are fully or partially invalidated
21The decision of the opposition division may be subject to appeal. In fact, almost half of all decisions in the
sample are appealed. However, the reversal rate of the Board of Appeals is very low and skewed; i.e., pro-patent
holder outcomes are more likely to be overruled in favor of the opponent than vice versa.
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during the proceeding. The average DOCDB patent family comprises around 10 applications,
the mean application filing year is 1997. The year of the first outcome of the opposition is
2004 on average, reflecting an average time period of around 7-8 years between application
and opposition outcomes.
We additionally retrieve data on financial characteristics and on the size of applicant firms
from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database by matching to the assignees of the opposed patents in
our sample. We use leverage, profitability, and R&D intensity to explore effect heterogeneity
along applicant financial characteristics in Figure 2.5 and Table B.15. They are defined as
total liabilities per total assets, EBITDA per total assets, and R&D expenses per total assets,
respectively. As proxies for firm size, we extract the number of employees and revenues. Rev-
enues are deflated by the US GDP deflator provided in the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators database.
2.2.3 Econometric Specification
It is difficult to empirically assess the effects of patent invalidation on affected inventors’ sub-
sequent patent filings. On the one hand, if some inventors’ work becomes more “incremental”
over time, then this will both increase the likelihood of invalidation and the number of subse-
quent applications. In this case, the coefficient reflecting the impact of invalidation on future
patenting would be positively biased, even when accounting for inventor fixed effects. On the
other hand, if patent quality decreases over time because inventors become less creative (e.g.,
due to fishing out of ideas or inventor age; see Jones, 2010), then a higher likelihood of inval-
idation may be correlated with a lower level of future patenting. In this case, the estimated
impact would be negatively biased. Thus, any correlation between patent invalidation and the
inventor’s application propensity does not have a causal interpretation, with unclear direction
of bias.
Our econometric setup therefore leverages the presence of the original examiner in the
opposition division as an instrumental variable. The presence of the original examiner in
the opposition division is a suitable instrument if it predicts the invalidation of the opposed
patent (i.e., if it is relevant) and if it is orthogonal to future patenting of the opposed patent’s
inventors (i.e., if it is exogenous). The relevance condition is directly testable in our data. In
the instrument’s first stage, we estimate the following equation:
Invalidatedi,t = αExaminer participationi,t + at + bt−taf + ci + εi,t
where i denotes the inventor index, t the index for the year relative to the opposition outcome,
and at the corresponding year effects. taf is the year of application filing relative to opposi-
tion outcome and bt−taf are the corresponding year effects.22 Table 2.2 demonstrates that the
22The notation Invalidatedi,t is short for 1(Invalidatedi)1(Postt), the notation Examiner participationi,t is short
for 1(Examiner participationi)1(Postt).
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Table 2.2: First stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS FE
Dependent variable 1(Invalidated) 1(Invalidated) 1(Invalidated) 1(Inv)× 1(Post)
Level of observation Opposition Opposition Inventor Inv panel
1(Examiner participation) −0.071∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
1(Exam part) × 1(Post) −0.059∗∗∗
(0.007)
App filing year effects No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Implicit
Opp outcome year effects No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Implicit
Year effects (rel to oppo) No No No Yes∗∗∗
Year effects (rel to appl) No No No Yes∗∗∗
Number of oppositions 29,009 29,009
Number of inventors 65,415
Observations 29,009 29,009 65,415 1,276,729
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show OLS-regressions on the opposition level of the indicator for invalidation on the
examiner participation instrumental variable. Column (3) displays the results of an analogous OLS-regression on
the inventor level. In Columns (2) and (3), year effects for the filing of the opposed application and for the first
outcome of the opposition proceeding are included as controls. Column (4) shows a fixed-effects regression on the
first-opposition inventor-panel. Due to inventor fixed effects, application filing year and opposition outcome year
effects need not explicitly be controlled for. The post period is defined as the time window from 0 to 10 years after
opposition. The standard errors reported in columns (1) and (2) are robust to heteroskedasticity, the standard
errors in columns (3) and (4) are clustered at the opposition level.
original examiner’s participation in the opposition division significantly decreases the opposed
patent’s likelihood of invalidation by around 4-7 percentage points. This corresponds to de-
crease of about 10% relative to the average rate of invalidation. Heteroskedasticity-robust
first stage F -statistics are substantially above the common thresholds for weak instruments
(Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald F = 77.5). Thus, the instrument meets the relevance con-
dition.
The exogeneity condition is by definition untestable. However, there are a number of rea-
sons why we believe that it holds. First and most importantly, the presence of the original
examiner in the opposition division is mostly driven by the availability of other potential mem-
bers with expertise in the particular technology. Thus, staffing at the EPO seems to be the
primary driver of the original examiners’ participation in the opposition division. This is con-
firmed by interviews conducted with EPO officials (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.4). Figure 1.1
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in the appendix presents further evidence, showing the likelihood of examiner participation
over time: After the EPO introduced the “BEST” initiative to increase the number of available
patent examiners, the likelihood of having the original examiner in the opposition division
decreased substantially.23 Second, the associated parties do not know the composition of the
opposition division until the oral proceedings, i.e., the day of the decision on the opposition
outcome. Therefore, lobbying in some direction is difficult. Third, attributes of the opposed
application or the inventor have no explanatory power for examiner participation in our data:
Table B.1 in the appendix shows that conditional on grant year, outcome year, and technology
fixed effects, examiner participation in the opposition division is unrelated to a number of
important application and inventor characteristics. In summary, the participation of the origi-
nal examiner in the opposition division is likely exogenous to the future patenting activity of
inventors.
We are interested in the impacts of patent invalidation on affected inventors’ subsequent
supply of ideas to the patent system. To assess these, we estimate the following main specifi-
cation.
yi,t = β ÛInvalidatedi,t + a′t + b′t−taf + c′i + ε′i,t ,
where yi,t is the outcome under consideration of inventor i in year t relative to opposition out-
come. ÛInvalidatedi,t is the instrumented dummy variable indicating that the inventor’s patent
has been invalidated prior to year t relative to the opposition outcome, a′t is a time period fixed
effect and b′t−taf are fixed effects which indicate years relative to the application filing. These
account for life-cycle patterns in inventors’ patenting. Finally, we add inventor fixed effects c′i
which remove any variation that is constant within inventors over time, such as innate ability.
The standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the opposition level throughout the paper.
Our estimates can be interpreted as causal if conditional on inventor fixed effects and time
period specific effects, the allocation of original patent examiners to the opposition division is
exogenous to the future productivity of inventors. For the reasons outlined above, we believe
this assumption is plausible.
2.3 Results and Discussion
In this section, we present and discuss our results. We start by providing evidence on the impact
of patent invalidation on future patent applications of affected inventors. In this context,
we also test for substitution of patenting to other authorities. We then assess the impact of
invalidation on the quality of these applications. Subsequently, we investigate changes in the
direction of patenting activities by using alternative dependent variables. Finally, we assess the
23The “BEST” (“Bringing Search and Examination Together”) initiative aimed at having the search report and
examination decision made by the same examiner. For this purpose, search examiners were trained and promoted
to substantive examiners.
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Figure 2.2: Inventor patenting around the outcome of opposition, by examiner participation
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Notes: The figure shows the average number of patent applications in the years around the outcome of an inventor’s
first opposition. The blue solid line indicates inventors with opposition divisions that include the original examiner,
the orange dashed line represents examiners with divisions that do not. Absence of the original examiner in the
opposition division makes an invalidation more likely (see Table 2.2). Shaded areas indicate 90% confidence
intervals around the mean.
heterogeneity of our results through splits by applicant and inventor characteristics. In each
case, we discuss in how far our results are compatible with potential underlying mechanisms.
2.3.1 Patent Counts
Figure 2.2 shows the time series of inventor productivity, split by whether the original examiner
of the patent participates in the opposition division. Absence of the examiner is associated with
a higher likelihood of invalidation. In line with our identification assumption, in the years
leading up to the outcome of opposition, we find no visible differences in the average number
of patent applications. After the outcome, however, inventors with participating examiners are
relatively more productive. This effect starts around three years after the opposition outcome.
To assess whether these reduced-form effects are statistically significantly different from
zero and whether they are robust to the inclusion of control variables and fixed effects, we
repeat this analysis in an event-study framework. Figure 2.3 shows the time-varying reduced
form impact of examiner participation on subsequent patent filings. In line with the prior
graph, “lucky” inventors whose original examiner takes part in the opposition division sub-
sequently file more patent applications. The effect materializes after around three years, as
before. In line with the identification assumption, there are no statistically significant differ-
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Figure 2.3: Reduced form effect of examiner participation on the number of applications
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Notes: Coefficient estimates for years relative to the opposition outcome from a reduced form regression on
(inventor, year relative to opposition outcome)-level of the number of applications on the examiner partic-
ipation instrumental variable. The dependent variable yi t = Napp,i t counts the number of applications on
DOCDB family level which inventor i has filed in period t. The corresponding specification is given by yi t =∑10
τ=−10 βτ 1(Exam parti)1(t = τ) + at + bt−taf + ci + εi t . i and t are the indices for the inventor and the year
relative to opposition outcome, respectively; fixed effects are described in the main text. τ= −10, . . . , 10 denotes
years relative to opposition outcome. Error bars indicate the respective coefficient’s 95% confidence interval. Stars
at the bottom of the figure indicate the significance levels of the coefficients.
ences in patent filings before the decision of the opposition division.
Figure 2.4 shows the instrumented yearly effect of patent invalidation on the number of
applications that inventors file. Again, there is no statistically significant difference between
inventors in the treatment and in the control group before the opposition outcome. In response
to the outcome, inventors whose patent was invalidated due to the absence of the original
examiner in the opposition division file significantly fewer patent applications. The effect
starts around three years after the opposition outcome and is statistically significantly different
from zero in most years. In the appendix, Figure B.1 shows the instrumented impact of patent
invalidation on the likelihood of filing for a patent. In line with our identification assumption,
there is no differential application propensity in the years prior to the outcome of opposition.
Yet, after an invalidation, inventors are significantly less inclined to file for a patent, with the
effects being most pronounced around four years after the opposition outcome.
Table 2.3 displays the regression results of our preferred specification. Without instrument-
ing the invalidation decision, Column (1) shows the partial correlation of patent invalidation
and the number of subsequent patent applications. The inventor fixed effects regression re-
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Figure 2.4: Effect of invalidation on the number of applications
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Notes: Coefficient estimates of invalidation for years relative to opposition outcome from an instrumental variable
(2SLS) fixed effects regression on (inventor, year relative to opposition outcome)-level using Schaffer (2010). The
dependent variable yi t = Napp,i t counts the number of applications on DOCDB family level which inventor i has filed
in period t. The corresponding specification is given by yi t =
∑10
τ=−10 βτ 1(Invalidatedi)1(t = τ)+at+ bt−taf + ci+
εi t . i and t are the indices for the inventor and the year relative to opposition outcome, respectively; fixed effects
are described in the main text. The interactions are instrumented with z τi,t = 1(Examiner participationi)1(t = τ),
where τ= −10, . . . , 10 denotes years relative to opposition outcome. Error bars indicate the respective coefficient’s
95% confidence interval. Stars at the bottom of the figure indicate the significance levels of the coefficients. We
find similar results for a dummy dependent variable yi t = 1(NApp,i t > 0), indicating whether inventor i has filed a
patent application in period t (see Figure B.1 in the appendix).
turns a negative, significant coefficient of patent invalidation. Because of the potential endo-
geneity of the invalidation decision, we use the examiner participation instrumental variable
in all subsequent columns. In a first step, Column (2) shows the reduced form coefficient. The
presence the original examiner (lower likelihood of invalidation) increases subsequent patent
applications. Column (3) presents the instrumented coefficient of invalidation. It shows that
the magnitude of the effect is substantial: On average, the local average treatment effect im-
plies that inventors file half a patent less per year. The sizeable difference to the coefficient
in Column (1) indicates that an important source of endogeneity is time-varying and cannot
be controlled for by individual fixed effects. This is in line with the findings of Galasso and
Schankerman (2015, 2018). Column (4) shows that our results are robust to using the log
number of applications to account for the skewness of the dependent variable. Following in-
validation due to examiner (non-)participation, inventors file around 20% fewer patents. To
get a sense of whether the productivity effects are driven by the extensive or the intensive
margin, Column (5) shows the effect on the probability of filing a patent application at all in
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a given year. Having a patent invalidated in opposition reduces the likelihood of subsequently
filing a patent by 15 percentage points.
In principle, the decrease in patent applications after invalidation could be independent
of innovative activities and merely reflect a change in filing strategies. First, inventors, their
firms, or their patent attorneys could steer patenting away from the EPO and instead patent
directly at the desired national patent offices, avoiding a potential centralized opposition pro-
cedure. To investigate this channel, Column (6) uses the number of patent families with (Eu-
ropean) national patent applications as the dependent variable (not counting patent families
that contain EP or WIPO applications). We find no change in national patenting. Alternatively,
innovators could substitute EP patenting with WIPO’s centralized application procedure. To
investigate this possibility, the dependent variable in Column (7) counts patent families con-
taining aWIPO, but no EP application. While the point estimate is positive, it is not significantly
different from zero. Besides, its magnitude is substantially smaller than our main effects. Our
results therefore reflect an actual decrease in patent filings rather than a shift to substitute
patent authorities. Second, inventors or their firms could be more selective in choosing inven-
tions for patenting and could be more reluctant to split connected inventions into several ap-
plications. In either case, one would expect an immediate change in filing behavior. However,
Figure 2.4 shows that the invalidation effect is most pronounced 3-5 years after the opposition
outcome. This could reflect the delayed effect of a real change in innovative activities.
In the appendix, we show that our main productivity results are robust to excluding outliers
(such as the top 5% of inventors with respect to prior filings and technology areas) and to
restricting the sample to inventors who patent both before and after the opposition outcome
(Table B.5). In Table B.6, we also show that our results are unaffected by using the alternative
inventor disambiguation by Morrison et al. (2017). Finally, in Tables B.7 and B.8 we show that
findings are very similar for European and non-European inventors.
Given that we instrument invalidation by the presence of the original examiner in the op-
position division, our estimates reflect local average treatment effects. To explore whether
compliers differ from the overall population of patents in opposition, in Appendix B.2 we fol-
low Angrist and Pischke (2009) and document the relative incidence of certain applicant and
inventor characteristics among compliers. Note that in our context, compliers are inventors
whose application was invalidated because the original patent examiner did not participate
in the opposition division. Table B.2 shows the complier share, which lies at around 7% on
average. Table B.3 examines the characteristics of complier applications relative to the gen-
eral population of patents in opposition. On average, applications whose opposition outcome
changes with the examiner’s presence in the opposition division are less likely to have more
than two inventors and to receive above median citations. Their family size is larger, but this
is at the margin of statistical significance. Table B.4 conducts an analogous comparison for
inventor characteristics. Inventors of complier patents are more likely to have below median
tenure and to have filed patents in a lower number of technology areas before the invalidation.
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They have also filed fewer patents before the opposition, but the difference is insignificant. In
summary, however, complier patents do not differ substantially from the average patent in
opposition.
2.3.2 Patent Quality
While the effects on the number of patent applications are interesting in their own regard,
a goal of post-grant review systems is to increase the quality of applications to the patent
system. An assessment of the consequences of invalidations in opposition therefore critically
depends on the impact on patent quality. To this end, we explore the effect on different proxies
for patent quality in Table 2.4. We first split the dependent variable by whether subsequent
applications are linked to novelty-threatening prior art through an X-, Y-, or E-reference in the
EPO examiner’s search report. The first column shows that the number of patent applications
containing such references decreases significantly and that the effect is even stronger than the
baseline estimate. In contrast, Column (2) shows that the number of patent applications which
do not contain such references even slightly increases. Column (3) uses a standard measure of
patent quality by weighting applications with forward citations received in a five-year window
after filing. The effect is significantly negative. Column (4) repeats this exercise counting
citations only for those subsequent applications that do not contain X-, Y-, or E-references.
Here, we do not find a statistically significant effect, and the point estimate is negative.
Overall, this table shows that while invalidation in opposition decreases subsequent patent
filings, this effect is driven by a decrease in applications with novelty-threatening prior art.
This sheds a favorable light on the opposition procedure at the EPO: Following an invalidation,
inventors decrease applications that are at risk of being invalidated because of a lack of novelty
or the absence of an inventive step. This finding is in line with a positive impact of invalidation
in opposition on the average quality of subsequent filings. The effects for non-XYE-referenced
applications are ambiguous, given that the number of such applications increases significantly
while we do not find a positive impact on their forward-citations.24
In principle, shifts from patenting to secrecy25 could be driving our results, since private
incentives for nondisclosure may differ for applications at the margin of patentability. Gener-
ally, firms and inventors will prefer to keep inventions secret if the expected benefit from filing
compares unfavorably with disclosure and the risk of invalidation. Applications with X, Y, or E
search report references are likely less novel and insightful than the average patent (Harhoff
and Wagner, 2009). On the one hand, they will thus be subject to a higher risk of invalidation.
On the other hand, filing such applications will reveal little technological information to com-
petitors. Besides, as a signal about future firm strategy they should not be more informative
24In the appendix, we show in Table B.9 that our results are very similar when using the disambiguation by
Morrison et al. (2017). In Tables B.10 and B.11 we further show that our findings are similar for European and
non-European inventors.
25For an extensive review of motives to choose between patenting and secrecy, see Hall et al. (2014), who
discuss results of firm-level surveys, the theoretical literature, and empirical analyses.
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Table 2.4: Effect of invalidation: Quality of applications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Dependent variable NXYEapp N
non-XYE
app N
cit5
app N
cit5, non-XYE
app
1(Invalidated) × 1(Post) −0.637∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗ −1.633∗∗ −0.249
(0.130) (0.051) (0.718) (0.181)
Year effects (rel to oppo) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Year effects (rel to appl) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 76.9 76.9 28.3 28.3
Weak identification test 77.5 77.5 28.6 28.6
Number of oppositions 29,009 29,009 18,742 18,742
Number of inventors 65,415 65,415 42,390 42,390
Observations 1,276,729 1,276,729 811,006 811,006
Standard errors clustered at the opposition level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Column (1) shows the causal effect of invalidation on the number of applications which receive an X-, Y-, or
E-reference in the EPO examiner’s search report. Such references are indicative of potentially novelty destroying
prior art and hence constitute a proxy for subsequent failure to receive a patent grant. Column (2) presents
regression results for the number of applications which do not receive such a reference. While the number of
XYE-cited applications significantly decreases, the number of patent families, which are more likely to receive a
grant, increases. Column (3) displays the effect on the number applications weighted by the forward citations they
receive in a five-year window after filing. Column (4) uses the number of non-XYE-cited applications, weighted
by the five-year forward citation number, as the dependent variable. The citation-weighted variables in Column
(3) and (4) are winsorized at the 99th percentile to mitigate noise introduced by outliers. Without winsorizing,
we obtain coefficients of very similar magnitude, but larger standard errors. To allow for a full observation of the
citation window, the sample is truncated five years earlier, resulting in fewer observations. All variables are counted
on the DOCDB family level. The post period is defined as the time window from 0 to 10 years after opposition.
Standard errors are clustered at the opposition level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are
the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by
the xtivreg2 Stata command (Schaffer, 2010). For an analogous table using the Morrison et al. (2017) inventor
disambiguation, see Table B.9 in the appendix. For analogous tables on the subsamples of European and foreign
inventors, see Tables B.10 and B.11.
65
2. MARGINAL PATENTS AND THE SUPPLY OF IDEAS
than the average patent application. Hence, secrecy should be more attractive for inventions
that constitute a substantial technical advance (cf. Anton and Yao, 2004; Zaby, 2010). Given
that the decrease after invalidation is concentrated in applications of questionable novelty, it
seems implausible that a shift to secrecy is the main driver of the effect.
From a welfare perspective, decreases in disclosure matter, given that enhancing knowl-
edge transfer is one of the core intended benefits of the patent system (Williams, 2017). In
view of the decrease in forward-citation-weighted applications, this might be of particular
concern. However, given that the decrease in forward citations is driven by applications of
uncertain novelty, the observed forward citation patterns might reflect a replacement effect:
Subsequent applications could have also referred to closely related precedent work instead
of the non-novel application itself. In such a case, decreases in disclosure might not be a
first-order concern.
2.3.3 Direction of Patenting
In Table 2.5, we explore in how far our results can be explained by changes to the direction
of patenting. Inventors may shift their efforts to other technology areas in response to an in-
validation. Inventors could also only frame their patents differently to steer applications to
examiners from other EPO technology units. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.5 we split sub-
sequent patent applications by whether they were filed in the same area than the invalidated
patent or another area. We find similar effects for both.
Galasso and Schankerman (2018) find that after an invalidation of litigated patents, firms
decrease patenting especially when the invalidated patent was in their core technology area.
In Columns (3) and (4) we thus split our sample by whether the invalidation occurred in
the inventor’s expert technology area. We find very similar effects for both, although the
estimates are imprecise when the invalidation occurs in a different area than the inventor’s
expert technology. In line with the findings of Galasso and Schankerman (2018), the effects for
invalidations in the expert area are mostly attributable to fewer filings in the same technology
area (Column 5), which is also where most filings occur. However, we also find significant
effects for subsequent applications in other areas (Column 6).26
2.3.4 Applicant and Inventor Heterogeneity
To assess the heterogeneity of the invalidation effect on subsequent patent filings, we split
our samples by applicant and inventor characteristics. Figure 2.5 shows how results differ
with respect to patent applicants. As can be seen from the figure, the confidence bounds
of all subsamples overlap with the point estimate of the overall sample. If anything, those
firms with above median patent applications per employee are less affected than those below
the median, unlike in Galasso and Schankerman (2018). An absence of substantial effect
26In Tables B.13 and B.14 we show that these results are similar for European and non-European inventors.
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Table 2.5: Effect of invalidation: Direction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Dependent variable N same arapp N
other ar
app Napp Napp N
same ar
app N
other ar
app
Subsample Full Full Non-Expert Expert Expert Expert
1(Invalidated) × 1(Post) −0.282∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗ −0.567 −0.503∗∗∗ −0.350∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗
(0.098) (0.091) (0.365) (0.153) (0.121) (0.061)
Year effects (rel to oppo) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗
Year effects (rel to appl) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 76.9 76.9 26.5 68.4 68.4 68.4
Weak identification test 77.5 77.5 26.7 68.9 68.9 68.9
Number of oppositions 29,009 29,009 9,915 25,090 25,090 25,090
Number of inventors 65,415 65,415 15,047 50,368 50,368 50,368
Observations 1,276,729 1,276,729 291,083 985,646 985,646 985,646
Standard errors clustered at the opposition level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present the effect of invalidation on the number of applications in the same and
other technology areas as the opposed patent, respectively. Column (3) shows the invalidation effect for inventors
who experience their first opposition outside their area of expertise, i.e., outside the area in which they have filed
most patents prior to opposition outcome. Columns (4)-(6) show the effect for the complimentary subsample
of inventors whose first opposition is in their expert technology area. Column (4) presents the effect on the all
applications, Columns (5) and (6) present the effects on applications in the same and other areas as the opposed
patent, respectively. All variables are counted on the DOCDB family level. The post period is defined as the
time window from 0 to 10 years after opposition. Standard errors are clustered at the opposition level. The
underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by the xtivreg2 Stata command (Schaffer, 2010). For an
analogous table using the Morrison et al. (2017) inventor disambiguation, see Table B.12 in the appendix. For
analogous tables on the subsamples of European and foreign inventors, see Tables B.13 and B.14 in the appendix.
heterogeneity along applicant characteristics would be surprising if the impact of invalidation
on subsequent filing behavior was a function of the effect on the firm. Therefore, explanations
proposed in the literature, such as impacts on firm survival (Farre-Mensa et al., 2017; Gaulé,
2018), are unlikely to drive our effects.27 However, our results complement the finding that
firm heterogeneity only accounts for around 3-5% of the variance in inventor’s innovative
performance (Bhaskarabhatla et al., 2017).
In addition to applicant characteristics, we explore the invalidation effect’s heterogeneity
with respect to inventor characteristics. Figure 2.6 displays the results of this exercise. Here,
27Note that due to data availability and the matching process between Patstat and Orbis, sample sizes are
considerably smaller for some of the regressions, going along with weaker first-stage F -statistics (see Table B.15).
Undocumented regressions show that inventors who work for firms with available data belong to a slightly more
impacted subsample.
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Figure 2.5: Effect of invalidation on number of applications: Applicant heterogeneity
1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
IV FE coefficient
Full sample
Few app (pre)
Many app (pre)
Few employees
Many employees
Few app per employee
Many app per employee
Low revenue
High revenue
Low leverage
High leverage
Low profitability
High profitability
Full sample
Subsample A
Subsample A
Notes: Coefficient estimates of invalidation from instrumental variable (2SLS) fixed effects regressions on (inven-
tor, year relative to opposition outcome)-level using Schaffer (2010). The baseline regression on the full sample is
shown in gray, together with a dashed line for the ease of comparison. Pairs of blue and orange markers indicate
coefficients in complementary subsamples. For each pair, the sample is split at the median of an applicant char-
acteristic: the prior number of applications, the number of employees, the number of applications per employee,
revenue (deflated), leverage (defined as total liabilities over total assets), and profitability (defined as ebitda over
total assets). The dependent variable is in each case yi t = NApp,i t . Error bars indicate the respective coefficient’s
95% confidence interval. For the corresponding regression table, see Table B.15 in the appendix.
differences between subsamples are somewhat more pronounced. Inventors with a below me-
dian number of patent filings before the opposition are less impacted than those with above
median applications. Analogously, those who filed patents in a below median number of tech-
nology areas before the opposition are less affected by an invalidation. Consistently, those
having below median tenure (defined as the time since their first patent application) are less
impacted as well, even though this difference is smaller. These results do not support expla-
nations proposed in the literature, such as inventors receiving information about the quality
of their ideas (Chan et al., 2014; Azoulay et al., 2015, 2017), changes in inventor income
streams (Harhoff and Hoisl, 2007; Toivanen and Väänänen, 2012), or other impacts on inven-
tor careers such as labor mobility (Melero et al., 2017). If any of these explanations were true,
we would expect larger effects for young and inexperienced inventors who are still uncertain
about their productivity and who still have their careers ahead of them. However, if anything,
our results point towards these inventors being less affected by invalidations.
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Figure 2.6: Effect of invalidation on number of applications: Inventor heterogeneity
1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
IV FE coefficient
Full sample
Non-European inventor
European inventor
Short tenure
Long tenure
Few app (pre)
Many app (pre)
Few app (pre) in same area
Many app (pre) in same area
Few app (pre) of coauthors
Many app (pre) of coauthors
Few tech areas (pre)
Many tech areas (pre)
Multiple-inventor opp
Single-inventor opp
Opp in non-expert tech area
Opp in expert tech area
Full sample
Subsample A
Subsample A
Notes: Analogous to Figure 2.5, but using inventor instead of applicant characteristics. The IV FE coefficient of
1(Invalidatedi)1(Postt) is shown for the full sample (gray, dashed gray line), and for sample splits by inventor
origin, tenure, number of applications, number of applications in the same technology area as the opposed patent,
co-inventor patenting experience, number of technology areas in prior applications, and by whether the opposition
occurred in the inventor’s area of expertise, i.e., the area in which she has filed most patents prior to opposition
outcome. The dependent variable is in each case yi t = NApp,i t . Error bars indicate the respective coefficient’s 95%
confidence interval. For the corresponding regression table, see Table B.16 in the appendix.
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2.4 Conclusion
We study the impact of patent invalidation during post-grant review on affected inventors’
subsequent patenting. In this context, patent opposition at the European Patent Office provides
a unique setting for causal identification. It is inexpensive and frequent, rendering our sample
much less selective than those in previous work. In addition, the rich EPO data allows us to
study responses in more detail. To identify causal effects, we leverage the random participation
of the patent’s original examiner in the opposition division as an instrumental variable for
invalidation. The presence of original examiners decreases the likelihood of invalidation and
is largely driven by the availability of other qualified personnel at the EPO.
Our results show that inventors file fewer patents in response to an invalidation. This
effect is driven by a decrease in the number of subsequent applications associated with novelty-
threatening prior art. It thus appears unlikely that a shift towards secrecy fully explains the
results. We can further exclude that we observe a mere substitution of patenting at the EPO –
the effect is not driven by patenting shifts to national authorities or the WIPO. If firm success
was driving the invalidation effect, differences across applicants would be likely. However, our
findings apply broadly throughout the sample, without strong heterogeneities along applicant
characteristics. Our data points to slight differences for inexperienced inventors, who appear
to be less impacted by an invalidation. If inventor mobility or signals about inventor or idea
quality were mainly underlying the effect, we would expect the opposite. Assessing the relative
importance of different channels of the invalidation effect may constitute an interesting avenue
for future work.
Being one of the first to provide evidence on the consequences of patent invalidation for
individual inventors, this paper complements recent research on the firm level. Importantly,
our study further contributes to the assessment of social costs and benefits of post-grant review.
Despite having gained substantial interest, empirical evidence on the impacts of opposition
procedures remains scarce. While invalidations in opposition seem to decrease the quantity
of inventors’ subsequent applications, we find that the effect is concentrated in low-quality
filings. From this angle, post-grant review at the EPO appears to benefit the patent system.
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Selection of Patents for Litigation
Inferring the Distribution of Patent Quality
3.1 Introduction
To provide ex-ante incentives to technological innovators, most countries rely on patents. In
principle, by granting a temporary monopoly right, under-provision of non-excludable inven-
tions is mitigated. However, concomitant deadweight loss and slower economic growth may
outweigh social benefits if existing patent rights stifle competition and hinder subsequent in-
novation. This concern is of particular relevance for patents of dubitable quality, of insufficient
inventive step, or of indeterminate scope. Patents comprising negligible advances can create
harmful uncertainty for competing innovators, when an accurate assessment of legal stability
is elusive. Even if expectations can consistently be formed, substantial risk arises for com-
petitors from unjustified infringement suit, from costs associated with licensing or inventing
around, and from increased search costs. While it is no surprise that the quality of granted
patents has been subject to substantial debate in recent years1, results illuminating the un-
derlying validity distribution remain scarce. To a large extent, this is a consequence of the
fact that only around 1% of all patents are ever scrutinized in nullity proceedings.2 The high
1See for example Federal Trade Commission (2003); Lemley and Shapiro (2005); Jaffe and Lerner (2007);
Farrell and Shapiro (2008); Bessen and Meurer (2008); Hilty (2009); Mann and Underweiser (2012); Henkel and
Zischka (2016); Schankerman and Schuett (2016).
2See Section 3.8 and Footnote 34 for a detailed description of the legal institutional framework in Germany.
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invalidation rates observed in court rulings may thus be a result of substantial selection, and
a poor estimator for quality in the patent population.
This paper characterizes latent properties of the patent litigation system and studies the
prevalence of low-quality patents. To this end, I develop and calibrate a divergent expectations
model3 of the selection of patents for litigation. To overcome the difficulties of extrapolation
outlined above, patent heterogeneity is represented in amulti-dimensional fashion, comprising
both legal stability and value. In the model, a patent holder, whose intellectual property grants
him exclusion rights in a Cournot product market, is faced with a symmetric competitor. While
the associated monopoly and duopoly rents are known exactly, both parties observe the focal
patent’s inventive step with error, leading to value-dependent divergent expectations about its
validity.4 In a first stage, the potential infringer decides whether to enter the market protected
by the focal patent. Disputes are thus endogenous. In a second stage, resembling the setting
developed by Priest and Klein (1984), the two parties can either come to a settlement of their
dispute, or enter litigation if expectations are sufficiently diverse given the commercial value
of the patented invention. Courts then reveal the true inventive step5, and judge a patent to be
valid or invalid. The resulting market structure is either a monopoly, if the competitor chooses
not to enter or if the patent is judged valid and infringed, or a duopoly, if the dispute is settled
or if the patent is invalidated.
To characterize the actual state of the patent litigation system, I exploit the imposed struc-
ture of the model and calibrate its parameters to reproduce litigation and invalidation rates
observed for German (DE) patents and the German components of European (EP) bundle
patents. Of the around 1% of DE and EP patents which become subject of an nullity suit, more
than three quarters are judged fully or partially invalid by the German Federal Patent Court
(Bundespatentgericht, BPatG) (Hess et al., 2014).6
The main results of the study are the following. First, the share of latently invalid patents
is considerably lower for the patent population in its entirety (35-50%) than for the subsam-
ples of settled (90-92%) and litigated patents (75%, fixed at empirical rate). I define patents
to be “latently invalid,” which have successfully passed examination at the patent office, but
which would be fully or partially invalidated in court if they became subject of annulment
proceedings. This result contrasts related findings in the literature, in which estimates range
from 65% to above 80% (Henkel and Zischka, 2016; Schankerman and Schuett, 2016).7 Con-
sequently, the present paper challenges conclusions relating to the inefficiency of the patent
3The divergent expectations framework was originally developed by Priest and Klein (1984).
4All probability distributions are common knowledge, uncertainty about them is not part of the model. Parties
are thus able to form consistent expectations.
5Whether one views courts to reveal or to define the true inventive step, is only a semantic matter. See the
discussion in Section 3.8 for details.
6Hess et al. (2014) do not find significant differences in the invalidation rates for German patents and the
German components of European bundle patents. Henkel and Zischka (2016) report very similar invalidation
rates for first instance (BPatG), second instance (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) and combined first or second instance
decisions.
7I will return to a discussion of potential origins of these differences in Section 3.5.
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office in weeding out applications of poor quality. A latent invalidity rate of about 40% instead
of 80% leaves considerably more room for the view that patent offices may be operating within
the range of a socially optimal “rational ignorance” of true validity (Lemley, 2001).
Second, a ceteris paribus simulation of policy reform shows that raising the courts’ judg-
ment threshold for validity is effective in stimulating entry of competitors to otherwise mo-
nopolistic product markets. Third, while such reform is predicted to go along with increased
litigation rates, its adverse impact can be dissolved by raising court fees in a feasible manner.
Fourth, the calibrated model displays substantial selection with respect to patented inven-
tion value, in line with findings in the empirical literature (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001,
2003; Harhoff et al., 2003a). Patents that never become subject of a dispute, due to lack of
market entry, constitute the majority of all patents (75%). Corresponding patented invention
values average to 0.76 of the population mean. Settled patents (24%) have a value of about
1.4 times the average. While this is already indicative of selection with respect to value, it
becomes substantial for litigated patents. Their average patented invention value is 8.7 times
higher than the population mean. Furthermore, the model predicts that patents with an in-
vention value below a threshold of approximately 400 ke never enter litigation. Especially the
latter prediction may be testable in future empirical work.
Limitations of the pursued approach include the abstraction from bifurcated courts for in-
fringement and invalidation (as in the German system), from patent thicket structures, from
asymmetric litigants and non-practicing patent holders, from licensing to downstream firms,
and from systematically varying legal and settlement costs. Further calibrations exploring
heterogeneity across technology areas with different litigation and invalidity rates and across
jurisdictions with alternative rules for the allocation of legal costs, constitute interesting av-
enues for future research. In addition, a comprehensive welfare assessment requires the de-
velopment of a holistic general equilibrium model, comprising an explicit representation of
input factors and knowledge production functions.
The present paper is related to different strands of literature. It relates most closely to
recent work on the optimal structure of examination at the patent office, pre- and post-grant
fees, and challenges in courts by Schankerman and Schuett (2016). The authors find that
pre-grant fees are more effective in deterring low-quality applications than post-grant fees.
Calibrations of their model to US data suggest that patenting is socially excessive, and that
examination at the patent office does not eliminate low-grade patents. With regard to patent
litigation in particular, the following studies are related to the research agenda of this paper.
Crampes and Langinier (2002) develop a model of patent litigation with endogenous monitor-
ing effort of the patent holder and an endogenous entry decision of the imitator and analyze it
in both simultaneous and sequential game frameworks. Also focusing on an endogenous selec-
tion of disputes, Bessen and Meurer (2006) set out a model in which the incumbent’s and the
entrant’s investments modify the probability distribution of successful suit in their favor, and
derive empirically testable implications. Farrell and Shapiro (2008) study the welfare implica-
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tions of determining patent validity prior to licensing as compared to “probabilistic patents”8
which are valid with a certain probability only. Their model describes licensing to downstream
oligopolists, with royalty rates dependent on patent strength. A divergent expectations model
in the context of patent licensing is developed by Marco and Walsh (2006). The authors find
that asymmetric stakes do not substantially impact litigation and invalidation rates. Meurer
(1989) devises a model of patent litigation and settlement with asymmetric information and
discusses implications for patent licensing. A less closely related model discussing informa-
tional spillovers from patent litigation in the context of multiple firm entry is developed by
Choi (1998). In the larger context of litigation theory, Priest and Klein (1984) develop a
model for the selection of disputes for litigation, as opposed to settlement. Conditional on
the true characteristics of the dispute relative to a given legal standard, both parties form
independent expectations of the likelihood of plaintiff and defendant verdicts. The negotia-
tion stage of the present paper’s model is based on this framework of divergent expectations.9
Bebchuk (1984) studies a model of litigation and settlement under informational asymmetry
and explores how the respective likelihoods change under different assumptions for stakes,
the nature of information, and the allocation of litigation costs.10
Concerning empirical approaches, a study by Henkel and Zischka (2016) poses the most
closely related research question. It examines correlates of selection into first and second
instance annulment proceedings11 and estimates shares of latent invalidity for the patent pop-
ulation. The authors conduct interviews and surveys among experts and legal practitioners,
from which they deduce that patents entering annulment proceedings are comparably likely to
be revoked as an average patent. This approach is supplemented by estimating Heckman selec-
tion models on a dataset of BPatG and BGH court decisions.12 Out-of-sample predictions for a
set of matched patents unchallenged in annulment proceedings13 suggest that the share of la-
tently invalid patents in the patent population is larger than 80%. De Rassenfosse et al. (2016)
compile a sample of patents filed in at least two of the five largest patent offices. To account for
differences in the offices’ validity thresholds, they estimate a latent variable model. They find
single-digit rates of “weak” patents that are inconsistently granted with regard to the respec-
tive office’s threshold. However, in addition to thresholds, patent offices are hardly comparable
in their general examination procedure, e.g., concerning refusals and options for deferment.
8For a discussion of “probabilistic patents” also see Lemley and Shapiro (2005).
9For empirical tests of the Priest and Klein (1984) model across different case types, see Siegelman andWaldfo-
gel (1999). For intellectual property cases, the authors find that structural estimates of the Priest and Klein (1984)
model are in accordance with independent measures of the model parameters.
10For an empirical comparison of the divergent expectations and the asymmetric information frameworks, see
Waldfogel (1998).
11The first instance being the German Federal Patent Court (BPatG) and the second instance being the German
Federal Court of Justice (BGH).
12For identification, the authors leverage the size of the defendant, claiming that this variable is highly relevant
for the selection equation, while it does not enter the outcome equation. The authors do not find a significant
effect of the Heckman correction.
13The matching is based on the patents’ application filing month. Plaintiff size variables are adjusted to the
average of adjudicated patents.
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Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) compile a dataset of patents litigated at US district courts
and show that the likelihoods of nullity and infringement suits significantly increase with the
number of claims and the number of forward citations per claim. This result is consistent
with the finding of this paper that particularly valuable patents become subject of litigation.
Similar results have been obtained for patents challenged in post-grant opposition (Harhoff
and Reitzig, 2004). Allison et al. (2004) study characteristics of valuable patents under the
presumption that litigated patents are a subset of the most valuable. Marco (2004) estimates
win rates for patent validity and infringement suits based on observable patent characteristics.
He finds that selection biases the win rate in validity, but not in infringement proceedings. So-
maya (2003) provides evidence that asymmetric (“strategic”) stakes increase the likelihood of
non-settlement. Cremers et al. (2017) compare cases of patent litigation across four European
countries, finding differences in caseloads and outcomes, as well as inconsistency of verdicts
for patents litigated in multiple jurisdictions. Concerning differences among litigated patents,
Allison et al. (2009) find that the most-litigated patents differ significantly from patents liti-
gated only once, with respect to technology area, proxies of value, and applicant type. Lanjouw
and Lerner (2000) review empirical work on the enforcement of intellectual property rights
in the context of a stylized model of the patent litigation process. An extensive review of both
theoretical and empirical results is given by Weatherall and Webster (2014).
This paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, it complements prior work on
the economics of the patent litigation system (e.g., Crampes and Langinier, 2002; Bessen and
Meurer, 2006) by characterizing latent properties and the resulting selectionmechanics. While
previous studies have mostly focused on either theoretical modeling or descriptive empirics,
this paper develops a structural model that can reproduce empirical outcome rates of patent
disputes. It provides new insights concerning patent validity, and its interaction with selection
into litigation, where prior evidence is scarce. At the same time, it confirms well-established
empirical findings identifying patent value as a driver of litigation propensity (Lanjouw and
Schankerman, 2001, 2003; Harhoff et al., 2003a). The model allows to disentangle origins of
selection: Calibration results suggest that separate stages drive the selection with respect to
validity and value.
Second, the study contributes to the literature by reassessing the prevalence of low-quality
patents. A considerable amount of prior work has investigated theoretical repercussions of
exclusion rights with questionable validity. In contrast, evidence concerning the extent of the
problem remains scarce (Schankerman and Schuett, 2016; Henkel and Zischka, 2016). To
narrow this gap, this paper suggests a novel approach to estimate the rate of latent invalidity
in the patent population. The results may serve as a benchmark for policy makers and practi-
tioners, for instance, in assessing whether examination at the patent office is effective (Lemley,
2001) and to what extent the presumption of validity in litigation is reasonable (Lichtman and
Lemley, 2007).
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 develops a structural
theoretical model of the selection process. A sketch of the model’s solution is subsequently
presented in Section 3.3.14 Section 3.4 presents a calibration of the model to empirically
observable outcome rates of the patent litigation system. Based on the fitted parameters,
Section 3.5 is concerned with the prediction of unobservable characteristics, most prominently
the share of latently invalid patents in the population. Section 3.6 examines the sensitivity of
the model calibration when varying parametric assumptions. Section 3.7 studies the simulated
impact of policy reformwith respect to the courts’ validity threshold and litigation cost. Section
3.8 discusses limitations of the approach and proposes directions for further research. Section
3.9 concludes.
3.2 A Model of the Selection of Patents for Litigation
To model the selection of patents for litigation, I devise a divergent expectations model based
on the framework developed by Priest and Klein (1984). In order to keep the model estimable,
I prioritize procedural elements of prime importance for the selection mechanics, while ab-
stracting from second-order institutional details. The model thus features comprehensive rep-
resentations of patent validity and value, and separates the entry and the negotiation stages.
In contrast, it abstracts from heterogeneous product market structures and the separation of
infringement and annulment proceedings (“bifurcation”), among others. In the following, I
introduce the model’s structure and assumptions in a concise and straightforward way. See
Section 3.8 for a detailed comparison of the model and the institutional setting in Germany
and Europe and for a comprehensive discussion of the model’s limitations.
Figure 3.1 shows the general structure of the model. First, a patent is drawn from the
population and subsequently observed with error by both the patent owner (potential future
plaintiff, p) and the potential infringer (future defendant, d).15 In the second stage, the poten-
tial infringer decides whether to enter the market and to (potentially) infringe the patent. The
decision is based on the expected profits given his observations, taking possible litigation into
account. Finally, in the third stage, the parties come to a settlement if the plaintiff’s minimum
settlement demand A is below the defendant’s maximum settlement offer B, or enter litigation
otherwise. When forming expectations about litigation in court, parties take their respective
observations into account. The judgment can have the outcomes “patent valid and infringed,”
which corresponds to the plaintiff winning, “patent valid and not infringed” or “patent invalid,”
which correspond to the defendant winning, with pc being the exogenous probability that a
14A detailed derivation of the analytical results can be found in Appendix C.1.
15The parties’ roles in trial are meant with respect to the infringement proceeding, in which the patent owner is
the plaintiff and the potential infringer is the defendant. While the two switch roles in an annulment proceeding, I
will keep referring to the parties with respect to their role in the infringement proceeding throughout the paper, to
avoid confusion. Besides, I will use the female gender for the patent holder and the male gender for the potential
infringer.
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valid patent is considered infringed.
In the model, a patent is characterized by two features: (i) the inventive step ıˆ and (ii)
the value vˆ associated with the patented invention. Concerning the requirements for a patent,
article 52 of the European Patent Convention states that “patents shall be granted for any in-
ventions, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
susceptible of industrial application” (EPO, 1973). Consequently, from a formal point of view,
patentability is a multi-dimensional concept. Accordingly, the European Patent Office’s (EPO)
guidelines for examination treat novelty and inventive step16 as distinct criteria (EPO, 2017,
Part G, Chapters VI and VII). Nonetheless, the question for the presence of an inventive step is
meant to arise only if the invention is novel (cf. G-VII, 1). Besides, the existence of an industrial
application is a rather low hurdle for the patentee, excluding only few inventions beyond the
other requirements (EPO Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 2018). In favor of simplicity, I thus
abstract from the multi-dimensionality of patent validity. Instead, I employ a one-dimensional
random variable ıˆ : Ω → R that represents a patent’s inventive step relative to the state of
the art i0 ≡ 0, where I denote the probability space as (Ω,F ,P). ıˆ combines the notions of
novelty and inventive step: If ıˆ < i0, the patented invention does not constitute a novel and
sufficient departure from the state of the art. As such, the one-dimensional conceptualization
of validity is in line with reasons for invalidity judgments observed for German and European
patents at the German Federal Patent Court. A large majority of annulments is effected on
the grounds of a lack of inventive step (53%) or a lack of novelty (20%) (Hess et al., 2014).
Besides the inventive step, a patent’s selection for litigation may be determined by its value.
In the model, patented invention value vˆ is defined as the profits made by a monopolist based
on her enforced exclusion right. This has to be distinguished from the value of the patent right
as such, which is given by the difference in profits from an invention with and without patent
protection. See Section 3.4.3 for a description of how this distinction is operationalized in the
calibration of the model.
Stage 1: Patent Population
In a first step, a patent with a true inventive step ıˆ and a patented invention value vˆ, which are
independent random variables, is drawn from the population.17 Subsequently, the inventive
step is observed with error, by both the plaintiff and the defendant, ıˆp = ıˆ+ ϵˆp and ıˆd = ıˆ+ ϵˆd ,
where ϵˆp and ϵˆd are once again independent random variables. During litigation in court, the
true inventive step is revealed and the patent will be considered valid if its inventive step is
above the (exogenously given) state of the art i0, i.e. if ıˆ ≥ i0. We are free to choose i0 ≡ 0,
since only the inventive step relative to the state of the art will be relevant.
16In US patent law, the conceptual analogue to the “inventive step” criterion is called “non-obviousness.”
17See Section 3.8 for a discussion of the independence assumption.
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Figure 3.1: Model structure
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Notes: Stage 1: A patent’s inventive step ıˆ, the plaintiff’s (p) and the defendant’s (d) respective assessment errors
ϵˆp and ϵˆd , and patented invention value vˆ are drawn by nature, with the underlying distributions being common
knowledge. p and d observe the inventive step with error, while they correctly assess the value of the patented
invention. Stage 2: d enters the market if, given his information, he can expect higher profits pid than in the case
of not entering. Stage 3: If p’s minimum settlement demand A(ˆıp, vˆ) is below or equal to d ’s maximum settlement
offer B(ˆıd , vˆ), the parties come to an agreement with respective negotiation costs of Sp and Sd , otherwise enter
litigation. In case of a settlement, d pays an amount Lˆ ∈ [A(ˆıp, vˆ),B(ˆıd , vˆ)] to p and in turn obtains a license.
V2(vˆ) denotes the (symmetric) duopoly profits of p and d, respectively. In case the parties do not settle due to
divergent expectations resulting from different observations ıˆp and ıˆd , the court verdict can have three different
outcomes. First, the patent can be valid and infringed, resulting in a compensation payment by d to p, such that
p is reimbursed for the losses incurred after d ’s entry prior to dispute. Second, the patent can be judged valid, but
not infringed, or third, it can be judged invalid, both cases resulting in a duopoly with p having to bear the total
legal cost C (British Rule). J˜(vˆ) denotes the compensation payment net of d ’s pre-dispute duopoly profits.
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Stage 2: Entry Decision
The potential defendant will enter the market if the expected profits given his observations are
larger than the profits in the case of not entering the market (pid = 0),
E[pid | ıˆd , vˆ, entry]
= P(A(ˆıp, vˆ)≤ B(ˆıd , vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⇒ settlement if entry
| ıˆd , vˆ)

V2(vˆ)− Sd − Lˆ

+ P(A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⇒ litigation if entry
, valid | ıˆd , vˆ)

pc (−J˜(vˆ)− C) + (1− pc)V2(vˆ)

+ P(A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ), invalid | ıˆd , vˆ) V2(vˆ)− Centry
> 0 . (3.1)
The conditional expected profits are composed of the profits in case of settlement, the profits
in case of litigation with a valid patent, and the profits in case of litigation with an invalid
patent, times the respective conditional probabilities, minus market entry costs. A(ˆıp, vˆ) is the
plaintiff’s minimum settlement demand (asking price), B(ˆıd , vˆ) is the defendant’s maximum
settlement offer (bidding price). For the case of a settlement, A(ˆıp, vˆ)≤ B(ˆıd , vˆ), d can expect
profits V2(vˆ) − Sd − Lˆ, where V2(vˆ) denotes the profits each competitor makes in a duopoly
setting, Sd denotes d ’s settlement costs, and Lˆ ∈ [A(ˆıp, vˆ),B(ˆıd , vˆ)] denotes the licensing fee.
Patented invention value vˆ represents monopoly profits. Assuming that competition can be
modeled as a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand,18 it follows that in an oligopoly with n
firms, each makes profits of Vn(vˆ) = 4vˆ/(n+ 1)2. Consequently, in a symmetric duopoly,
V2(vˆ) =
4
9
vˆ . (3.3)
For the case of litigation, A(ˆıp, vˆ) > B(ˆıd , vˆ), there are three possible verdict outcomes.
First, the patent may be valid, ıˆ ≥ i0, and considered infringed by the court, in which case
18 For the linear Cournot setting, I assume that the price of the final good is given by p = a− b∑ni=1 x i , where x i
denotes the quantity supplied by firm i. The corresponding profit is pii = (p− c)x i , where c are the firm’s marginal
production costs (equal for all firms, since all use the same technology described in the patent). Each firm seeks
to maximize profits, 0
!
= ∂ pii/∂ x i , resulting in an optimal quantity of x∗i = (a − c)/2b − 1/2
∑
j, j ̸=i x j . In Nash
Equilibrium, all firms achieve this goal, playing mutually best responses. In a symmetric equilibrium, each firm
produces x∗ = (a− c)/b(n+1) and makes profits of pin,∗(x∗) = (a− c)2/b(n+1)2. Rewritten in terms of monopoly
profits pi1,∗ = (a− c)2/4, I thus obtain
pin,∗ = 4
(n+ 1)2
pi1,∗ . (3.2)
Total oligopoly profits decline with increasing n, pitotal =
∑n
i=1pi
n,∗ = npin,∗ = 4n(n+1)2 pi
1,∗.
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the defendant has to pay a compensation J(vˆ) to the plaintiff and in addition has to bear the
total legal cost C . I assume valid patents to be considered infringed by the court with the
exogenous probability pc . If the judgment does not include any additional fines, J(vˆ) will
be chosen such that the patent owner is compensated for the losses incurred due to illegal
infringement. These losses are equal to the difference between the profits in the (symmetric)
duopoly and the monopoly profits of the patent holder. Consequently, for the linear Cournot
duopoly I obtain
J(vˆ) =
t¯
T
(vˆ − V2(vˆ)) = t¯T
5
9
vˆ , (3.4)
where t¯ is the average time the defendant can make duopoly profits – either before he is
detected and a court order is issued or before a settlement is agreed upon. T denotes the legal
patent lifetime. In Eq. (3.1) and in Figure 3.1, J˜(vˆ) denotes the compensation the defendant
has to pay to the plaintiff if convicted of infringement, net of his average profits prior to dispute,
which are given by t¯ V2(vˆ)/T . Hence, for the linear Cournot setting,
J˜(vˆ) = J(vˆ)− t¯
T
V2(vˆ) =
t¯
T
(vˆ − 2V2(vˆ)) = t¯T
1
9
vˆ . (3.5)
Second, the patent may be valid, yet not considered infringed, in which case the suit is unsuc-
cessful, enabling the defendant to make duopoly profits V2(vˆ) for the patent’s entire lifetime
without any payment obligations. The legal expenses C are in this case borne by the plaintiff.
Third, the patent may be invalid, ıˆ < i0, the profit outcomes of which are assumed equivalent
to the previous case, i.e., duopoly profits V2(vˆ) for both parties, with the legal cost paid by the
plaintiff.
Figure 3.2 shows E[pid | ıˆd = id , vˆ = v, entry] as a function of id for the distributional
assumptions and the parameters obtained in Section 3.4.
Stage 3: Litigation and Settlement
The negotiation stage is based on the divergent expectations framework developed by Priest
and Klein (1984). The plaintiff and the defendant will be able to settle if the plaintiff’s mini-
mum settlement demand A(ˆıp, vˆ) (asking price) is below or equal to the defendant’s maximum
settlement offer B(ˆıd , vˆ) (bidding price), i.e., if A(ˆıp, vˆ)≤ B(ˆıd , vˆ). If however, due to different
observations of the inventive step and resulting divergent expectations, p’s minimum settle-
ment demand exceeds d ’s maximum settlement offer, A(ˆıp, vˆ) > B(ˆıd , vˆ), the parties will not
come to an agreement and the patent will enter litigation.
Successful settlement negotiations involve costs Sp and Sd for the plaintiff and the defen-
dant, respectively. As part of an agreement, the defendant pays a fee Lˆ ∈ [A(ˆıp, vˆ),B(ˆıd , vˆ)] to
the plaintiff and in return obtains a license enabling him to make duopoly profits. I assume the
patent owner to hold sufficient bargaining power to achieve a licensing payment Lˆ = B(ˆıd , vˆ)
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Figure 3.2: Expected profits (potential infringer)
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Notes: Expected profits of the defendant in case of entry, E[pid | ıˆd = id , vˆ = v, entry], as a function of the
observed inventive step id for different patented invention values v. Distributional assumptions and parameters
are chosen according to Section 3.4. The short vertical lines crossing the zero-profit line indicate the root imaxd (v)
of E[pid | ıˆd = id , vˆ = v, entry], as defined in Appendix C.1.3. The roots define the maximum value of ıˆd , for which
d will still enter the market given vˆ.
whenever A(ˆıp, vˆ) ≤ B(ˆıd , vˆ). If the parties cannot settle, the patent enters litigation. In case
of an unsuccessful suit, either through invalidation of the patent or a no-infringement verdict,
the defendant continues to make duopoly profits for the rest of the patent lifetime without
any payment obligations, while the plaintiff has to bear the total legal costs. In contrast, in
case of a successful suit, the plaintiff can sustain his monopoly position and is reimbursed for
the profits lost prior to the dispute, whereas the defendant is obliged to pay for the total legal
expenses (British Rule).
To abstain from filing suit against the defendant, the plaintiff will demand at least the
difference in expected gains from litigation and from settlement. Settlement results in deter-
ministic gains pisetp = V2(vˆ)− Sp, i.e., duopoly profits minus settlement cost. In contrast, the
expected gains from litigation E[pilitp | ıˆp, vˆ, entry] depend on p’s information at this point: her
observation (ˆıp, vˆ) and the fact that d has entered the market. Hence,
A(ˆıp, vˆ) = E[pi
lit
p | ıˆp, vˆ, entry]−pisetp
= Rlit +P(valid | ıˆp, vˆ, entry)
 
pc vˆ + (1− pc)(V2(vˆ)− C)

+P(invalid | ıˆp, vˆ, entry)
 
V2(vˆ)− C
−  V2(vˆ)− Sp
= P(valid | ıˆp, vˆ, entry) pc
 
vˆ − V2(vˆ) + C

+ Sp − C + Rlit . (3.6)
The exogenous parameter Rlit represents the plaintiff’s gain from building a reputation for
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litigiousness (in monetary terms) when entering litigation. In other words, it is the value the
plaintiff (consciously or unconsciously) assigns to scaring off potential future infringers.19 The
final expression for A(ˆıp, vˆ) in Eq. (3.6) can be interpreted in terms of relative payouts: In case
of a settlement, legal costs never have to be paid, but settlement costs always occur. In case of
litigation, the only time the plaintiff does not have to pay the legal expenses is if he wins the
case, i.e., if the patent is valid and considered infringed. Compared to a settlement and the
other litigation outcomes, he then also makes additional profits of vˆ − V2(vˆ).
At the same time, to avoid litigation the defendant will offer no more than his gain pisetd
from settlement minus the expected gain E[pilitd | ıˆd , vˆ] from litigation (given his information
in the situation after entering the market). In other words, he offers at most the expected loss
due to litigation as compared to a settlement,
B(ˆıd , vˆ) = pi
set
d − E[pilitd | ıˆd , vˆ]
= V2(vˆ)− Sd −P(valid | ıˆd)
 
pc(−J˜(vˆ)− C) + (1− pc)V2(vˆ)

−P(invalid | ıˆd)V2(vˆ)
= P(valid | ıˆd) pc
 
V2(vˆ) + J˜(vˆ) + C
− Sd . (3.7)
The final expression has an intuitive interpretation: Compared to a settlement, which will
always induce costs of Sd , the defendant loses the amount V2(vˆ)+ J˜(vˆ)+C if he loses the case,
i.e., if the patent is valid and if he is convicted of infringement. Except for settlement costs,
the other litigation outcomes (patent valid, yet no infringement verdict, and patent invalid)
are equivalent to settlement from the defendant’s perspective: There is no compensation to be
paid, legal costs are covered by the plaintiff, and duopoly profits can be made for the entire
lifetime of the patent.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the probabilities P(valid | ıˆd = id) and P(valid | ıˆp = ip, vˆ =
v, entry) as functions of id and ip, respectively.20 To form an expectation about validity, the
entrant can only draw from his observation ıˆd of the inventive step (cf. Eq. (C.11) in Appendix
C.1.3). In contrast, the patent holder can draw from an additional piece of information: She
has observed that the potential infringer has entered the market. Hence, she can to a certain
degree infer the inventive step ıˆd the entrant has observed. Since entry is dependent on the
relation of ıˆd and vˆ, her validity estimate is thus also a function of value (see Eq. (C.17)).
Figure 3.4 shows P(valid | ıˆp = ip, vˆ = v, entry) as a function of ip for different patented
invention values v.
Figure 3.5 helps to form an intuition for how the outcome (indicated by colored/hatched
areas) depends on the parties’ observations. The panels depict the dependence on observed
inventive steps (ˆıp, ıˆd) for a series of patented invention values vˆ. It is evident that the selection
19For a discussion of reputation building in patent litigation, see e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) and
Agarwal et al. (2009).
20The underlying distributional assumptions and parameters are derived in Section 3.4.
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Figure 3.3: Expected validity (potential infringer)
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Notes: Probability for the patent to be valid given d ’s information, P(valid | ıˆd = id) = Fϵd (id − i0), as a function
of id , for the distributional assumptions and parameters derived in Section 3.4. Since the error is assumed to be
non-negative, the probability that the patent is valid is zero for ıˆd < i0 ≡ 0. For large ıˆd , the probability converges
to one. See also Appendix C.1.3.
Figure 3.4: Expected validity (patent holder)
0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
ip
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
P
(v
al
id
i p
,v
,e
nt
ry
)
v = 200
v = 160
v = 120
v = 80
v = 40
Notes: Probability for the patent to be valid given p’s information, P(valid | ıˆp = ip, vˆ = v, entry), as a function of
ip for different patented invention values v. Distributions and parameters are again chosen according to Section
3.4. In contrast to P(valid | ıˆd = id) depicted in Figure 3.3, the probabilities do not converge to one for ip →∞.
This is due to the additional information p has, namely the fact that he has already observed the entry of d and
may thus deduce ıˆd ≤ imaxd (v).
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Figure 3.5: Outcomes – Interaction of patented invention value and inventive step observa-
tions
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Notes: The panels depict (ip, id)-planes for different patented invention values v. Red hatched shading indicates
situations where no entry occurs, green shading indicates settlement outcomes and blue cross-hatched shading
litigation. For patented inventions of value v = 10 ke and v = 200 ke the decision between no entry and a
settlement is entirely due to the defendant’s perception ıˆd , while litigation never occurs. For increasing patented
invention value, the probability for no entry decreases, while settlement and litigation occur in a larger number of
cases. The straight horizontal line separating the red and the green regions is precisely given by imaxd (v) and the
dotted line separating the green and the blue regions by iminp (id , v), both of which are defined in Appendix C.1.3.
The dashed and dashed-dotted lines in the v = 10 panel indicate the (rescaled) probability density functions of ıˆp
and ıˆd , respectively.
to different outcomes is determined by the interplay of ıˆp, ıˆd , and vˆ. A few observations are
noteworthy. First, entry only depends on the potential infringer’s observations, ıˆd and vˆ. For
larger values vˆ, his decision threshold imaxd is shifted upwards. Second, litigation never takes
place for patents of low value (first two panels). For increasing patented invention value,
however, it occurs for an extending region of (ˆıp, ıˆd) pairs. The location of these regions in the
lower right corner is intuitive: Parties are unable to settle if the patent holder observes a large
inventive step ıˆp, while the entrant considers the patent to be likely invalid. In the opposite
case of divergent expectations, where the potential infringer observes a large inventive step ıˆd ,
no entry occurs. The dashed and dashed-dotted lines in the first panel indicate the probability
density functions of ıˆp and ıˆd , respectively.
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3.3 Model Solution
Given the vector of parameters of the model, predictions for aggregate quantities can in prin-
ciple be derived in a straightforward fashion. The purpose of this section will be to develop
an intuition for how one may proceed and where potential difficulties and pitfalls may arise.
A comprehensive list of all relevant analytical results is given in Appendix C.1.
As an example, consider the probability that a patent is invalid given that it is subject to
litigation, P(invalid | litigation). By the definition of conditional probability,
P(invalid | litigation) = P(invalid∧ litigation)
P(litigation)
. (3.1)
For litigation to take place, two conditions have to be met. First, the defendant has to enter the
market, which he does if his expected profits are larger than in the case of not entering, E[pid |
ıˆd , vˆ, entry] > 0. Second, the parties should not be able to settle, i.e., the plaintiff’s asking
price should be larger than the defendant’s bidding price, A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ). The denominator
is thus given by
P(litigation) =
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)
∫ ∞
−∞
di fi(i)∫ ∞
0
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)
∫ ∞
0
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)1E[pid |id=i+ϵd , v, entry]>01A(ip ,v)>B(id ,v) . (3.2)
Finally, a patent is invalid if its inventive step is smaller than the validity threshold, ıˆ < i0.
Hence, the expression for the numerator contains an additional indicator function,
P(invalid ∧ litigation) =
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)
∫ ∞
−∞
di fi(i)∫ ∞
0
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)
∫ ∞
0
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)1E[pid |id=i+ϵd , v, entry]>01A(ip ,v)>B(id ,v)1i<i0 . (3.3)
Up to this point, the analysis has been straightforward. However, the explicit evaluation of
these expressions involves several subtleties that need to be taken care of.
Clearly, for any distributional assumptions for the four elementary random variables
(vˆ, ıˆ, ϵˆp, ϵˆd), it is advisable to proceed analytically as far as possible to make the subsequent
numerical integration viable and efficient. This is especially true for the nature of the inte-
grands this model inherently produces. Since decisions are discrete, as in “ ‘entry’ if expected
profits larger than zero, ‘no entry’ otherwise,” which translates into indicator functions in the
above expressions, the integrands are discontinuous. Without further adjustments, this leads
to convergence issues in quadrature algorithms. Note that numerical integration will for most
distributional assumptions be inevitable at some point, because closed-form solutions to the
integrals may not exist and, more crucially, because some of the quantities are only implicitly
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defined. For example, d ’s expected profits E[pid | ıˆd , vˆ, entry] indirectly depend on p’s asking
price, which is a function of P(valid | ıˆp, vˆ, entry), which in turn depends on the expected
profits. While analytical closed-form definitions might thus be elusive, numerical root-finding
allows for deriving these functions at any given point.
Verification through Monte Carlo Simulation
In order to avoid errors in the analytical derivations and the corresponding numerical imple-
mentations, I carry out a Monte Carlo simulation to verify that results agree within the variance
of the simulation. For that purpose, a large number of tuples of random numbers (vˆ, ıˆ, ϵˆp, ϵˆd),
representing a patent and the parties’ assessments, are drawn from their respective distribu-
tions and subjected to the selection rules constituting the model. Exact probabilities are then
compared to the relative frequencies in the simulation. For quantitative results see Figure C.5
in the appendix. It shows that within the precision of the simulation, analytical results are
reproduced perfectly.
3.4 Model Calibration
In order to reproduce aggregate patent system characteristics found empirically, I will cali-
brate the model by tuning its parameters appropriately. This section explains in detail which
assumptions and methods are used for determining each model parameter. A summary of
methods and results is provided in Table 3.1.
3.4.1 Distributional Assumptions
In order to fit the model to empirical data, one has to commit to explicit distributional assump-
tions for the random variables of the model. Despite the fact that more flexible distributions
with more parameters always yield a better fit, I use standard distributions with few param-
eters, paying tribute to the scarcity of observable patent system characteristics available for
calibration.
Let me start with the distribution of patented invention value vˆ, which is the least stylized
random variable of the model, having a direct analogue in reality. There exists a noteworthy
body of literature21 which has studied the distribution of patent value and its relation to widely
observable proxies, most notably forward citation count. While it seems commonly accepted
that it is a highly skewed, fat tailed distribution, with most patents having very little or no
value, and a slowly decaying probability of some patents having very high value, the precise
functional form is difficult to pin down empirically. There is some evidence (Harhoff et al.,
2003b) that the tail of the patented invention value distribution is best approximated by a
21 See for example Schankerman and Pakes (1986); Lanjouw (1998); Schankerman (1998); Harhoff et al.
(1999, 2003a,b, 2015); Gambardella et al. (2010); Fischer and Leidinger (2014); Kogan et al. (2017).
86
3. SELECTION OF PATENTS FOR LITIGATION
log-normal distribution, a finding I will adopt in the following by assuming
ln vˆ ∼N (µv ,σ2v) , (3.1)
where N (µ,σ2) denotes a normal distribution of mean µ and variance σ2. Contrary to the
parameters of the remaining distributions, I will be able to extract µv and σv from a direct fit
of the cumulative distribution function to simulated values provided in the literature (Harhoff
et al., 2015), as explained in the next section.
For the inventive step ıˆ, which is a stylized concept abstracting from the multidimensional
nature of the patent offices’ patentability requirements, I assume a normal distribution,
ıˆ ∼N (µi ,σ2i ) . (3.2)
This is in line with the intuition that both patents with very small and very large inventive steps
are extremely rare. On the one hand, the unlikeliness of very low inventive steps is justified by
the patentability requirements, or at least the risk of failing to meet these requirements. Even if
the patent office has limited resources for examination, obvious low-quality applications will be
filtered out. In the population of granted patents, extreme cases will thus be absent. Besides,
an applicant would incur substantial extra costs if she applied for a huge number of patents
comprised of minuscule inventions. On the other hand, the unlikeliness of very high inventive
steps is a consequence of competition on the market for technology. Competition induces
parties to apply early and to obtain multiple patents to mitigate the risk of invalidation after a
plea of annulment. In view of the central limit theorem, considering a patent’s inventive step
as the sum of a (large) number of small insights provides an additional plausible justification
for the use of the normal distribution.
The assessment errors ϵˆp and ϵˆd , in contrast, arise from a process of a very different nature.
First of all, it is reasonable to assume that both parties assess the inventive step of a poten-
tially contested patent professionally, through a designated department or a specialized law
firm. Systematic bias by whether an invention was developed internally or externally should
thus be negligible. Consequently, the two parties should have similarly distributed assessment
errors. Rather than bias, the error stems from the expected amount of prior art submitted in
the course of an annulment suit. Assessing the likelihood that patentability-destroying prior
art exists is inevitably noisy without a very costly search. Nonetheless, under the supposition
of professionalism, one would assume that the probability density decreases very quickly with
increasing assessment errors. Now, if parties always correctly distinguish relevant and irrele-
vant prior art when they find it, i.e., if the error emerges from the search process alone, only
too little prior art can be found. This is in line with the finding of Hess et al. (2014, Section
E.II) that (a) in almost all annulment proceedings, plaintiffs introduce new prior art, which
(b) subsequently plays a central role in the proceeding. I thus assume that the inventive step
of a patent can only be overestimated erroneously, i.e., I assume that errors are larger than
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zero. Exponential distributions provide a decent reflection of these considerations, with the
most likely error being zero, and a quickly decreasing probability of very large errors. I thus
assume
ϵˆp ∼ Exp(λp)
ϵˆd ∼ Exp(λd) , (3.3)
where Exp(λ) denotes an exponential distribution with parameter λ > 0.
For a list of the corresponding probability density and cumulative distribution functions,
see Appendix C.1.1.
3.4.2 Parameters Fixed Exogenously
Definition of scale
Since the inventive step is an abstract concept, which is meaningful only relative to the state
of the art i0 and up to a normalization factor, I am free to choose i0 and the scale arbitrarily.
As the definition of zero, I choose i0 ≡ 0 without loss of generality. Fixing the scale could in
principle be done through either the standard deviation σi of the inventive step or through
the parameter λ of either party’s assessment error distribution. For convenience I choose to
set λp ≡ 1.
Legal and settlement costs
The following legal and settlement cost parameters are consistent with data on the average
costs of patent litigation in Germany (Harhoff, 2009, p. 31). I fix expected total legal cost to
C = 200,000 e . (3.4)
Supposing that plaintiff and defendant incur similar negotiation costs when coming to a set-
tlement, I fix Sp and Sd to an equal amount of
Sp = Sd = S = 50,000 e . (3.5)
I thus assume that legal and settlement costs do not vary systematically with the value of the
patented invention. See Section 3.8 for a detailed discussion.
Further, when entering litigation, I assume the plaintiff to derive a benefit Rlit from obtain-
ing a reputation as someone who is willing to defend his patent rights. Incorporating some
notion of this kind into the model seems indispensable, given that a granted patent right will
only benefit its holder if she can credibly commit to legally uphold her exclusion rights in case
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of infringement. In monetary terms, I set this benefit to
Rlit = 10,000 e (3.6)
for the baseline model. Both S/C and Rlit/C are varied over a large range in Section 3.6 to
explore the model calibration’s sensitivity to the above choices.
Time scales
A German (and European) patent’s lifetime T is
T = 20 years . (3.7)
Concerning the average time t¯ an entrant can make duopoly profits before a court order is
issued, I assume
t¯ = 2 years . (3.8)
Only the ratio of these parameters enters the model, namely through the compensation pay-
ment after an infringement verdict, net of average profits made prior to dispute, J˜(vˆ) = t¯T
1
9 vˆ,
as derived in Eq. (3.5).
3.4.3 Fit of the Patented Invention Value Distribution
To determine the parameters of the patented invention value distribution, I fit a log-normal
cumulative distribution function to simulated data provided by Harhoff et al. (2015, p. 23,
Table 3). They estimate quantiles of the patent population’s value distribution by fitting a
model of deferred examination to data on patent applications filed at the German patent office
between 1989 and 1996. Figure 3.6 shows the fit of the log-normal cumulative distribution
function to the simulated data using non-linear least squares.22 Denoting values in units of
1,000€2015 I obtain as optimal parameters
µu ≈ 3.623
σu ≈ 1.402 , (3.9)
which corresponds to an expected patent value of about E[uˆ] ≈ 100,000 e2015. This value
differs by approximately 12% from the mean simulated in the paper, which seems reasonable
given that the expected value of the log-normal distribution is very sensitive to small variations
of the parameters. The simulated data by Harhoff et al. (2015) used above are estimates
22Units are changed from 1989 USD to 2015 EUR by accounting for an inflation of 94% (Williamson, 2016,
“real value”) and an exchange rate of approximately 0.9205 EUR/USD (ECB, 2016, exchange rate of Nov 6th,
2015).
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Figure 3.6: Fit of the patent value distribution
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Notes: Fit of a log-normal cumulative distribution function to the simulated patent value distribution provided by
Harhoff et al. (2015, p. 23, Table 3).
for the private value uˆ of granted patent rights, which stands in a close relationship with
the monopoly rents vˆ used as the fundamental value representation in the model developed
here. vˆ can be seen as the combined value of the invention per se and the patent protection.
As an approximate representation of the private value of a patent right in the model I thus
use uˆ = vˆ − V2(vˆ), i.e., the difference between monopoly and duopoly rents, or, in other
words, the difference between the value of the patent-protected invention and the value of the
unprotected invention. Consequently, given the linear Cournot setting and the properties of
the log-normal distribution (see Eq. (3.3) and footnotes 18 and 24), one immediately obtains
µv = µu + ln

9
5

≈ 4.211
σv = σu ≈ 1.402 .
This corresponds to an average patented invention value of approximately 180,000 e2015.
Note that the parameters (µu,σu) and thus the corresponding distribution differ signifi-
cantly from the values derived in Harhoff et al. (2003b), who estimate parameters for the tail
of the patented invention value distribution.23 The log-normal parameters obtained from a
23The authors asked the interviewees to estimate the loss in profit their firm would have incurred, had it been
precluded from use of the patented invention. This has to be distinguished from the value of the patent right per
se. However, the two could not always be disentangled (Harhoff et al., 2003b, Section 12.3.2).
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Table 3.1: Determination of (baseline) model parameters
Symbol Value Calibration method Description
Distributional parameters
µv = 4.211 direct fit (Sec. 3.4.3) distr. of patent value
σv = 1.402 direct fit (Sec. 3.4.3)
µi = 0.1931 optimization (Sec. 3.4.5) distr. of inventive step
σi = 0.9568 optimization (Sec. 3.4.5)
λp ≡ 1 definition of scale (Sec. 3.4.2) distr. of p’s assessment error
λd = λp simplifying assumption (Sec. 3.4.4) distr. of d’s assessment error
Fundamental model parameters
i0 ≡ 0 definition of zero (Sec. 3.4.2) validity threshold
C = 200 (ke) exogenous parameter (Sec. 3.4.2) total legal cost
Sp = 50 (ke) exogenous parameter (Sec. 3.4.2) p’s settlement cost
Sd = 50 (ke) exogenous parameter (Sec. 3.4.2) d’s settlement cost
T = 20 (yr) exogenous parameter (Sec. 3.4.2) patent lifetime
t¯ = 2 (yr) exogenous parameter (Sec. 3.4.2) time prior to dispute
Rlit = 10 (ke) exogenous parameter (Sec. 3.4.2) gain in litigation reputation
Centry ≡ 0 simplifying assumption (Sec. 3.4.4) no entry cost
pc = 1 simplifying assumption (Sec. 3.4.4) entry⇔ infringement
fit to the tail imply a substantially higher skewness24 of the distribution (6953 vs 23) and a
substantially higher average patent value25 of 10,600,000€2015. Since especially the latter
suggests that a fit to the tail of the value distribution does not result in parameters repre-
sentative of the entire distribution, I do not employ the parameter estimates in Harhoff et al.
(2003b), but choose to fit to the simulated patent values in Harhoff et al. (2015).
3.4.4 Simplifying Assumptions
Since I will only use two patent system characteristics to calibrate the remaining model
parameters, I reduce the model’s complexity by introducing the following simplifications.
First, I assume the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s assessment error distributions to be equal,
λd = λp ≡ 1, which one may see as a consequence of the professionalism assumption estab-
lished in Section 3.4.1. Second, I suppose that entry costs do not matter for the defendant’s
24Note that while the skewness only depends on the σ-parameter of the log-normal distribution, a change of
units only affects the µ-parameter, which can be seen as a (non-linear) scaling parameter in the pdf and cdf (cf.
appendix C.1.1): (ln(x)−µ)/σ = ln(x/eµ)/σ.
25Inflation 1996-2015 (1996 = survey year in Harhoff et al. (2003b)): 60% (Williamson, 2016, “real value”),
fixed exchange rate: 1.9558 DM/EUR.
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entry decision, Centry = 0. Third, I set the (exogenous) conviction probability pc of a valid
patent to be considered infringed by the court to 1. This means that a defendant who has
entered a market protected by a valid patent is always infringing. Entry and infringement be-
come synonymous. Fourth, I assume plaintiff and defendant to incur equal settlement costs,
as described in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.5 Fit of the Remaining Parameters
Definition of target characteristics
I calibrate the remaining model parameters (µi ,σi) such that the model reproduces the follow-
ing aggregate quantities, which are consistent with data on German patents and the German
components of European bundle patents litigated at the German Federal Patent Court (Hess
et al., 2014): First, the share of all patents becoming subject to litigation is set equal to 1.2%.
Second, the share of patents in nullity proceedings which are partially or fully invalidated is
set to 75%.
Minimization algorithm
To make use of a multi-dimensional minimization algorithm, one has to define an objective
function g to be minimized. I employ the Euclidean norm of the relative difference vector r
of the target characteristics ct defined above and the corresponding model predictions cm(p),
where p denotes the parameter vector,
g(p) =‖ r ‖=
√√√√∑
i

c ti − cmi (p)
c ti
2
. (3.10)
In this way, I give equal weight to the relative differences of each target characteristic, which
may differ considerably in absolute magnitude.
For the minimization itself I use standard multi-dimensional minimization routines: the
Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm (Nocedal and Wright, 2006, p. 136ff.)
for unconstrained minimization and the L-BFGS-B algorithm for bound constrained minimiza-
tion (Byrd et al., 1995).26
For the target characteristics defined above, the optimal parameters are approximately
given by27
µi = 0.1931
σi = 0.9568 .
26In SciPy, both are accessible via the scipy.optimize.minimize interface.
27Technical note: This result was obtained using constrained minimization with bounds µi ∈ [−10,10], σi ∈
[0.001,10].
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3.4.6 Uniqueness and Accuracy of Calibration
The model can be uniquely calibrated to perfectly replicate the aggregate patent system char-
acteristics defined in Section 3.4.5. While this may seem trivial at first sight, given that I am
freely tuning two model parameters to essentially produce two model outcomes, one should
keep in mind that the parameters influence the predictions in a highly non-linear and interde-
pendent way.
Two concerns may arise with regard to fitting a non-linear model. First, the existence of
several local minima may obscure the minimization algorithm’s path to the optimal point in
parameter space. As a result, one may underestimate the model’s capability of reproducing
empirical outcome rates. If relaxing simplifying assumptions then proves insufficient, one
may even reject its general suitability to represent the litigation selection process. Second, the
optimal parameters may not be unique, if several local minima exist whose depth is comparable
to that of the global minimum. This may not pose a major problem as long as the predictions
of the unobservable characteristics of interest are identical for all optimal parameter vectors.
Yet, if the corresponding predictions differ substantially, unambiguous conclusions cannot be
drawn in a straightforward fashion. For the calibration implemented here, however, the above
considerations are of no significance, since the optimum turns out to be the unique minimum,
as shown in Figures C.1 and C.2 in the appendix.
Moreover, the calibration results allow to assess whether the simplifications of Section 3.4.4
are overtly restrictive. Since the simplifying assumptions prove to be sufficiently lax to allow
for a calibration exactly reproducing the observable outcome rates, corresponding concerns
are alleviated.
3.5 Model Predictions
Equipped with the parameters determined in Section 3.4, I am now in the position to predict
unobservable patent system characteristics of interest. As a first application, I derive the share
of latently invalid patents in the patent population, i.e., the share of all patents which would
be fully or partially invalidated if they became subject to a nullity proceeding. In the model,
this corresponds to deriving
P(ˆı < i0) = Fi(i0) = Φ

i0 −µi
σi

≈ 42.0%. (3.1)
This result may come as a surprise, given that I demanded 75% of all patents subject to nullity
proceedings to be judged invalid. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 shed light on the drivers of this outcome.
For invalid patents, i.e., patents with ıˆ < i0, entry occurs in approximately every second case,
P(no entry | invalid) = 45.4%. In contrast, for most valid patents the potential infringer never
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Figure 3.7: Outcome distribution (baseline calibration)
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Notes: Outcome distribution and conditional validity for the baseline calibration of the model (see Table 3.1).
Figure 3.8: Patented invention values (baseline calibration)
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Notes: Average invention values by outcome for the baseline calibration of the model (see Table 3.1).
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enters the market,
P(no entry |valid) = 96.0%, (3.2)
because he cannot expect to make positive profits given the large inventive step ıˆd he has
observed. A large inventive step means small chances in winning a potential suit, which goes
along with an unfavorable position in settlement negotiations (high bidding and expected
asking prices). He will only enter if the perceived validity is sufficiently moderate in relation
to the value of the patented invention; higher values potentially leading to higher returns
from entry. As a result, the model’s first stage, i.e., the endogeneity of disputes, has profound
implications for validity and value at later stages. While invalidity rates lie at 42.0% in the
patent population and at 25.5% in the case of no entry in the baseline calibration, they are
considerably higher for litigated patents (75.0%) and the highest for settled patents (91.5%).
Hence, latent invalidity is predicted to be considerably lower than estimated in Henkel and
Zischka (2016) and still noticeably lower than in Schankerman and Schuett (2016), whose
estimates range from 65% to above 80%. Generally, for findings based on expert interviews
and surveys, differences might partly be explained by the calibration results. The rate of latent
invalidity is higher in settlements than in litigation. A legal practitioner only observing patents
which become subject of a dispute might thus be led to the fallacious conclusion that litigated
patents on average have a smaller inventive step than the average patent in the population,
and that they are accordingly less stable from a legal point of view.
Concerning the second patent characteristic, patented invention value vˆ, the baseline cal-
ibration again suggests substantial selection (see Figure 3.8). Patents which never become
subject of a dispute constitute the majority of all patents, with around 74.7%. They are as-
sociated with an average patented invention value of 138 ke, which corresponds to 0.76 of
the population mean of 180 ke. Patented invention values for settled patent disputes (24.1%)
average to 244 ke, or 40% more than the population mean. While this is already indicative
of selection with respect to value, the negotiation stage induces substantial value selection
for litigated patents. Parties are aware of the considerably higher cost associated with trial in
court as opposed to settlement. Hence, even under divergent expectations concerning validity,
the infringer’s maximum settlement demand B will exceed the patent holder’s minimum set-
tlement demand A, thus allowing parties to settle, unless the stakes are very high. If patents
are litigated, the average patented invention value lies at 1.56 million e, or 8.7 times the pop-
ulation mean. The ratio is even more extreme for litigated patents which are valid. According
to the calibration, they are 14.5 times as valuable as the average patented invention. The
finding that litigated patents are substantially more valuable than the average is in line with
results in the empirical literature, which has found a significant, positive relationship between
typical proxies for value and the likelihood of infringement and nullity proceedings (Lanjouw
and Schankerman, 2001, 2003). Harhoff et al. (2003a) find that patents which have survived
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Figure 3.9: Outcome probabilities as a function of patented invention value
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Notes: Outcome probabilities conditional on patented invention value. The gray dotted line indicates the proba-
bility density function f (v) of patented invention values.
an annulment proceeding are 42.6 times more valuable than an unchallenged patent. In the
model, the closest analogy is the ratioE[v | valid, litigation]/E[v | no entry]. According to the
baseline calibration, E[v | valid, litigation] = 2.62 million e and E[v | no entry] = 138 ke.
Hence, litigated valid patents are on average 19 times as valuable as patents that never become
subject of a dispute. The two findings thus fall within the same order of magnitude.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 provide a few further insights. First, as visible in Figure 3.9, entry
becomes much more likely for valuable patents. Over a relevant range of patented invention
values, the probabilities for settlement and for litigation increase by a similar amount (despite
different curvature), at the expense of the probability for no entry occurring. Second, due
to fixed legal costs, litigation is only entered if patented invention value is sufficiently high.
In fact, the litigation probability is zero for patented inventions below a minimum threshold
value, which lies at approximately
vlit, min ≈ 396.3ke , (3.3)
a value which is considerably above the median of 67.44 ke and the mean of 180.2 ke. This
is clearly visible in Figure 3.10, which displays the value distribution conditional on litigation
f (v | litigation). The existence of a threshold value is not only intuitive, it may also be testable
in future empirical work. Finally, from inspecting the inset in Figure 3.10, it seems that the
conditional distributions are closely related to the log-normal distribution. Deviations are the
largest when conditioning on litigation, where the distribution essentially only comprises the
log-normal tail.
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Figure 3.10: Patented invention value distribution by outcome
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In the appendix, Figures C.3 and C.4 display the joint probability density functions of ıˆ and
vˆ. By definition, ıˆ and vˆ are independent random variables and are hence uncorrelated in the
patent population (cf. Figure C.3). However, due to selection, they exhibit positive correlation
within each outcome subsample (cf. Figure C.4 for the subsample of litigated patents).
In summary, the calibration results suggest that the entry and the negotiation stages drive
different dimensions of selection. While selection with respect to validity primarily is a conse-
quence of the potential infringer’s decision at the entry stage, selection with respect to value
is predominantly driven by the negotiation stage.
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I report results on the sensitivity of the model’s predictions when calibrating
under varying parameter assumptions. I start with the parameter Rlit, which represents the
patent holder’s gain from building a reputation for litigiousness (in monetary terms) when
entering litigation, that I have so far set in an ad-hoc fashion. Figure 3.11 shows the results of
a series of calibrations from Rlit = 0 to Rlit = .4C . As highlighted in Figure 3.11, for a plausible
range between 5% and 20% of total legal cost, the estimated share of latently invalid patents
in the population varies between 42.0% and 31.5%, respectively (left panel). The average
value of litigated patents (right panel) shifts from 156 ke to 138 ke, i.e., from 8.67 to 7.66
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Figure 3.11: Calibration sensitivity – Reputation parameter
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Notes: Calibration sensitivity with respect to Rlit/C . The left panel shows the predicted share of latently invalid
patents P(invalid) under calibrations with different litigation reputation parameters Rlit (as a share of total le-
gal cost C). Analogously, the right panel displays the expected patented invention values of litigated patents
E[v|litigation] in units of the population average E[v]. The model is in each case calibrated to reproduce
P(litigation) = 1.2% and P(invalid | litigation) = 75%.
times the value of an average patent in the population.
A second dimension of sensitivity worth exploring is settlement cost as a fraction of total
legal cost, S/C . Note that throughout the analysis in this section I maintain the assumptions
of Section 3.4.4, in particular the assumption of identical settlement cost for both plaintiff
and defendant, Sp ≡ Sd =: S. Figure 3.12 displays the change of the probability P(invalid)
of latent invalidity for a random patent in the population (left panel) and the expected value
E[v|litigation] of a litigated patent (right panel) for calibrations under different assumptions
of S/C . Varying S/C between 20% and 30% (green shaded area), while maintaining the
remaining exogenous parameters as indicated in Table 3.1, moves the fitted share of latently
invalid patents from 48.3% to 35.2%. At the same time, the average value of a litigated patent
E[v|litigation] is shifted from 166 ke to 144 ke in calibration, which corresponds to 9.22E[v]
and 8.02 E[v], respectively.
In summary, I observe that for a broad range of parametric assumptions for Rlit/C and
S/C , calibrations of the model lead to similar conclusions as the baseline case: the share
of latently invalid patents in the population is consistently estimated to be below 50%, and
litigated patents to be between 7 and 10 times as valuable as a patent in the population, on
average.
Finally, I explore the sensitivity of the model calibration to inaccuracy in the distribution
of patent values. Note that while technically similar, this exercise is accounting for a concep-
tually different source of error than the preceding discussion. Whereas variations of Rlit/C
and S/C address exogenously fixed parameters, the parameters µv and σv of the log-normal
distribution of patent values have been determined by a fit to data provided in the literature
(cf. Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3). In the following, I thus examine in how far the model calibra-
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Figure 3.12: Calibration sensitivity – Settlement cost
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Notes: Calibration sensitivity with respect to S/C . The left panel shows the predicted share of latently in-
valid patents P(invalid) under calibrations with different settlement cost parameters Sp ≡ Sd =: S (as a share
of total legal cost C). Analogously, the right panel displays the expected patented invention value of litigated
patents E[v|litigation] in units of the population average E[v]. The model is in each case calibrated to reproduce
P(litigation) = 1.2% and P(invalid | litigation) = 75%.
tion would change if the results in the literature were different. However, I limit the analysis
to modifications of mean patent value E[v] = exp(µv +σv/2), while holding constant stan-
dardized higher moments, such as skewness and kurtosis, and thus preserving the intuitive
“distributional shape”. This can easily be achieved by confining parameter variation to µv , a
shift of which by ∆µv is equivalent to a rescaling of patented invention value by a factor of
exp(∆µv), as shown in Footnote 24. Hence, mean and standard deviation are rescaled by the
same factor and standardized moments are unaffected.28
Figure 3.13 depicts the results of this final calibration exercise. When tuning E[v]
over a range of ±10% around the baseline average patented invention value E0[v] (green
shaded area), the calibrated share of latently invalid patents P(invalid) varies between 46.1%
and 39.0% (left panel). Over the same range, which corresponds to the interval E[v] ∈
[162ke, 198ke], the ratio of the average value of a litigated patent and a random patent de-
creases from around 9.17 to 8.19 (right panel). Note that in absolute terms, E[v | litigation]
increases with E[v], as one would expect.
Hence, in addition to alternative parameter regimes, the baseline conclusions are qualita-
tively robust to misspecification of the distribution of patented invention value. For instance,
such imprecisions could arise from measurement error that biases the results in the literature
which were used in the fit of the value distribution (see Section 3.4.3). Besides, misspecifica-
tion could be the result of inappropriate functional form assumptions (cf. Eq. 3.1).
28The former is an immediate consequence of the linearity of the expectation and the behavior of the variance
under multiplication by a scalar a, Var[axˆ] = a2Var[ xˆ], the latter of the definition of standardized moments µ˜k,
µ˜k =
µk
σk
=
E[( xˆ −µ)k]
Var[ xˆ]k/2
=
E[(axˆ − aµ)k]
Var[axˆ]k/2
.
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Figure 3.13: Calibration sensitivity – Distribution of patented invention value
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Notes: Calibration sensitivity with respect to the distribution of patented invention value. The left panel shows
the predicted share of latently invalid patents P(invalid) under calibrations with different E[v] (in units of the
baseline value E0[v]). Analogously, the right panel displays the expected patented invention value of litigated
patents E[v|litigation] in units of the population average E[v]. Note that while the relative factor decreases,
E[v|litigation] in fact increases withE[v] (not explicitly shown). The model is in each case calibrated to reproduce
P(litigation) = 1.2% and P(invalid | litigation) = 75%.
3.7 Impact Simulation of Policy Measures
I now turn to an impact analysis of different policy measures. In each case, I compare the mod-
ified outcomes to the predictions of the calibrated baseline model defined by the parameters
in Table 3.1. Note that the subsequent analysis does not allow for the prediction of general
equilibrium effects, but that it is addressing a ceteris paribus counterfactual: Holding constant
the remaining characteristics of the patent population, would the impact of policy reform be
sizeable? This is non-trivial, even within the stylized world of the model. Depending on the
initial state, i.e., the latent characteristics of the patent litigation system, policy reform may
have highly non-linear consequences, with major and costly reform potentially translating into
negligible change.29 In the following discussion, “raising the inventive step threshold” refers
to the practice of the patent office and the courts, not necessarily a change in the wording of
the law. Such changes can be effectuated independently in the patent office and the courts.
For example, patent examiners can be given more time per application, allowing for more rig-
orous prior art searches. While such reform increases the de-facto threshold for patent grants,
court decisions are unaffected.
3.7.1 Raising the Courts’ and the Patent Office’s Inventive Step Thresholds
First, let me discuss the case when the patent office and the courts raise their respective in-
ventive step thresholds in an analogous manner. To this end, suppose that the patent office’s
intensified screening efforts result in ıˆ ∼ N (µ′i = µi +∆i,σ2i ), while the courts raise their
29See Section 3.7.2 for a more detailed discussion in the context of Figure 3.14.
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Figure 3.14: Outcome probabilities under changes of court strictness
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Notes: Outcome probabilities under ceteris paribus changes ∆i of court strictness i0. At ∆i = 0 (vertical dashed
line), the model is calibrated to reproduce P(litigation) = 1.2% and P(invalid | litigation) = 75%. The inset
shows a wider range of ± four standard deviations.
validity criterion to i′0 = i0 +∆i. Then, from the model’s perspective, we find ourselves in an
equivalent situation to the one prior to the policy change – nothing has changed in terms of
outcome rates; the model is sensitive only to changes in µi − i0. Of course, the absolute num-
ber of patent applicationsmay change if applicants adjust within a new general equilibrium.30
This consideration, however, lies outside of the scope of the theoretical approach pursued
here, which models the selection process into litigation that the population of granted patents
is subject to.
3.7.2 Raising the Courts’ Inventive Step Validity Threshold
With the preceding intervention in mind, let me now outline the case where the distribution
of inventive steps in the patent population is unchanged, and hence the patent office’s effort
requirements per application, while the courts raise their validity criterion to i0 +∆i, as be-
fore.31 Figure 3.14 depicts the model’s predictions for the outcome probabilities of no entry
occurring (red solid line), of settlement (green dashed line), and of litigation (blue dotted line)
for different levels ∆i of court strictness relative to the calibrated baseline case. Let me give
an example of how to read the graph. Raising the threshold i0 by 0.1σi leads to a decrease of
30Concerning the optimal strictness and effort level of the patent office, Lemley (2001) provides a comprehen-
sive analysis for the US patent system.
31Note that in the model, an increase∆i in the courts’ validity threshold i0 is equivalent to a decrease∆i in the
average inventive step.
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P(no entry) from 74.7% to 72.1%. At the same time, the probability of settlement increases
from 24.1% to 26.6% and the probability of litigation from 1.2% to 1.27%.
Hence, infringers enter with a higher rate, resulting in a relative increase of the probability
of settlement by 10.6% and of the probability of litigation by 5.7%. This is intuitive: In terms
of validity before the courts, the patent population is now less stable, causing a dilution of
a litigation’s deterrence potential. Such policy intervention can in principle have highly non-
linear effects depending on the system’s initial state, as is especially evident in the inset of
Figure 3.14. The calibrated model however suggests that the patent litigation system is in a
situation where the intervention has an almost linear impact, resulting in the aforementioned
notable effect sizes.
3.7.3 Raising Litigation Cost
Legal costs constitute a different means of tuning the litigation system’s selection mechan-
ics. However, while courts could in principle charge arbitrarily high fees for patent cases, the
extent to which a policy intervention can reduce total legal cost, is naturally bounded from
below. Figure 3.15 explores ceteris paribus changes of total legal cost C around the base-
line assumption of C = 200 ke. Increasing expected total legal cost by 25% relative to the
baseline, from 200 ke to 250 ke, goes along with an increase of the probability of no entry
occurring from 74.7% to 75.8%. At the same time, the probabilities of settlement and liti-
gation decrease from 24.1% to 23.4% and from 1.20% to 0.708%, respectively. Speaking in
relative terms, P(no entry) and P(settlement) are rather insensitive to changes in total legal
cost, while P(litigation) is considerably reduced. This observation is conspicuous when us-
ing a logarithmic y-axis, as in the inset of Figure 3.15. From a policy perspective, a decrease
of litigation cases by around 41% may seem desirable, abstracting from general equilibrium
adjustments. However, in the model, it comes at the cost of reduced entry, which is in turn
detrimental for competition.
In summary, given the relative impact on the probabilities of entry and litigation observed
in Subsections 3.7.2 and 3.7.3, combining the measures of increasing court validity thresholds
and raising court fees might provide an interesting lever to stimulate entry without incurring an
upsurge in litigation. To give an example, if the validity threshold is increased by 0.2 standard
deviations of the population’s inventive step, and court fees are raised by 8.86 ke (4.43% of
baseline total legal cost), the rate of entry increases by 5.1 percentage points, from 25.3% to
30.4%, while the probability of litigation remains unchanged.
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Figure 3.15: Outcome probabilities under changes of total legal cost
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Notes: Outcome probabilities under ceteris paribus changes of total legal cost C . Over a range of ± 25% relative
to the baseline model cost (vertical dashed line), P(no entry) and P(settlement) change relatively little in rela-
tive terms, while P(litigation) decreases visibly, as one would expect. This is particularly visible in the inset, in
which a logarithmic y-axis is used. At C = 200 ke (vertical dashed line), the model is calibrated to reproduce
P(litigation) = 1.2% and P(invalid | litigation) = 75%.
3.8 Discussion and Outlook
In this section, I discuss the model assumptions’ degree of abstraction and outline avenues for
further research.
3.8.1 General Setup of the Model
In a first step, let me discuss design choices concerning the general setup of the model. With
regard to product market structure, only two possible outcomes are observed in the model: a
monopoly, in case of no entry or in case the entrant is successfully sued by the patent holder, or
a duopoly, in case of settlement or unsuccessful suit. Both are modeled in a linear Cournot set-
ting, which excludes “strategic” duopolies, in which the parties are able to maintain monopoly
prices, either through direct agreement, or indirectly, via adjusted licensing fees. This is in line
with antitrust guidelines in the EU and in the US, which prohibit any such anti-competitive
practices (European Commission, 2014; U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission, 2017). As an alternative approach, one could maintain the assumption of a
duopolistic market structure as a consequence of settlement, but replace it with a situation
of perfect competition if the patent is invalidated. However, concerning patent litigation,
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the implicit assumption of unlimited entry of new firms seems implausible for capital- and
knowledge-intensive industries with high fixed costs or sunk investments (cf. Tirole, 1988,
Chapter 8). While the model in principle allows for monetary barriers to entry by choosing
Centry > 0, the assumptions of Section 3.4.4 refrain from additional impediments beyond the
limitation to two competitors. Besides, a more refined model could relax the assumption of
perfectly symmetric parties, thus allowing for non-practicing patent holders, a phenomenon
increasingly observed in patent litigation in Europe (Darts-ip, 2018), and for competitors in-
homogeneous in size.
With regard to the market for technology and its relation to the product market, the
model abstracts from the substantial complexity introduced by overlapping intellectual prop-
erty rights, or “patent thickets” (Galasso and Schankerman, 2010; von Graevenitz et al., 2013).
Besides, it abstracts from “complex” products comprised of a multitude of protected inventions
(Cohen et al., 2000) and from general purpose technologies, where a single patent can affect
multiple product markets (Gambardella and Giarratana, 2013). Instead, the model implicitly
makes the strong assumption of a one-to-one correspondence of each patent to an associated
product market. While this may constitute an accurate representation for discrete technology
areas, such as chemistry, it is a rather stylized depiction for complex technologies, such as
telecommunications.
Concerning the institutional setup for challenges of granted patents, I distinguish between
proceedings conducted by the patent offices and litigation in the courts. Post-grant opposi-
tion, which can be filed within nine months after grant at both the German and the European
Patent Office, is not explicitly represented in the model. Rather, the patent population charac-
terized in the calibration of Section 3.4 is to be understood as the ensemble of granted patents,
which either remain unchallenged in the nine-month window (around 93-95% of all granted
patents) or which survive post-grant opposition.32 Litigation, in contrast, is a central element
of the model. Prior to court proceedings, entrants can always make duopoly profits over a time
period t¯, reflecting imperfections in the detection of infringement (see Section 3.4.2).33 If set-
tlement fails, infringement and nullity decisions are taken by a single court of last instance.
For the example of the German patent litigation system, this constitutes an abstraction from
two institutional features. First, litigation in Germany is bifurcated, with infringement and
annulment proceedings being heard by different courts.34 While nullity suits are most com-
monly a reaction to infringement charges (Henkel and Zischka, 2016), the two proceedings
32Around one third of opposed patents remains unaltered, one third is amended and one third is fully invali-
dated. See (Harhoff et al., 2007, p. 31) and Chapter 1.
33The model abstracts from further imperfections in screening, including never-detected patent infringement.
Incorporating such notions could be credible in a model with more complex product market structures.
34In Germany, infringement proceedings are treated as standard civil procedures. As such, they are conducted by
the courts of ordinary jurisdiction (Landgerichte, Oberlandesgerichte, Bundesgerichtshof). In contrast, annulment
proceedings are heard by the Federal Patent Court (Bundespatentgericht), whose judgments can be appealed to
the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH). The BGH hence serves a double role as last instance: as an
overseer of the application of the law in infringement proceedings and as a reviewer of the contested decision in
both legal and factual regard for appealed validity judgments. (Kühnen, 2013)
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can be advanced independently. As a result, it is possible to incur an infringement verdict for a
patent which is subsequently invalidated35 (Cremers et al., 2016). The model does not allow
for such (temporary) outcomes. Second, decisions of the first instance Federal Patent Court
(Bundespatentgericht, BPatG) can be appealed, resulting in a hearing at the Federal Court of
Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH). While in the model, settlements can only be reached prior
to court hearings, based on the information available at this point in time, litigation over sev-
eral instances provides a wider scope for finding agreements. Parties may settle prior to the
filing of a suit (unobserved), as in the model, or withdraw or settle in the course of the first
or second instance proceedings (in the case of appeal). This happens for more than half of
the cases brought to trial (Henkel and Zischka, 2016). The later parties settle, the more in-
formation is revealed, potentially shifting the odds to one or the other side. In either case,
a progression to the next instance reflects the parties’ persisting inability to settle, indicating
that expectations may still diverge substantially.
The assumption of perfect courts (reveal true ıˆ) does not impose a loss of generality from
the model’s perspective: What the courts perceive as the inventive step, can just be seen as
the definition of the underlying “truth.” Under appropriate distributional assumptions, the
extent to which the part of the assessment error associated with imperfect courts is also for-
mally placed at the courts, as opposed to the parties, is irrelevant. In the description of the
model chosen here, the parties’ assessment error simply contains the uncertainty arising from
imperfect courts in its entirety. Introducing ıˆp and ıˆd as the sum of a true, underlying inventive
step ıˆ and the parties’ assessment errors ϵˆp and ϵˆd thus amounts to nothing more than a way
to intuitively introduce correlation between the parties’ observations.
Generally, the design of the model developed in this paper is tailored to allow for a char-
acterization of the patent litigation system through calibration. Priority is thus given to an
accurate representation of continuously distributed patent characteristics relevant for selec-
tion, while maintaining a certain degree of analytical tractability. Conversely, the analysis of
the model does not allow for a comprehensive welfare assessment, which would require an
extension to a dynamic general equilibrium model, with more flexible technology and product
market structures, including downstream businesses and consumers, and an explicit modeling
of input factors and knowledge production functions. In addition, such a model would have
to comprise a notion of cumulative invention and a framework of repeated interaction. The
model developed in this paper is limited to a static incorporation of this idea, through the
introduction of the litigation reputation parameter Rlit.
3.8.2 Technical Simplifications
In a second step, let me outline some more specific technical simplifications, made in favor
of analytical and computational tractability, and to avoid a cluttered and ultimately opaque,
35Of the cases where infringement was decided first, 5.9% see a full or partial infringement verdict which is
followed by a full invalidation of the focal patent (Cremers et al., 2016, Table 1).
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incomprehensiblemodel. I start by discussing the properties of the random variables represent-
ing the patent’s inventive step, ıˆ, and the value of the patented invention, vˆ. While the require-
ments for patentability have a multi-dimensional nature in reality (technical character, nov-
elty, inventive step, and industrial application), they are streamlined into the one-dimensional
variable ıˆ in the model.36 Nonetheless, this choice does not entail a major divergence from an
exact representation, since especially the latter is a rather low hurdle in practice, excluding
only few inventions beyond the other criteria (EPO Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 2018). A
stronger assumption revolves around the treatment of patented invention value vˆ. As opposed
to the inventive step, which parties observe with error, the model assumes vˆ to be perfectly
observable by both the patent holder and the potential entrant. Divergent expectations are
thus limited to the assessment of legal stability of the patent right. In contrast, monopoly and
duopoly rents are a deterministic function of vˆ. While this is undoubtedly a departure from
the actual challenge of such estimates, a restriction of this or similar kind is inevitable to keep
the model tractable for calibration. Though it may be reasonable to forgo assessment errors
for value rather than legal stability, it would be interesting to explore the implications of the
opposite or an intermediate assumption in future work.
Further room for refinement lies in the relaxation of the assumption of statistical inde-
pendence of the inventive step ıˆ and patented invention value vˆ. The intuition behind this
assumption is that a patent protecting an incremental invention might be just as likely to
block access to an interesting market, as one constituting a major advance. Keep in mind that
in the context of the model, this is a statement conditional on being granted. Value could still
be correlated to a patent’s technological area and scope (Lerner, 1994; Merges and Nelson,
1990). Recent empirical evidence (Kelly et al., 2017, p. 22, footnote 8) however suggests that
inventive step and private value are indeed positively correlated, Corr(ˆı, vˆ) > 0. Since corre-
lation excludes factorization of the joint probability density, f (i, v) ̸= fi(i) fv(v), incorporating
this notion into the model would go along with a major impediment to analytical tractability.37
Besides, fundamental correlation of ıˆ and vˆ might blur the analysis of co-occurrence patterns
due to selection. This is best explained by Figures C.3 and C.4 in the appendix. While ıˆ and vˆ
are uncorrelated in the patent population, due to selection they are positively correlated con-
ditional on litigation. Despite these caveats, it might be worthwhile to explore the sensitivity
of the calibration to different levels of correlation, or, in a first attempt, to simulate how out-
come rates change ceteris paribus when correlation is gradually introduced. More generally,
the exploration of alternative distributional assumptions for vˆ, ıˆ, ϵˆp and ϵˆd to those motivated
in Section 3.4.1, is left for future work.
In the context of the inventive step, the model introduces a simplification of court deci-
sions. Depending on the revealed ıˆ and the validity threshold i0, courts judge a patent to
36For details, see Section 3.1.
37Note that analytical intermediate results analogous to those presented in Appendix C.1 may be indispensable
for an exact solution of the model. Since relevant integrands inherently contain discontinuities, as discussed in
Section 3.3, adding further layers of numerical integration may be unfeasible.
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be either valid or invalid in its entirety. The model thus abstracts from the notion of partial
invalidity, which for the purpose of calibration is subsumed under “invalid.” The calibration
results concerning validity have consequently been interpreted as the latent share of patents
which are fully or partially invalid. Results by Henkel and Zischka (2016) suggest that 47% of
partial annulments comply with the plaintiff’s claim and can thus be considered fully invalid.
The same might apply to a number of cases where plaintiffs claimed full, but courts decided
on partial invalidation.
A different kind of simplification lies in the treatment of total legal and settlement cost as
constant parameters. Keep in mind that the quantities C and S are supposed to reflect what
parties expect when making their decisions. Hence, introducing a probability distribution over
legal costs of mean C does not make a difference for risk-neutral parties. If, however, C and S
are expected to systematically depend on patented invention value vˆ or the true inventive step
ıˆ, the model could be extended correspondingly. From a technical point of view, this naturally
comes at the cost of additional parameters. While a linear relationship, and hence a single
additional parameter, may be sufficient for C(vˆ), settlement costs likely depend on ıˆp, ıˆd and
vˆ in a non-linear and potentially non-symmetric way.
Two dimensions of heterogeneity lend themselves to further calibrations of the model in
follow-on research. First, it may be worthwhile to explore in how far the selection intensity
varies by technology area. For instance, the distribution of inventive steps may differ due to
particular appropriation environments, due to different levels of technological maturity, due to
varying innovation cycles, or due to differing incentives for strategic patenting. Lanjouw and
Schankerman (2001, Table 1) show that while the ratio of infringement and annulment cases is
comparable across technology areas, overall litigation rates differ considerably. Furthermore,
differing market sizes, business models, and levels of competition may lead to heterogeneous
patent value distributions across technologies. Exploiting patent renewal data, the empirical
literature has found that patent value differs substantially by technology areas (Lanjouw, 1998;
Schankerman, 1998). In this context, an extension to the model developed here could consider
the possibility that patents primarily held to facilitate cross-licensing might be subject to lower
litigation risk, all else equal. For calibration in specific technology subsamples, this may be
particularly relevant.38
Second, it may be informative to study selection for jurisdictions with differing litigation
regulation. For example, under a system of American rule, in which both parties bear their
respective litigation costs, conclusions concerning the unobservable validity distribution may
differ, even if observed outcome rates are comparable. Besides, the prevalence of suits filed
by non-practicing entities strongly depends on the respective field. In fact, annulment rates
observed across European countries and applicant types are heterogeneous (Darts-ip, 2018,
38For the case of the US semiconductor industry, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) argue that litigation is
disincentivized as a consequence of cross-licensing practices in an oligopolistic market structure. Nonetheless,
evidence by Ziedonis (2003) suggests that litigation rates in the semiconductor industry have risen relative to R&D
investment after 1985.
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Figures 5 and 7). A challenge to extending the analysis to technology subsamples or other
countries is that the calibration of the model necessitates reliable estimates of the patent value
distribution.
3.9 Conclusion
In this paper I have developed a divergent expectations model for the selection of patents for
litigation. Conceptually, it incorporates an entry decision stage introducing endogeneity of
disputes and a negotiation stage separating settlements and litigation. Technically, it is based
on two key notions: the stylized representation of a patent’s inventive step, which parties
observe with error, and an explicit modeling of patented invention values, unlike in previous
studies. The paper characterizes the patent litigation system and illuminates the unobservable
mechanics of the selection process in a quantitativemanner. To this end, themodel is calibrated
to observable aggregate characteristics of the patent litigation system. The fitted model is in
turn used to explore the current state of the system, most prominently the share of latently
invalid patents in the population, and to simulate the impact of different forms of policy reform,
given the system’s current state.
The paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it complements prior research
on the economics of the patent litigation system. While most studies have focused on either
theoretical modeling or descriptive empirics, this paper develops a structural model that can
reproduce empirical outcome rates of patent disputes. Thereby, it provides new insights on
the role of patent validity in the selection for litigation. Prior evidence in this dimension is
scarce. Besides, the model is the first to explicitly account for the skewed distribution of patent
value. Prior empirical findings identifying patent value as a driver of litigation propensity are
confirmed. The model however allows to disentangle the origins of selection: Calibration
results suggest that the drivers of selection with respect to validity and value lie in separate
stages. Second, the paper contributes to prior work on the issue of low-quality patents. Most
of the literature has discussed potential negative consequences conceptually. Evidence on the
extent of the issue, however, remains scarce. To advance in this direction, this paper suggests
a novel approach to estimate the rate of latent invalidity in the patent population.
The key results are fourfold. First, for reasonable parameter assumptions, the model sug-
gests that despite the fact that 75% of litigated patents are fully or partially invalidated, the
share of patents in the population which would be invalidated if they became subject of court
proceedings, may lie as low as between 35% and 50%. This outcome is an indication for the
presence of a substantial selection bias concerning not only the value of patents, but also their
validity – a result not accurately reflected in previous studies. More specifically, the calibra-
tion reveals the competitor’s entry decision as the pivotal stage for the selection with respect
to validity. While only 4% of valid patents become subject of a dispute, as many as 55% of
invalid patents see the entry of a competitor. This result has profound implications for an as-
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sessment of the dysfunctionality of the patent examination and litigation systems. Although
patent rights should indeed be viewed as probabilistic by their holders (Lemley and Shapiro,
2005), this paper suggests that a majority of patent owners can indeed rely on their patent
protection – and, as a result, rarely incurs litigation.
Second, the model predicts that raising the courts’ current validity threshold by 10% of a
standard deviation of the patent population’s inventive step distribution, could – ceteris paribus
– translate into an increase of the probability of entry from 25.3% to 27.9%, an increase of
around 10%. In consequence, such a reform may have profound impact on competitive mar-
ket structures, potentially constituting a lever to transcend otherwise monopolistic regimes,
with presumably large benefits for downstream firms and consumers. Besides, the intensified
removal of marginally valid patents may spur follow-on innovation, at least in certain technol-
ogy areas, as Chapter 1 and other recent studies suggest (Galasso and Schankerman, 2015).
However, since weaker patent rights reduce ex-ante incentives to innovators, application num-
ber and quality may adjust in equilibrium and dampen the above estimates in the long run.
Even under the assumption that applicant behavior remains unchanged, these benefits come
at a certain price: The model predicts litigation rates to rise by around 5.8%, thus creating
higher negotiation and legal cost for firms and possibly the public sector.
Third, given the latent characteristics of the litigation system, a detrimental impact of a
reform as above, via increased rates of litigation, may be counteracted by increasing court fees
for patent cases in a reasonable manner. Since such reform requires increased scrutiny only
for the small fraction of cases handled by the courts, a cost-efficient level of “rational igno-
rance” at the patent office (Lemley, 2001) can be maintained. Consequently, the proposed
combination of policy reforms appears feasible. That being said, court heterogeneity (Lem-
ley, 2010; Gaessler and Lefouili, 2017) will likely persist and may pose a threat to successful
implementation throughout the entirety of a jurisdiction.
Fourth, selection with respect to patented invention value is substantial for litigated
patents, which are predicted to be 7-10 times more valuable than the average patent. The
driver is the negotiation stage, where parties can either come to a settlement or enter litiga-
tion. A further finding of the calibrated model is that cases with patented invention values
below a threshold of approximately 400 ke never enter litigation. These predictions can be
tested in future empirical work.
The results of this paper may serve as a benchmark for policy makers and practitioners,
for instance, in assessing whether examination at the patent office is effective (Lemley, 2001),
to what extent the presumption of validity in litigation is reasonable (Lichtman and Lemley,
2007), and in how far policy reform may have impact.
Further research required for a comprehensive welfare assessment includes the calibration
of a general equilibrium model incorporating more flexible and more complex market struc-
tures, downstream licensees, a more realistic notion of cumulative invention and repeated
interaction, and an explicit modeling of input factors and knowledge production functions.
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A.1 Figures
Figure A.1: Timeline for the average opposed patent in our sample
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Notes: The Pre3 citation window covers the first three years after filing, the Post5 citation window covers the five
years after the opposition outcome.
Figure A.2: Distribution of patent age
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Notes: This graph includes all opposition proceedings (on patent level) which are part of our main sample of
analysis.
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Figure A.3: Distribution of examiner-specific participation rates
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Notes: This graph shows the distribution of participation rates at examiner level. Examiners with less than 3
observations are excluded.
Figure A.4: Quantile-Quantile Plot: EP/WO examiner citations vs US citations
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Figure A.5: Timing of the invalidation effect – Chemistry subsample
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Notes: This figure is in direct analogy to Figure 1.4 in the main text, but with the sample restricted to chemistry
patents. Blue points depict the coefficients of invalidation resulting from IV regressions for each year after oppo-
sition outcome, where as the dependent variable we use a dummy citation variable indicating whether or not a
patent has been cited in the respective time span. The usual independent citation control variables (Pre3Self and
Pre3Other) are also replaced by dummies. Error bars show the corresponding lower and upper 95% confidence
limits. The significance levels are indicated by stars below each bar.
Figure A.6: Timing of the invalidation effect – Electr. Engineering / Instruments subsample
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Notes: The IV regressions underlying this figure are restricted to electrical engineering and instrument patents, in
direct analogy to Figure A.5.
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A.2 Tables – Descriptives
Table A.1: Overview and definition of subsamples
Sample definition N %
All patents with filed opposition and grant date 1993-2011 49,938 100.00%
− destroyed files 8 0.02%
− unavailable files 150 0.30%
⇒ available in online file inspection register 49,780 99.68%
− no readable examiner information 1,203 2.41%
⇒ with (primary) examiner information 48,577 97.27%
− patent holder requests revocation 2,031 4.07%
− patent holder withdraws patent 514 1.03%
− opponent withdraws opposition 3,863 7.74%
− no readable opposition information 338 0.68%
− opposition proceeding still pending 470 0.94%
⇒ with opposition division information 41,358 82.82%
− first decision after 2011 8,283 16.59%
⇒ sample of analysis 33,075 66.23%
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Table A.2: Opposition outcomes and appeals
Oppositions Appeal rate Reversal rate
Electrical engineering
Outcome: valid 982 0.39 0.18
Outcome: invalid 2,458 0.45 0.02
Instruments
Outcome: valid 1,136 0.46 0.23
Outcome: invalid 3,086 0.50 0.03
Chemistry
Outcome: valid 3,277 0.43 0.22
Outcome: invalid 9,734 0.50 0.02
Mechanical engineering
Outcome: valid 3,496 0.43 0.21
Outcome: invalid 6,890 0.45 0.02
Other Fields
Outcome: valid 743 0.48 0.17
Outcome: invalid 1,273 0.46 0.02
Notes: Reversal rate unconditional on appeal.
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Table A.3: Groups of control variables
Group name Variables in group
Year effects Dummies for grant year
Dummies for opposition outcome year
Age effects Dummies for age in years
Technology effects Dummies for technology class (34)
Patent characteristics Dummy for PCT application
Dummy for accelerated examination
Dummy for examination in Munich
Dummies for publication language
Size of docdb family
Number of IPC classes
Number of inventors
log(1 + Number of patent literature references)
Patent holder characteristics Number of applicants
Dummies for patent holder country
Dummy for patent holder corporation
Dummies for patent holder patent portfolio size:
tertiles within technology: small – medium – large
Opponent characteristics Number of opponents
Dummies for opponent country
Dummy for opponent corporation
Examination characteristics Duration of examination
Duration of wait until examination
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A.3 Tables – Instrumental Variable and Complier Analysis
Table A.4: Differences between patents by opposition outcome
Dependent variable β(Invalidated) StdErr t p
Docdb family size 0.679∗∗∗ 0.108 6.278 0.000
PCT application (d) 0.033∗∗∗ 0.006 5.723 0.000
No of applicants −0.003 0.004 −0.722 0.470
No of inventors 0.098∗∗∗ 0.020 4.835 0.000
No of claims 1.265∗∗∗ 0.109 11.578 0.000
No of IPC classes 0.006 0.027 0.217 0.828
No of PL refs 0.194∗∗∗ 0.035 5.514 0.000
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.035∗∗∗ 0.007 5.414 0.000
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.012∗ 0.005 2.463 0.014
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Results from OLS regressions of different patent characteristics on first opposition outcome and sets of
indicator variables for technology area, grant year and opposition outcome year. Each row shows the coefficient,
the robust standard error, the t-statistic, and the p-value of the indicator for invalidation. The two groups of
patents differ significantly, indicating the necessity of the instrumental variable approach. One is added to all
citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no citations.
Table A.5: Differences between patents by examiner participation
Dependent variable β(Ex. part.) StdErr t p
Docdb family size −0.092 0.128 −0.718 0.473
PCT application (d) 0.003 0.006 0.464 0.643
No of applicants 0.004 0.004 1.109 0.268
No of inventors 0.035† 0.021 1.654 0.098
No of claims −0.002 0.124 −0.014 0.989
No of IPC classes 0.012 0.029 0.415 0.678
No of PL refs 0.003 0.037 0.083 0.934
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.002 0.007 0.313 0.754
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.004 0.005 0.837 0.403
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Results from OLS regressions of different patent characteristics on the instrumental participation variable
and sets of indicator variables for technology area, grant year and opposition outcome year. Each row shows the
coefficient, the robust standard error, the t-statistic, and the p-value of the “Examiner participation” indicator.
Patents with and without participation of the granting examiner in opposition do not differ significantly. One is
added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no citations.
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Table A.6: Probit regressions of instrumental dummy variable “Examiner participation in op-
position proceeding” on patent and examination characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit
Dependent variable Exam. part. Exam. part. Exam. part. Exam. part.
log(No of claims) −0.031∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) −0.008† −0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
PCT application (d) −0.045∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Accelerated examination (d) −0.012 0.023∗∗ 0.021∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Examined in Munich (d) 0.121∗∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.017∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Publication language: German (d) 0.013 0.011 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Publication language: English (d) 0.033∗∗ 0.014 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Docdb family size −0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No of IPC classifications 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No of inventors 0.002 0.003† 0.003†
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(Patent backward references) 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Duration of examination (yr) −0.015∗∗∗ 0.005 0.004
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
Duration of wait (yr) −0.014∗∗∗ 0.008 0.007
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Year effects No No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects No No Yes∗ Yes∗
Technology effects No No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent holder characteristics No No No Yes∗
Opponent characteristics No No No Yes
Model degrees of freedom 3 14 96 110
χ2-statistic 73.7 572.9 2,751.0 2,772.1
Pseudo-R2 0.002 0.014 0.072 0.073
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no citations. A
comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the
appendix.
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Table A.7: LATE discussion – Complier shares
Binary instrument
Exam. part. pˆ(Inv)< q(.25) pˆ(Inv)< q(.5) pˆ(Inv)< q(.75)
P(Invalidated) 0.7087 0.7087 0.7087 0.7087
P(Instrument = 1) 0.6770 0.2500 0.5000 0.7500
P(Complier) 0.0661 0.2110 0.1987 0.2046
P(Complier | Invalidated) 0.0301 0.2233 0.1402 0.0722
P(Complier | Not Inv.) 0.1535 0.1811 0.3411 0.5267
Notes: This table shows the share of complier patents in the full sample, P(Complier), the share among invalidated
patents, P(Complier | Invalidated), and the share among non-invalidated patents, P(Complier | Not Inv.), with
respect to different binary instruments. The first column uses the examiner participation indicator variable, the
remaining columns transform the probit-predicted invalidation probability instrument pˆ of Eq. (1.2) into binary
instruments by splitting at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile, respectively. For the examiner participation instru-
ment, the population share of compliers lies at around 6.6%, which is comprised of a share of 3.0% for invalidated
patents and 15.4% for non-invalidated patents.
Following the notation of Angrist and Pischke (2009, Section 4.4.4), we can write a patent i’s potential treatment
status as D1i when the instrument is Z = 1 and as D0i when Z = 0. “Complier” patents are then defined as those
whose treatment status is sensitive to the instrument, i.e., D1i = 0 (no invalidation) and D0i = 1 (invalidation) in
the above context. In a potential outcomes framework, the Wald estimand can be interpreted as a local average
treatment effect (LATE) on the subpopulation of compliers (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). They have to be distin-
guished from “always-takers” with D1i = D0i = 1, and “never-takers” with D1i = D0i = 0. The calculations of this
table rely, inter alia, on the monotonicity assumption D0i ≥ D1i∀i, i.e., on excluding the existence of “defiers” with
D1i = 1 and D0i = 0.
Table A.8: LATE discussion – Complier characteristics
Binary characteristic x E[x] E[x|complier] E[x|complier] / E[x] p(Ratio = 1)
DOCDB family size > 8 0.480 0.496 1.033 (0.080) 0.678
PCT application (d) 0.436 0.425 0.975 (0.086) 0.770
No of applicants > 1 0.061 0.032 0.521 (0.315) 0.129
No of inventors > 2 0.421 0.369 0.878 (0.092) 0.182
No of claims > 11 0.460 0.470 1.021 (0.083) 0.796
No of IPCs > 2 0.393 0.335 0.854 (0.100) 0.142
No of PL lit refs > 4 0.497 0.480 0.966 (0.080) 0.667
CitEPExaPre3Other > 0 0.407 0.387 0.952 (0.093) 0.606
CitEPExaPre3Self > 0 0.230 0.175 0.761 (0.142) 0.092
Notes: This table explores in how far the complier subpopulation differs from the full sample of opposed patents
with respect to a series of patent characteristics. Since the underlying calculation relies on characteristics being
binary, count variables are split at their indicated median. The first column indicates the share E[x] = P(x = 1) of
patents with x = 1 in the entire population, the second column indicates the corresponding share E[x | complier]
among complier patents. The third column shows the relative likelihood that complier patents have the binary
characteristic x indicated on the left. The corresponding robust standard errors shown in parantheses are derived
using seemingly unrelated estimation. Most characteristics occur among complier patents with similar rates as in
the full sample. Exceptions are the share of patents with more than one applicant and the share of patents with
self citations (added by EP examiners), both of which are lower among complier patents. However, none of the
ratios is significantly different from one on a 5% level, as shown in column four. Compliers are defined as in the
notes of Table A.7.
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A.4 Tables – Robustness
Table A.9: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – sizes of focal and citing patent holders
– chemistry subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExa. . . Post5Other) Large Non-large Large Non-large
Patent holder subsample Large Large Non-large Non-large
Invalidated (d) 0.130 −0.043 0.159∗ 0.236∗
(0.128) (0.154) (0.066) (0.102)
log(No of claims) 0.025∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.013† 0.031∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.033∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.019 −0.011 0.027∗ −0.005
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Year effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Technology effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗ Yes Yes Yes
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes† Yes∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes Yes∗ Yes†
Underidentification test 23.1 23.1 113.1 113.1
Weak identification test 63.0 63.0 197.8 197.8
Observations 4,328 4,328 8,670 8,670
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table explores the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations in the chemistry subsample
with respect to the differences in size between the holder of the citing patent (dependent variable) and the holder
of the focal patent (subsample). Columns (1) and (2) show the effect of invalidation on citations to patents held
by large and non-large patent owners, respectively, for the subsample of patents held by large patent owners,
Columns (3) and (4) analogously for the subsample of patents held by non-large patent owners. One is added
to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS
regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit
regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and
weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics,
respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control
variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.10: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent thickets and patent fences –
chemistry subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Thicket No thicket Fence No fence
Invalidated (d) −0.149 0.245∗ 0.282 0.326∗∗
(0.189) (0.104) (0.201) (0.110)
log(No of claims) 0.052∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.017 0.048∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.087∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) −0.003 −0.001 0.004 0.017
(0.027) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes† Yes Yes
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes†
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentification test 44.8 77.2 33.4 109.1
Weak identification test 53.5 221.8 56.7 216.4
Observations 1,613 10,786 3,629 9,364
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table explores the different effects of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations in the chemistry
subsample in the presence or absence of patent thickets and patent fences. Columns (1) and (2) represent a
sample split with respect to the presence of a patent thicket in the focal patent’s technology area. We consider a
thicket to be present if the area triples variable derived by von Graevenitz et al. (2011) lies at or above the 90th
percentile in the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) show the effect of invalidation for a sample split with respect to
the presence of a patent fence erected by the holder of the focal patent. We consider a fence to be present if we find
at least one similar patent by the focal patent owner prior to opposition. The similarity measure we use is sensitive
to the title, the claims, the technology area and the full text of the patent. One is added to all citation variables
before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated”
dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner
participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are
the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported
by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the
indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.11: Impact of invalidation on EP/WOcitations – sizes of focal and citing patent holders
– electrical engineering / instruments subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExa. . . Post5Other) Large Non-large Large Non-large
Patent holder subsample Large Large Non-large Non-large
Invalidated (d) 0.016 −0.026 0.080 0.309∗
(0.166) (0.253) (0.107) (0.150)
log(No of claims) 0.004 0.024 0.026∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.008) (0.012)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.039† 0.003 0.015 0.072∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.024)
Year effects Yes† Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes Yes∗∗ Yes
Technology effects Yes∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes†
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes Yes
Underidentification test 42.8 42.8 46.9 46.9
Weak identification test 53.1 53.1 96.2 96.2
Observations 2,547 2,547 5,105 5,105
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table explores the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations in the electrical engineering /
instruments subsample with respect to the differences in size between the holder of the citing patent (dependent
variable) and the holder of the focal patent (subsample). Columns (1) and (2) show the effect of invalidation
on citations to patents held by large and non-large patent owners, respectively, for the subsample of patents held
by large patent owners, Columns (3) and (4) analogously for the subsample of patents held by non-large patent
owners. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward
citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability
predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The
underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk
LM andWald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive
list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.12: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent thickets and patent fences –
electrical engineering / instruments subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Thicket No thicket Fence No fence
Invalidated (d) −0.187 0.319 0.092 0.400†
(0.205) (0.231) (0.188) (0.219)
log(No of claims) 0.076∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.171∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.014) (0.022) (0.014)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.107† 0.027 0.022 0.089∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.021) (0.027) (0.026)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes Yes Yes
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes†
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes∗∗
Underidentification test 32.0 63.7 41.8 39.8
Weak identification test 46.7 91.1 44.9 90.4
Observations 1,097 6,200 1,844 5,798
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table explores the different effects of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations in the electrical en-
gineering / instruments subsample in the presence or absence of patent thickets and patent fences. Columns (1)
and (2) represent a sample split with respect to the presence of a patent thicket in the focal patent’s technology
area. We consider a thicket to be present if the area triples variable derived by von Graevenitz et al. (2011) lies at
or above the 90th percentile in the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) show the effect of invalidation for a sample
split with respect to the presence of a patent fence erected by the holder of the focal patent. We consider a fence
to be present if we find at least one similar patent by the focal patent owner prior to opposition. The similarity
measure we use is sensitive to the title, the claims, the technology area and the full text of the patent. One is
added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each
2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit
regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and
weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statis-
tics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control
variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.13: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – exclusion of particular cases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample No dead patents No acc exam No rev appeals No appeals
Invalidated (d) 0.270∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.171†
(0.072) (0.087) (0.070) (0.091)
log(No of claims) 0.054∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.130∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.020∗ 0.019∗ 0.017∗ 0.011
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes
Underidentification test 217.8 151.1 289.6 43.0
Weak identification test 564.8 407.0 731.5 251.4
Observations 30,347 29,389 30,620 17,653
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward
citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability
predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The
underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk
LM andWald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive
list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.14: Baseline regressions with bootstrapped standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.008 0.292∗∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.079) (0.033) (0.081)
log(No of claims) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.130∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.005† 0.127∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.019∗ 0.020∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Analogous to Table 1.6 in the main text, but showing bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses (500
replications). All bootstrapped standard errors are quantitatively very similar to the robust standard errors in Table
1.6, resulting in identical significance levels for the invalidation coefficient.
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Table A.15: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPextExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.005 0.249∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.067) (0.026) (0.069)
log(No of claims) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
log(CitEPextExaPre3Other) 0.135∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.003 0.131∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
log(CitEPextExaPre3Self) 0.015 0.017† 0.032∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 222.3 222.3 222.3
Weak identification test 505.5 505.5 505.5
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table is analogous to Table 1.6, but counts only one forward citation per unique follow-on inventor in
the respective time frames. The results thus indicate the effect of invalidation on the extensive margin of follow-on
innovation. Columns (1) and (2) provide a comparison between the OLS and the 2SLS regressions for the impact of
invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations to patents held by other parties than the focal patent owner, as measured
by EP/WO examiner forward citations in a 5-year window following the decision of the opposition proceeding.
Columns (2)–(4) show 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation on the number of follow-on patents held
by other parties than the focal patent owner, on the number of follow-on patents held by the focal patent owner
herself and on the total number of follow-on patents, respectively. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated”
dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner
participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are
the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported
by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the
indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.16: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citation dummy variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: (CitEPExaPost5. . . ) > 0 (d) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.001 0.247∗∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.060) (0.038) (0.061)
log(No of claims) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
CitEPExaPre3Other > 0 (d) 0.101∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
CitEPExaPre3Self > 0 (d) 0.016∗ 0.017∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes† Yes† Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 221.1 221.1 221.1
Weak identification test 504.7 504.7 504.7
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table is analogous to Table 1.6, but has all citation variables replaced with the corresponding dummies
indicating at least one citation. Columns (1) and (2) provide a comparison between the OLS and the 2SLS regres-
sions for the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations to patents held by other parties than the focal
patent owner, as measured by EP/WO examiner forward citations in a 5-year window following the decision of the
opposition proceeding. Columns (2)–(4) show 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation on the number of
follow-on patents held by other parties than the focal patent owner, on the number of follow-on patents held by the
focal patent owner herself and on the total number of follow-on patents, respectively. In each 2SLS regression the
“Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the
“Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identifica-
tion tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as
reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained
in the indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.17: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – alternative treatment of “amended”
patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.020∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.042 0.234∗∗
(0.006) (0.072) (0.031) (0.075)
log(No of claims) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
log(CitEPExaPre3Other) 0.129∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
log(CitEPExaPre3Self) 0.019∗ 0.020∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Underidentification test 97.4 97.4 97.4
Weak identification test 426.8 426.8 426.8
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table is analogous to Table 1.6, but has cases where the patent remained valid in amended form with
fewer claims lost than the global median treated as valid. Columns (1) and (2) provide a comparison between
the OLS and the 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation on EP/WO examiner citations to patents held
by other parties than the focal patent owner, as measured by EP/WO examiner forward citations in a 5-year
window following the decision of the opposition proceeding. Columns (2)–(4) show 2SLS regressions for the
impact of invalidation on the number of follow-on patents held by other parties than the focal patent owner, on the
number of follow-on patents held by the focal patent owner herself and on the total number of follow-on patents,
respectively. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability
predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The
underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk
LM andWald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive
list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.19: Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – citations added by non-focal exam-
iners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitEPOtExaPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Technology area Electr Eng Instruments Chemistry Mech Eng
Invalidated (d) 0.273 0.428† 0.292 0.211
(0.283) (0.256) (0.184) (0.170)
log(No of claims) 0.003 0.077∗∗ 0.019 0.037∗
(0.026) (0.029) (0.015) (0.014)
log(CitEPOtExaPre3Other) 0.141∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.025 0.126∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.059) (0.023) (0.027)
log(CitEPOtExaPre3Self) −0.034 0.035 −0.023 0.065†
(0.068) (0.066) (0.026) (0.035)
Year effects Yes Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Technology effects Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes Yes† Yes
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentification test 10.6 19.3 28.7 9.7
Weak identification test 12.5 18.9 41.5 23.5
Observations 576 725 2,596 2,674
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: While in close analogy to Table 1.7, the EP examiner citation variables (both dependent and independent)
in the IV regressions above include only those citations, for which we can exclude that they were made by the focal
patent’s examiner. Due to resulting data restrictions we have to limit the sample to patents with an application
filing year ≥ 2001. While this reduces the number of observations and the citation count, the coefficients closely
reproduce those of Table 1.7, ruling out potentially modified powers of recall when a focal examiner involved in
the opposition proceeding is compiling subsequent search reports as a main driver of the observed effect. One is
added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward citations. In each
2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit
regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The underidentification and
weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics,
respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control
variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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A.5 Tables – US Citations
The following tables are analogous to Tables 1.4 to 1.10 for EP/WO citations in the main text.
Table A.20: Characteristics of US forward citations by relationship to cited patent
Self citations Other citations
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Publication authority
US (d) 1 0.00 1 1 1 0.00 1 1
Citation characteristics
Citation lag (yr) 10.59 3.38 0 28 10.90 3.83 0 30
Docdb family size 7.28 6.60 1 134 5.77 6.22 1 254
Sector (citing applicant)
Company (d) 0.99 0.11 0 1 0.86 0.35 0 1
Country (citing applicant)
EPC (excl. GB) (d) 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1
GB (d) 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.02 0.13 0 1
US (d) 0.58 0.49 0 1 0.62 0.49 0 1
JP (d) 0.09 0.28 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1
Other (d) 0.02 0.12 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1
Size (citing applicant)
Large (d) 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.27 0.45 0 1
Medium (d) 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Small (d) 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1
Observations 18,315 137,592
Notes: This table includes all forward citations of US applications to patents subject to opposition proceedings
in our main sample of analysis. The unit of observation is the citation. In case of multiple citing applicants, we
give preference according to the ordering of sector, country, and size. “Country” refers to the country of residence.
Size categories are proxied by the number of patents (incl. applications) filed during the last five years prior to the
opposition decision (large: 200 and more patents, medium: 20 and more patents, small: fewer than 20 patents.
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Table A.21: Examiner participation and opposition outcome (US citations)
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit
Dependent variable Invalidated (d) Invalidated (d) Examiner participation (d)
Exam. participation (d) −0.066∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
log(No of claims) 0.039∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
log(CitUSPre3Other) 0.012∗∗ 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
log(CitUSPre3Self) −0.009† 0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
Duration of examination (yr) −0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.007)
Duration of wait (yr) 0.009 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Year effects No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects No Yes∗ Yes∗
Technology effects No Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics No Yes∗∗∗ Yes†
Patent holder characteristics No Yes∗∗ Yes∗
Opponent characteristics No Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Model degrees of freedom 1 111 110
χ2-statistic 154.3 1,822.5 2,772.1
Pseudo-R2 0.004 0.061 0.073
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075
Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: The probit regressions in Columns (1) and (2) illuminate the relevance of the “Examiner participation”
dummy for the outcome of the opposition proceeding. The invalidation predictions of the probit regression in
Column (2)—or equivalent predictions for subsamples and other citation measures—are used as the instrument in
the 2SLS instrumental variables regressions throughout the paper. Column (3) shows the probit regression of the
“Examiner participation” dummy on the other exogenous variables. One is added to all citation variables before
taking the logarithm to include patents with no citations. A comprehensive list of the control variables contained
in the indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.22: Impact of invalidation on US citations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitUSPost5. . . ) Other Other Self Total
Invalidated (d) −0.027∗∗ 0.381∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.118) (0.062) (0.121)
log(No of claims) 0.102∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
log(CitUSPre3Other) 0.438∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
log(CitUSPre3Self) 0.155∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes† Yes† Yes†
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes∗∗ Yes† Yes Yes†
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Underidentification test 222.9 222.9 222.9
Weak identification test 505.8 505.8 505.8
Observations 33,075 33,075 33,075 33,075
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) provide a comparison between the OLS and the 2SLS regressions for the impact of
invalidation on US forward citations to patents held by other parties than the focal patent owner, as measured by
US forward citations in a 5-year window following the decision of the opposition proceeding. Columns (2)–(4)
show 2SLS regressions for the impact of invalidation on the number of follow-on patents held by other parties
than the focal patent owner, on the number of follow-on patents held by the focal patent owner herself and on the
total number of follow-on patents, respectively. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm
to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented
with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all
other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM andWald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum
et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table
A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.23: Impact of invalidation on US citations – technology main areas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitUSPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Technology area Electr Eng Instruments Chemistry Mech Eng
Invalidated (d) −0.040 0.582 0.307† 0.047
(0.297) (0.398) (0.171) (0.209)
log(No of claims) 0.136∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.027) (0.014) (0.014)
log(CitUSPre3Other) 0.507∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.011) (0.013)
log(CitUSPre3Self) 0.184∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.028) (0.014) (0.019)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes Yes Yes∗∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗ Yes∗ Yes
Underidentification test 32.2 49.3 123.2 43.9
Weak identification test 75.1 63.1 257.5 77.3
Observations 3,432 4,220 13,011 10,384
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Columns (1)–(4) show the impact of invalidation on US forward citations to patents held by parties other
than the focal patent holder for the technology main area subsamples Electrical Engineering, Instruments, Chem-
istry and Mechanical Engineering, respectively. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm
to include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented
with the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all
other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM andWald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum
et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table
A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.25: Impact of invalidation on US citations – sizes of focal and citing patent holders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitUS. . . Post5Other) Large Non-large Large Non-large
Patent holder subsample Large Large Non-large Non-large
Invalidated (d) 0.175 0.088 0.269∗∗ 0.324∗
(0.169) (0.204) (0.093) (0.132)
log(No of claims) 0.035∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.010)
log(CitUSPre3Other) 0.217∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
log(CitUSPre3Self) 0.121∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes∗ Yes Yes Yes†
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes†
Underidentification test 64.4 64.4 172.2 172.2
Weak identification test 149.2 149.2 351.3 351.3
Observations 11,038 11,038 22,037 22,037
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table explores the impact of invalidation on US citations with respect to the differences in size between
the holder of the citing patent (dependent variable) and the holder of the focal patent (subsample). Columns (1)
and (2) show the effect of invalidation on citations to patents held by large and non-large patent owners, respec-
tively, for the subsample of patents held by large patent owners, Columns (3) and (4) analogously for the subsample
of patents held by non-large patent owners. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to
include patents with no forward citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with
the corresponding probability predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all
other exogenous variables. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM andWald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum
et al., 2010). A comprehensive list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table
A.3 in the appendix.
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Table A.26: Impact of invalidation on US citations – patent thickets and patent fences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dep var: log(CitUSPost5. . . ) Other Other Other Other
Subsample Thicket No thicket Fence No fence
Invalidated (d) −0.326 0.227† 0.332 0.443∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.130) (0.220) (0.134)
log(No of claims) 0.126∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010)
log(CitUSPre3Other) 0.429∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009)
log(CitUSPre3Self) 0.131∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013)
Year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Age effects Yes Yes† Yes Yes†
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Patent characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Examination characteristics Yes Yes† Yes Yes∗
Patent holder characteristics Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opponent characteristics Yes Yes∗∗ Yes Yes∗∗
Underidentification test 64.3 178.6 68.9 171.8
Weak identification test 81.7 424.0 118.7 390.0
Observations 3,239 28,494 8,826 24,233
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table explores the different effects of invalidation on US citations in the presence or absence of patent
thickets and patent fences. Columns (1) and (2) represent a sample split with respect to the presence of a patent
thicket in the focal patent’s technology area. We consider a thicket to be present if the area triples variable derived
by von Graevenitz et al. (2011) lies at or above the 90th percentile in the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) show
the effect of invalidation for a sample split with respect to the presence of a patent fence erected by the holder of the
focal patent. We consider a fence to be present if we find at least one similar patent by the focal patent owner prior
to opposition. The similarity measure we use is sensitive to the title, the claims, the technology area and the full text
of the patent. One is added to all citation variables before taking the logarithm to include patents with no forward
citations. In each 2SLS regression the “Invalidated” dummy is instrumented with the corresponding probability
predicted by a probit regression on the “Examiner participation” dummy and all other exogenous variables. The
underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk
LM andWald F statistics, respectively, as reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2010). A comprehensive
list of the control variables contained in the indicated groups can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
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A.6 Construction of the Examiner Participation Dummy Variable
As explained in Section 1.4, we use the presence or absence of the primary examiner in the
opposition division as an instrument to allow for causal inference concerning follow-on inno-
vation for the sample of all opposed EP patents between 1993 and 2011. For this purpose,
we first identify the relevant set of patents by the EPO PATSTAT Register – 2015 Autumn Edi-
tion. Second, to determine the names of the examination and opposition division’s members,
we download three types of (scanned) pdf-documents from the EPO database for each of the
identified patents: the grant decision for the examination division and the minutes of the oral
proceedings as well as the opposition outcome decision for the opposition division. We use
two types of documents for the latter to reduce the likelihood of errors. Third, we extract
and pre-process the image files included in the pdf-files and read the contained information to
txt-files using optical character recognition (OCR) software. Fourth, using a keyword search
specific to each document type and language, we identify and parse the names of the respec-
tive division’s members to a standardized format with first and last names separated. Fifth, we
check whether one person is a member of both the examination and the opposition division
by comparing the names of both divisions with different string similarity measures.
Two aspects are worth noting. First, the use of both the minutes of the oral proceedings
and the opposition decision document to identify the opposition division is legitimate, since
the division holding the oral proceedings must be the same as the opposition division rendering
the decision in writing, otherwise the decision is deemed to be void.1 Second, in some cases we
are unable to identify all relevant members, for example because the EPO database holds the
wrong document under the specific link, and in some cases we might erroneously identify the
substantive examiner as being present or absent, for example because the scanned document
and thus the OCR is of poor quality. However, the read-out quality and success do not depend
on the outcome of the opposition, since the corresponding decision document has the same
format across all three outcomes, and thus does not affect identification.
1See for instance T 390/86 with a decision from 17 November 1987.
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B.1 Figures
Figure B.1: Effect of invalidation on the propensity to file for a patent
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Notes: Coefficient estimates of invalidation for years relative to opposition outcome from an instrumental variable
(2SLS) fixed effects regression on (inventor, year relative to opposition outcome)-level using Schaffer (2010).
The dependent variable yi t = 1(NApp,i t > 0) indicates whether inventor i has filed a patent application in period
t. The corresponding specification is given by yi t =
∑10
τ=−10 βτ 1(Invalidatedi)1(t = τ) + at + bt−taf + ci + ϵi t .
i and t are the indices for the inventor and the year relative to opposition outcome, respectively; fixed effects
are described in the main text. The interactions are instrumented with z τi,t = 1(Examiner participationi)1(t = τ),
where τ= −10, . . . , 10 denotes years relative to opposition outcome. Error bars indicate the respective coefficient’s
95% confidence interval. Stars at the bottom of the figure indicate the significance levels of the coefficients.
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B.2 Tables – Instrumental Variable and Complier Analysis
Table B.1: Regressions of instrumental variable on application and inventor characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable 1(Ex part) 1(Ex part) 1(Ex part)
Level of observation Opposition Inventor Inventor
Application characteristics
DOCDB family size 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
PCT application (d) 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.007)
No of applicants 0.015∗ 0.012
(0.008) (0.009)
No of inventors 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
log(1 + Claims) −0.005 0.001
(0.005) (0.006)
log(1 + Pat lit refs) −0.002 0.004
(0.005) (0.006)
log(1 + Cit5) 0.006∗∗ 0.006
(0.003) (0.004)
XYE backwards cit (d) 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.007)
Inventor characteristics
European inventor −0.008 −0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
Tenure 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
No of applications (pre) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
No of app in same area (pre) 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
No of app of coauthors (pre) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
No of tech areas (pre) 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Opp in expert tech area −0.006 −0.006
(0.006) (0.006)
App filing year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Opp outcome year effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Technology effects Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Number of oppositions 29,009 29,009
Observations 29,009 65,415 65,415
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Regression of the instrumental variable 1(Examiner participation) on different application (Column 1)
and inventor (Column 2) characteristics. Column (3) shows the regression on both application and inventor
characteristics. Standard errors reported in parantheses are heteroskedasticity-robust in Column (1) and clustered
on the opposition level in Columns (2) and (3).
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Complier Analysis
Following the notation of Angrist and Pischke (2009, Section 4.4.4), we can write a patent i’s
potential treatment status as D1i when the instrument is Z = 1 and as D0i when Z = 0. “Com-
plier” patents are then defined as those whose treatment status is sensitive to the instrument,
i.e., D0i = 1 (invalidation) and D1i = 0 (no invalidation) in the above context. (Remember
that examiner participation Z = 1 is associated with a lower likelihood of invalidation D = 1.)
In a potential outcomes framework, the Wald estimand can be interpreted as a local average
treatment effect (LATE) on the subpopulation of compliers (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). They
have to be distinguished from “always-takers” with D1i = D0i = 1, and “never-takers” with
D1i = D0i = 0. The calculations of the following tables rely, inter alia, on the monotonicity
assumption D0i ≥ D1i∀i, i.e., on excluding the existence of “defiers” with D1i = 1 and D0i = 0.
Table B.2: LATE discussion – Complier shares
Opposition level Inventor level
P(Invalidated) 0.7050 0.7141
P(Examiner participation) 0.6807 0.6860
P(Complier) 0.0708 0.0688
P(Complier | Invalidated) 0.0321 0.0302
P(Complier | Not Inv.) 0.1634 0.1650
N 29,009 65,415
Notes: This table shows the share of complier patents in the full sample, P(Complier), the share among invalidated
patents, P(Complier | Invalidated), and the share among non-invalidated patents, P(Complier | Not Inv.), on the
opposition and the inventor level. In both cases, the population share of compliers lies at around 7%, which is
comprised of a share of 3% for invalidated patents and 16-17% for non-invalidated patents.
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Table B.3: LATE discussion – Complier application characteristics
Binary characteristic x N E[x] E[x|com] E[x|com] / E[x] p(Ratio=1)
DOCDB family size > 8 29,009 0.461 0.525 1.137 (0.085) 0.104
PCT application (d) 29,009 0.447 0.455 1.017 (0.084) 0.843
No of applicants > 1 29,009 0.065 0.025 0.383 (0.310) 0.046
No of inventors > 2 29,009 0.451 0.379 0.841 (0.086) 0.065
No of claims > 11 29,009 0.458 0.474 1.034 (0.083) 0.680
No of PL lit refs > 5 29,009 0.460 0.422 0.918 (0.083) 0.320
Cit (5yr-window) > 2 29,009 0.632 0.518 0.819 (0.057) 0.002
XYE references (d) 29,009 0.692 0.665 0.961 (0.052) 0.456
Notes: This table explores in how far the complier subpopulation differs from the full sample of opposed patents
with respect to a series of patent characteristics. Since the underlying calculation relies on characteristics being
binary, count variables are split at their median indicated in the first column. The second column indicates the
number of opposed applications included in our baseline sample. The third column displays the share E[x] =
P(x = 1) of patents with x = 1 in the entire population, the fourth column displays the corresponding share
E[x | complier] among complier patents. The fifth column shows the relative likelihood that complier patents have
the binary characteristic x indicated on the left. The corresponding robust standard errors shown in parantheses
are derived using seemingly unrelated estimation. The p-values corresponding to a test of whether this ratio equals
one are presented in the last column. On a 10% level, we find significantly smaller shares of complier patents with
more than one applicant, with more than two inventors and with more than two citations in a five-year window
after filing. Compliers are defined as described above.
Table B.4: LATE discussion – Complier inventor characteristics
Binary characteristic x N E[x] E[x|com] E[x|com] / E[x] p(Ratio=1)
European inventor 65,415 0.575 0.614 1.067 (0.081) 0.410
Tenure > 9.05 65,415 0.500 0.436 0.873 (0.069) 0.065
No of applications (pre) > 4 65,415 0.443 0.395 0.890 (0.074) 0.136
No of app in same area (pre) > 2 65,415 0.422 0.397 0.942 (0.082) 0.480
No of app of coauthors (pre) > 4 65,415 0.495 0.489 0.989 (0.065) 0.866
No of tech areas (pre) > 2 65,415 0.307 0.232 0.756 (0.099) 0.013
Opp in expert tech area 65,415 0.770 0.784 1.019 (0.037) 0.621
Notes: Analogous to the application-level analysis in Table B.3, this table explores in how far the complier inventor
subpopulation differs from the full sample of first-opposition inventors with respect to a series of inventor char-
acteristics (cf first column). The second column shows the number of inventors included in our baseline sample.
On a 10% level, we find that significantly smaller shares of complier inventors with tenure above 9 years and with
prior patenting in more than two technology areas. Standard errors indicated in parantheses are clustered on the
opposition level.
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B.3 Tables – Robustness
Table B.5: Effect of invalidation on number of applications: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Dependent variable Napp Napp Napp Napp Napp
Subsample N¯preapp ≤ q.95 N¯preapp ≤ q.99 Nprearea ≤ q.95 App pre App pre+post
1(Invalidated) × 1(Post) −0.427∗∗∗ −0.561∗∗∗ −0.386∗∗∗ −0.506∗∗∗ −0.986∗∗
(0.097) (0.125) (0.131) (0.149) (0.402)
Year effects (rel to oppo) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Year effects (rel to appl) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 74.1 76.2 77.8 77.5 31.0
Weak identification test 74.7 76.8 78.4 78.2 31.1
Number of oppositions 28,355 28,901 28,521 28,849 16,505
Number of inventors 62,202 64,777 62,648 64,941 25,300
Observations 1,214,896 1,264,553 1,223,620 1,267,639 497,213
Standard errors clustered at the opposition level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Instrumental variable (2SLS) fixed effects regressions on (inventor, year relative to opposition outcome)-
level. N¯ preapp denotes the average yearly number of applications in the pre period, qx denotes inventor population
quantiles. N prearea indicates the number of technology areas, in which an inventor has filed applications prior to
opposition outcome. “App pre/post” indicates the subsample of inventors with applications in the pre or the post
period (almost the full sample), “App pre+post” indicates the subsample of inventors with applications in both the
pre and the post period (intensive margin). All variables are counted on the DOCDB family level. The post period
is defined as the time window from 0 to 10 years after opposition. Standard errors are clustered at the opposition
level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap
(2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by the xtivreg2 Stata command (Schaffer, 2010).
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B.4 Tables – Baseline Specification
Table B.6: Effect of invalidation: Number of applications (Morrison et al. (2017) inventor
disambiguation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FE FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Dependent variable Napp Napp Napp log(1+ Napp) 1app
Application authority EP EP EP EP EP
1(Invalidated) × 1(Post) −0.055∗∗∗ −0.518∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗
(0.009) (0.197) (0.065) (0.050)
1(Exam part) × 1(Post) 0.027∗∗∗
(0.010)
Year effects (rel to oppo) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Year effects (rel to appl) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 39.8 39.8 39.8
Weak identification test 40.1 40.1 40.1
Number of oppositions 21,324 21,324 21,324 21,324 21,324
Number of inventors 47,419 47,419 47,419 47,419 47,419
Observations 909,521 909,521 909,521 909,521 909,521
Standard errors clustered at the opposition level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Analogous to Table 2.3 in the main text, but using the Morrison et al. (2017) inventor disambiguation.
Fixed Effects (Column 1), reduced form fixed effects (Column 2) and instrumental variable (2SLS) fixed effects
(Columns 3–5) regressions on (inventor, year relative to opposition outcome)-level. Columns (1)–(3) use different
specifications for the same dependent variable, the number of applications. Columns (3)–(5) use the same IV
FE estimator for different functional forms of the dependent variable: a linear-, a log- and an indicator variable
specification. Since the Morrison et al. (2017) disambiguation does not include national patent applications,
dependent variables analogous to those in Columns (6) and (7) of Table 2.3 can not be shown here. All variables
are counted on the DOCDB family level. The post period is defined as the time window from 0 to 10 years after
opposition. Standard errors are clustered at the opposition level. The underidentification and weak identification
tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as
reported by the xtivreg2 Stata command (Schaffer, 2010).
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B.5 Tables – Quality of Applications
Table B.9: Effect of invalidation: Quality of applications (Morrison et al. (2017) inventor
disambiguation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Dependent variable NXYEapp N
non-XYE
app N
cit5
app N
cit5, non-XYE
app
1(Invalidated) × 1(Post) −0.577∗∗∗ 0.059 −1.007 −0.366
(0.159) (0.077) (0.982) (0.284)
Year effects (rel to oppo) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Year effects (rel to appl) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 39.8 39.8 12.7 12.7
Weak identification test 40.1 40.1 12.7 12.7
Number of oppositions 21,324 21,324 12,514 12,514
Number of inventors 47,419 47,419 27,419 27,419
Observations 909,521 909,521 508,518 508,518
Standard errors clustered at the opposition level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Analogous to Table 2.4 in the main text, but using the Morrison et al. (2017) inventor disambiguation.
Column (1) shows the causal effect of invalidation on the number of applications which receive an X-, Y-, or E-
reference in the EPO examiner’s search report. Such references are indicative of novelty-threatening prior art and
hence constitute a proxy for subsequent failure to receive a patent grant. Column (2) presents regression results
for the number of applications which do not receive such a reference. While the number of XYE-cited applications
significantly decreases, the number of patent families, which are more likely to receive a grant, increases. Column
(3) displays the effect on the number applications weighted by the forward citations they receive in a five-year
window after filing. Column (4) uses the number of non-XYE-cited applications, weighted by the five-year forward
citation number, as the dependent variable. The citation-weighted variables in Column (3) and (4) are winsorized
at the 99th percentile to mitigate noise introduced by outliers. Without winsorizing, we obtain coefficients of very
similar magnitude, but larger standard errors. To allow for a full observation of the citation window, the sample is
truncated five years earlier, resulting in fewer observations. All variables are counted on the DOCDB family level.
The post period is defined as the time window from 0 to 10 years after opposition. Standard errors are clustered
at the opposition level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by the xtivreg2 Stata command
(Schaffer, 2010).
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Table B.10: Effect of invalidation: Quality of applications (European inventors)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Dependent variable NXYEapp N
non-XYE
app N
cit5
app N
cit5, non-XYE
app
1(Invalidated) × 1(Post) −0.533∗∗∗ 0.130∗ −1.183 −0.191
(0.145) (0.071) (0.807) (0.235)
Year effects (rel to oppo) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗
Year effects (rel to appl) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 53.5 53.5 17.3 17.3
Weak identification test 53.9 53.9 17.4 17.4
Number of oppositions 18,553 18,553 11,776 11,776
Number of inventors 37,618 37,618 23,687 23,687
Observations 731,366 731,366 451,662 451,662
Standard errors clustered at the opposition level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Analogous to Table 2.4 in the main text, but using the subsample of European inventors. Column (1)
shows the causal effect of invalidation on the number of applications which receive an X-, Y-, or E-reference in
the EPO examiner’s search report. Such references are indicative of potentially novelty destroying prior art and
hence constitute a proxy for subsequent failure to receive a patent grant. Column (2) presents regression results
for the number of applications which do not receive such a reference. While the number of XYE-cited applications
significantly decreases, the number of patent families, which are more likely to receive a grant, increases. Column
(3) displays the effect on the number applications weighted by the forward citations they receive in a five-year
window after filing. Column (4) uses the number of non-XYE-cited applications, weighted by the five-year forward
citation number, as the dependent variable. The citation-weighted variables in Column (3) and (4) are winsorized
at the 99th percentile to mitigate noise introduced by outliers. Without winsorizing, we obtain coefficients of very
similar magnitude, but larger standard errors. To allow for a full observation of the citation window, the sample is
truncated five years earlier, resulting in fewer observations. All variables are counted on the DOCDB family level.
The post period is defined as the time window from 0 to 10 years after opposition. Standard errors are clustered
at the opposition level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by the xtivreg2 Stata command
(Schaffer, 2010).
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Table B.11: Effect of invalidation: Quality of applications (foreign inventors)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Dependent variable NXYEapp N
non-XYE
app N
cit5
app N
cit5, non-XYE
app
1(Invalidated) × 1(Post) −0.734∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗ −2.098 −0.309
(0.236) (0.071) (1.277) (0.280)
Year effects (rel to oppo) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Year effects (rel to appl) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 28.2 28.2 12.0 12.0
Weak identification test 28.4 28.4 12.1 12.1
Number of oppositions 11,383 11,383 7,501 7,501
Number of inventors 27,797 27,797 18,703 18,703
Observations 545,363 545,363 359,344 359,344
Standard errors clustered at the opposition level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Analogous to Table 2.4 in the main text, but using the subsample of non-European inventors. Column (1)
shows the causal effect of invalidation on the number of applications which receive an X-, Y-, or E-reference in
the EPO examiner’s search report. Such references are indicative of potentially novelty destroying prior art and
hence constitute a proxy for subsequent failure to receive a patent grant. Column (2) presents regression results
for the number of applications which do not receive such a reference. While the number of XYE-cited applications
significantly decreases, the number of patent families, which are more likely to receive a grant, increases. Column
(3) displays the effect on the number applications weighted by the forward citations they receive in a five-year
window after filing. Column (4) uses the number of non-XYE-cited applications, weighted by the five-year forward
citation number, as the dependent variable. The citation-weighted variables in Column (3) and (4) are winsorized
at the 99th percentile to mitigate noise introduced by outliers. Without winsorizing, we obtain coefficients of very
similar magnitude, but larger standard errors. To allow for a full observation of the citation window, the sample is
truncated five years earlier, resulting in fewer observations. All variables are counted on the DOCDB family level.
The post period is defined as the time window from 0 to 10 years after opposition. Standard errors are clustered
at the opposition level. The underidentification and weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics, respectively, as reported by the xtivreg2 Stata command
(Schaffer, 2010).
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B.6 Tables – Direction
Table B.12: Effect of invalidation: Direction (Morrison et al. (2017) inventor disambiguation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Dependent variable N same arapp N
other ar
app Napp Napp N
same ar
app N
other ar
app
Subsample Full Full Non-Expert Expert Expert Expert
1(Invalidated) × 1(Post) −0.359∗∗ −0.159 −0.204 −0.618∗∗∗ −0.439∗∗ −0.179∗∗
(0.144) (0.102) (0.421) (0.221) (0.178) (0.072)
Year effects (rel to oppo) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Year effects (rel to appl) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 39.8 39.8 14.6 33.9 33.9 33.9
Weak identification test 40.1 40.1 14.7 34.1 34.1 34.1
Number of oppositions 21,324 21,324 6,275 18,732 18,732 18,732
Number of inventors 47,419 47,419 9,554 37,865 37,865 37,865
Observations 909,521 909,521 181,739 727,782 727,782 727,782
Standard errors clustered at the opposition level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Analogous to Table 2.5 in the main text, but using the Morrison et al. (2017) inventor disambiguation.
Columns (1) and (2) present the effect of invalidation on the number of applications in the same and other tech-
nology areas as the opposed patent, respectively. Column (3) shows the invalidation effect for inventors who
experience their first opposition outside their area of expertise, i.e., outside the area in which they have filed most
patents prior to opposition outcome. Columns (4)-(6) show the effect for the complimentary subsample of inven-
tors whose first opposition is in their expert technology area. Column (4) presents the effect on the all applications,
Columns (5) and (6) present the effects on applications in the same and other areas as the opposed patent, respec-
tively. All variables are counted on the DOCDB family level. The post period is defined as the time window from
0 to 10 years after opposition. Standard errors are clustered at the opposition level. The underidentification and
weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics,
respectively, as reported by the xtivreg2 Stata command (Schaffer, 2010).
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Table B.13: Effect of invalidation: Direction (European inventors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Dependent variable N same arapp N
other ar
app Napp Napp N
same ar
app N
other ar
app
Subsample Full Full Non-Expert Expert Expert Expert
1(Invalidated) × 1(Post) −0.211∗ −0.192∗ −0.552 −0.371∗∗ −0.264∗ −0.107
(0.122) (0.104) (0.495) (0.180) (0.143) (0.070)
Year effects (rel to oppo) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗ Yes Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗
Year effects (rel to appl) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 53.5 53.5 12.8 51.0 51.0 51.0
Weak identification test 53.9 53.9 12.9 51.4 51.4 51.4
Number of oppositions 18,553 18,553 5,823 15,968 15,968 15,968
Number of inventors 37,618 37,618 8,356 29,262 29,262 29,262
Observations 731,366 731,366 161,160 570,206 570,206 570,206
Standard errors clustered at the opposition level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Analogous to Table 2.5 in the main text, but for the subsample of European inventors. Columns (1) and
(2) present the effect of invalidation on the number of applications in the same and other technology areas as
the opposed patent, respectively. Column (3) shows the invalidation effect for inventors who experience their
first opposition outside their area of expertise, i.e., outside the area in which they have filed most patents prior
to opposition outcome. Columns (4)-(6) show the effect for the complimentary subsample of inventors whose
first opposition is in their expert technology area. Column (4) presents the effect on the all applications, Columns
(5) and (6) present the effects on applications in the same and other areas as the opposed patent, respectively.
All variables are counted on the DOCDB family level. The post period is defined as the time window from 0
to 10 years after opposition. Standard errors are clustered at the opposition level. The underidentification and
weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics,
respectively, as reported by the xtivreg2 Stata command (Schaffer, 2010).
154
B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Table B.14: Effect of invalidation: Direction (foreign inventors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Dependent variable N same arapp N
other ar
app Napp Napp N
same ar
app N
other ar
app
Subsample Full Full Non-Expert Expert Expert Expert
1(Invalidated) × 1(Post) −0.359∗∗ −0.223 −0.420 −0.647∗∗ −0.464∗∗ −0.183∗
(0.161) (0.159) (0.513) (0.273) (0.217) (0.110)
Year effects (rel to oppo) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes
Year effects (rel to appl) Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗ Yes∗∗∗
Underidentification test 28.2 28.2 15.0 22.1 22.1 22.1
Weak identification test 28.4 28.4 15.1 22.2 22.2 22.2
Number of oppositions 11,383 11,383 4,237 9,791 9,791 9,791
Number of inventors 27,797 27,797 6,691 21,106 21,106 21,106
Observations 545,363 545,363 129,923 415,440 415,440 415,440
Standard errors clustered at the opposition level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Analogous to Table 2.5 in the main text, but for the subsample of non-European inventors. Columns (1)
and (2) present the effect of invalidation on the number of applications in the same and other technology areas
as the opposed patent, respectively. Column (3) shows the invalidation effect for inventors who experience their
first opposition outside their area of expertise, i.e., outside the area in which they have filed most patents prior
to opposition outcome. Columns (4)-(6) show the effect for the complimentary subsample of inventors whose
first opposition is in their expert technology area. Column (4) presents the effect on the all applications, Columns
(5) and (6) present the effects on applications in the same and other areas as the opposed patent, respectively.
All variables are counted on the DOCDB family level. The post period is defined as the time window from 0
to 10 years after opposition. Standard errors are clustered at the opposition level. The underidentification and
weak identification tests are the heteroskedasticity-robust Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM and Wald F statistics,
respectively, as reported by the xtivreg2 Stata command (Schaffer, 2010).
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C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 Analytical Results
This appendix shows analytical results necessary for the numerical evaluation of model predic-
tions and hence the fit of the model. Subsections C.1.1 to C.1.4 present general expressions,
Subsection C.1.5 derives results for the specific distributional assumptions of Section 3.4.1. In
the following, probability density functions (pdf) will be denoted with f , cumulative distribu-
tion functions (cdf) with F . Random variables will be indicated with a hat.
C.1.1 Probability Density and Cumulative Distribution Functions
This section lists probability density and cumulative distribution functions for a selection of
relevant distributions.
Normal distribution xˆ ∼N (µ,σ2) of mean µ ∈R and standard deviation σ ∈R+:
f (x) =
1p
2piσ
e−(x−µ)2/2σ2 = 1
σ
ϕ
 x −µ
σ

F(x) =
1
2

1+ erf

x −µp
2σ

= Φ
 x −µ
σ

, (C.1)
where x ∈ R and where ϕ and Φ are the standard normal pdf and cdf, respectively. Most
programming languages provide fast implementations for the exponential function exp, the
error function erf and often even the standard normal cdf Φ. Besides, numerous analytical
results exist for integrals containing ϕ and Φ in their integrands (Bronstein et al., 2008; Owen,
1980).
Log-normal distribution ln( xˆ)∼N (µ,σ2) with parameters µ ∈R and σ ∈R+:
f (x) =
1p
2piσx
e−(ln(x)−µ)2/2σ2
F(x) =
1
2

1+ erf

ln(x)−µp
2σ

= Φ

ln(x)−µ
σ

, (C.2)
where x ∈R+.
Exponential distribution xˆ ∼ Exp(λ) with parameter λ ∈R+:
f (x) = λe−λx
F(x) = 1− e−λx , (C.3)
where x ∈R.
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C.1.2 Joint, Conditional, and Derived Distributions
The cumulative distribution function of ıˆp = ıˆ+ ϵˆp is given by
Fip(ip) =
∫ ∞
−∞
di fi(i)
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)1i+ϵp≤ip
=
∫ ∞
−∞
di fi(i)
∫ ip−i
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
di fi(i)Fϵp(ip − i) . (C.4)
Hence, the probability density function is given by
fip(ip) =
∂
∂ ip
Fip(ip) =
∫ ∞
−∞
di fi(i) fϵp(ip − i) . (C.5)
Analogous expressions hold for ıˆd = ıˆ+ ϵˆd .
The joint distribution of ıˆp and ıˆd can be written as
f (ip, id) =
∫ ∞
−∞
di fi(i)
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)δ(i + ϵp − ip)δ(i + ϵd − id)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
di fi(i) fϵp(ip − i) fϵd (id − i) , (C.6)
where δ denotes the Dirac delta function.
The distribution of ıˆp conditional on ıˆd is given by
fip(ip | id) =
f (ip, id)
fid (id)
(C.7)
and the corresponding cumulative distribution function by
Fip(ip | id) =
∫ ip
−∞
di′p fip(i
′
p | id)
= ...=
1
fid (id)
∫ ∞
−∞
di fi(i)Fϵp(ip − i) fϵd (id − i) (C.8)
Analogous results hold for the distribution of ıˆd conditional on ıˆp.
For the joint distribution of ıˆp and ϵˆp one obtains
f (ip,ϵp) = fϵp(ϵp)
∫ ∞
−∞
di fi(i)δ(i + ϵp − ip)
= fi(ip − ϵp) fϵp(ϵp) . (C.9)
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The joint distribution of ıˆ, ıˆp and ıˆd is
f (i, id , ip) = fi(i) fϵd (id − i) fϵp(ip − i) . (C.10)
C.1.3 Model Mechanics
The probability that a patent is invalid given d ’s information is independent of vˆ,
P(invalid | ıˆd) = P(invalid | ıˆd , vˆ)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)1ıˆ=ıˆd−ϵd<i0
=
∫ ∞
ıˆd−i0
dϵd fϵd (ϵd) = 1− Fϵd (ˆıd − i0) (C.11)
The probability that a patent is valid given p’s information is the ratio
P(valid | ıˆp, vˆ, entry) = P(valid, entry | ıˆp, vˆ)
P(entry | ıˆp, vˆ) , (C.12)
the denominator of which is given by
P(entry | ıˆp, vˆ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)1E[pid |ˆıd=ıˆp−ϵp+ϵd ,vˆ,entry]>0 .
Note that through the sharp decision at zero expected profits, which enters through the indi-
cator function, the integrand is discontinuous. To simplify this expression further and to make
it accessible to numerical integration I define
imaxd (vˆ) : E[pid | ıˆd = imaxd (vˆ), vˆ, entry] = E[pid | no entry] = 0 . (C.13)
Under the assumption that E[pid | ıˆd , vˆ, entry] is a monotonous function of ıˆd that is strictly
decreasing in its root imaxd (vˆ) (the root consequently being unique), the following are equiva-
lent:
E[pid | ıˆd , vˆ, entry]> 0 ⇔ ıˆd < imaxd (vˆ) . (C.14)
One can thus write
P(entry | ıˆp, vˆ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)1ıˆd=ıˆp−ϵp+ϵd<imaxd (vˆ)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)Fϵd (i
max
d (vˆ)− ıˆp + ϵp) . (C.15)
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The numerator in Eq. (C.12) is given by
P(valid, entry | ıˆp, vˆ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)1ıˆd=ıˆp−ϵp+ϵd<imaxd (v)1ıˆ=ıˆp−ϵp>i0
=
∫ ıˆp−i0
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)Fϵd (i
max
d (vˆ)− ıˆp + ϵp) (C.16)
and thus
P(valid | ıˆp, vˆ, entry) =
∫ ıˆp−i0
−∞ dϵp fϵp(ϵp)Fϵd (imaxd (vˆ)− ıˆp + ϵp)∫∞
−∞ dϵp fϵp(ϵp)Fϵd (imaxd (vˆ)− ıˆp + ϵp)
. (C.17)
Auxiliary results for d’s expected profits
The probability that the patent would enter litigation in the case of entry, i.e. the probability
that the asking price is above the bidding price, given d ’s information, is given by
P(A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ) | ıˆd , vˆ)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)1A(ˆıd−ϵd+ϵp ,vˆ)>B(ˆıd ,vˆ) (C.18)
Note that I do not write P(litigation, valid | ıˆd , vˆ) here, since with “litigation” I usually mean
“entry” and “A> B”. Here however, the probability of “entry” does not make sense, since this
probability is precisely used to determine whether entry occurs. In that sense, “entry” does
not contain any additional information beyond ıˆd .
To move the indicator function to the integration borders, I define
iminp (ˆıd , vˆ) :=min{ip : A(ip, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ)} . (C.19)
If A(ip, vˆ) ≤ B(ˆıd , vˆ)∀ ip given (ˆıd , vˆ), I set iminp (ˆıd , vˆ) =∞, so that the probability of A being
larger than B is consistently zero, P(A(ˆıp, vˆ) > B(ˆıd , vˆ)) = P(ˆıp > iminp (ˆıd , vˆ)) = 0. Under the
assumptions that A(ˆıp, vˆ) and B(ˆıd , vˆ) are strictly increasing functions in ıˆp and ıˆd , respectively,
this leads to the equivalence relation
A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ) ⇔ ıˆp > iminp (ˆıd , vˆ) , (C.20)
which one can use to rewrite Eq. (C.18) to obtain
P(A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ) | ıˆd , vˆ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)Fϵd (ˆıd − iminp (ˆıd , vˆ) + ϵp) (C.21)
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or, equivalently,
P(A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ) | ıˆd , vˆ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)

1− Fϵp(iminp (ˆıd , vˆ)− ıˆd + ϵd)

.
Clearly, for the opposite event,
P(A(ˆıp, vˆ)≤ B(ˆıd , vˆ) | ıˆd , vˆ) = 1−P(A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ) | ıˆd , vˆ) .
The probability that a patent is valid and would enter litigation in the case of entry given d ’s
information follows from a reasoning similar to the one above, again using Def. (C.19),
P(A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ), valid | ıˆd , vˆ)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)1A(ˆıd−ϵd+ϵp ,vˆ)>B(ˆıd ,vˆ)1ıˆd−ϵd>i0
=
∫ ıˆd−i0
−∞
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)

1− Fϵp(iminp (ˆıd , vˆ)− ıˆd + ϵd)

. (C.22)
The probability of a patent potentially entering litigation and being invalid follows directly
from the two previous results,
P
 
A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ), invalid | ıˆd , vˆ

= P
 
A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ) | ıˆd , vˆ
−P A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ), valid | ıˆd , vˆ. (C.23)
C.1.4 Model Predictions
Outcome and validity rates
The probability that a random patent is invalid is simply given by
P(invalid) =
∫ i0
−∞
di fi(i) = Fi(i0) (C.24)
The probability that no entry occurs can be simplified using the definition of imaxd in Eq. (C.13),
P(no entry) =
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)
∫ ∞
−∞
did fid (id)1id>imaxd (v)
=
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)

1− Fid (imaxd (v))

(C.25)
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The probability of litigation can be derived as
P(litigation) = P(entry,A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ))
=
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)
∫ ∞
−∞
did fid (id)
∫ ∞
0
dip fip(ip | id)
1id ≤ imaxd (v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⇒entry
1ip ≥ iminp (id , v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⇒A>B
1iminp (id ,v)<∞︸ ︷︷ ︸
can be added since ip <∞P-a.s.
=
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)
∫ imaxd (v)
−∞
did fid (id)

1− Fip(iminp (id , v) | id)

1iminp (id ,v)<∞ (C.26)
Note that iminp =∞ causes a discontinuity in the integrand, forcing it to 0 due to Fip(iminp (id , v) |
id) = 1, which is why I have introduced the additional indicator function as a reminder above.
To circumvent resulting issues during numerical integration, I define
i∞d (v) :=max{id ∈R : iminp (id , v)<∞} , (C.27)
which can efficiently be determined to an arbitrarily high precision numerically. The probabil-
ity of litigation is thus given by
P(litigation) =
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)
∫ min{imaxd (v), i∞d (v)}
−∞
did fid (id)

1− Fip(iminp (id , v) | id)

(C.28)
The probability of settlement follows directly from the above,
P(settlement) = 1−P(no entry)−P(litigation) , (C.29)
since it is the only remaining outcome.
Conditional outcome and validity rates
The probability that a patent is valid, given that no entry occurs, is given by
P(valid | no entry) = P(valid, no entry)
P(no entry)
(C.30)
where the numerator is given by
P(valid, no entry) =
∫ ∞
i0
di fi(i)
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)1id=i+ϵd>imaxd (v)
=
∫ ∞
i0
di fi(i)
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)

1− Fϵd (imaxd (v)− i)

. (C.31)
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The probability that a patent is valid, given that it is subject to litigation, is the ratio
P(valid | litigation) = P(valid, litigation)
P(litigation)
(C.32)
where the numerator is given by
P(valid, litigation) =
∫ ∞
i0
di fi(i)
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)
∫ ∞
−∞
dϵd fϵd (ϵd)
1− Fϵp(iminp (i + ϵd , v)− i)

. (C.33)
Note that this is different from the result in Eq. (C.22), which is conditional on d ’s information.
Finally, the probability that a patent is valid, given a settlement outcome, is given by
P(valid | settlement) = P(valid, settlement)
P(settlement)
(C.34)
where the numerator follows directly from previous results,
P(valid, settlement) = P(valid)−P(valid, no entry)−P(valid, litigation) . (C.35)
Outcome probabilities conditional on validity follow immediately from the above results,
P(outcome | valid) = P(valid, outcome)
P(valid)
. (C.36)
Expected patented invention values
The expected patented invention value for an arbitrary patent from the population is
E[v] =
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)v = e
µv+σ2v/2 , (C.37)
by the standard result for the log-normal distribution.
The expected patented invention values conditional on an outcome can be calculated in
direct analogy to the corresponding outcome probabilities. In each case, the numerator differs
only by the additional v in the integrand. Hence, the expected patented invention value given
that no entry occurs can be derived as
E[v | no entry] = 1
P(no entry)
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)v
∫ ∞
−∞
did fid (id)1id>imaxd (v)
=
1
P(no entry)
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)v

1− Fid (imaxd (v))

. (C.38)
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The expected patented invention value given litigation is
E[v | litigation] = 1
P(litigation)
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)v
∫ ∞
−∞
did fid (id)
∫ ∞
−∞
dip fip(ip)
1id≤imaxd (v)1ip≥iminp (id ,v)1iminp (id ,v)<∞
=
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)v
∫ min{iqdmax(v), i∞d (v)}
−∞
did fid (id)

1− Fip(iminp (id , v) | id)

.
(C.39)
Finally, the expected patented invention value given that parties settle follows immediately
from the previous results,
E[v | settlement] = E[v]−P(no entry)E[v | no entry]−P(litigation)E[v | litigation]
1−P(no entry)−P(litigation) .
(C.40)
C.1.5 Explicit Results for the Distributional Assumptions of Section 3.4.1
This subsection lists analytical results for the distributional assumptions of Section 3.4.1. Re-
sults for the expressions of the previous subsections which are not explicitly spelled out follow
trivially or in close analogy. First, let me define and solve two definite integrals that will be
useful in several of the derivations below.
Integral I1 is defined as
I1(b, c) :=
∫ b
−∞
dϵp fϵp(ϵp)Fϵd (c + ϵd)
=
0 if b ≤ 0 ∨ b ≤ −ce−λpmax{0,−c} − e−λp b − λpλp+λd e−λd c e−(λp+λd )max{0,−c} − e−(λp+λd )b otherwise
(C.41)
Note that limıˆp→∞ I1(ˆıp − i0, imaxd (vˆ)− ıˆp) = 0.
Integral I2 is defined as
I2(λ, b) :=
∫ b
−∞
di fi(i)e
λi =
1
σ
∫ b
−∞
diϕ

i −µi
σi

eλi . (C.42)
By substituting with x = i−µiσi , one obtains
= eλµi
∫ (b−µi)/σi
−∞
dx ′ϕ(x ′)eλσi x ′+λµi ,
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which is a tabulated integral (Bronstein et al., 2008), evaluating to
= eλµi eλ
2σ2i /2Φ

b−µi
σi
−λσi

.
In the numerical implementation, it is advisable to calculate this expression as
= exp

λµi +
λ2σ2i
2
+ lnΦ

b−λσ2i −µi
σi

(C.43)
to avoid arithmetic overflow. In Python’s scipy library, the logarithm of the Gaussian cumu-
lative distribution function, lnΦ, is implemented as scipy.special.log_ndtr.
Using these definitions, I can rewrite the cumulative distribution function of ip as
Fip(ip) = Fi(ip)− e−λp ip I2(λp, ip) (C.44)
and, by applying the product rule, the probability density function as
fip(ip) =
∂
∂ ip
Fip(ip) = λpe
−λp ip I2(λp, ip) . (C.45)
Of course, analogous results hold for id .
The joint probability density of ip and id of Eq. (C.6) becomes
f (ip, id) = λpλd e
−λp ip−λd id I2(λp +λd ,min{ip, id}) . (C.46)
The conditional cumulative distribution function of ip given id of Eq. (C.8) is then
Fip(ip | id) =

e−λd id I2(λd ,min{ip, id})− e−λp ip−λd id I2(λp +λd ,min{ip, id})

/ fid (id) . (C.47)
Analogous results hold for Fid (id | ip).
Concerning probabilities, Eq. (C.17) becomes
P(valid | ıˆp, vˆ, entry) = I1(ˆıp − i0, ıˆ
max
d (vˆ)− ıˆp)
I1(∞ , ıˆmaxd (vˆ)− ıˆp)
(C.48)
It can be shown that for ıˆp > i
max
d (vˆ) > i0, the expression for P(valid | ıˆp, vˆ, entry) is indepen-
dent of ıˆp. Further, for Eq. (C.22),
P(A(ˆıp, vˆ)> B(ˆıd , vˆ), valid | ıˆd , vˆ) = I1(∞, ıˆd − iminp (ˆıd , vˆ)) . (C.49)
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Eq. (C.31) can be rewritten as
P(valid, no entry) =
∫ ∞
0
dv

1− Fi(imaxd (v)) + e−λd imaxd (v)

I2(λd , i
max
d (v))− I2(λd , i0)

.
(C.50)
From Eq. (C.33), I know that
P(valid, litigation) =
∫ ∞
0
dv fv(v)
∫ ∞
iminp (id ,v)
dip
∫ imaxd (v)
−∞
did H(ip, id) , (C.51)
where
H(ip, id) :=
∫ ∞
i0
di fi(i) fϵp(ip − i) fϵd (id − i)
=
∫ ∞
i0
di fi(i)λpλd e
−λp(id−i)e−λd (id−i)1id≥i1ip≥i
= fϵp(ip) fϵd (id)
∫ ı¯(ip ,id )
i0
di fi(i)e
(λp+λd )i
= fϵp(ip) fϵd (id)
 
I2(λp +λd , ı¯(ip, id))− I2(λp +λd , i0)

(C.52)
where ı¯(ip, id) :=max{min{ip, id}, i0}. In order to carry out the ip-integration,
H ′(id) =
∫ ∞
iminp (id ,v)
dip fϵp(ip)

I2(λp +λd , ı¯(ip, id)−)− I2(λp +λd , i0)

, (C.53)
I split the integral at ip = id and make a distinction by case. If iminp (id , v) =∞,
H ′(id) = 0 . (C.54)
If instead, id < i
min
p (id , v), then id < ip ⇒ ı¯ =max{id , i0} and
H ′(id) =

1− Fϵp(iminp (id , v))

I2(λp +λd ,max{id , i0})− I2(λp +λd , i0)

. (C.55)
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Finally, if id > i
min
p (id , v), then
H ′(id) =
∫ id
iminp (id ,v)
dip fϵp(ip)

I2(λp +λd ,max{ip, i0})− I2(λp +λd , i0)

+
∫ ∞
id
dip fϵp(ip)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−Fϵp (id )

I2(λp +λd ,max{id , i0})− I2(λp +λd , i0)

. (C.56)
The terms in square brackets vanish if ip ≤ i0 and id ≤ i0, respectively. Since the latter is
independent of ip, the evaluation of the corresponding integral is trivial.
The remaining integrations over ip, id and v are carried out numerically. To move discon-
tinuities in the v and the id -integration (due to i
min
p = ∞) to the integration borders, it is
helpful to introduce
i∞d (v) :=max{id : iminp (id , v)<∞} (C.57)
and
v∞(id) :=min{v : iminp (id , v)<∞} , (C.58)
which is constant for id ≤ i0 and smaller than at any id > i0, i.e., v∞(id1) = v∞0 <
v∞(id2) ∀ id1 ≤ i0 < id2. The expressions for i∞d and v∞ can efficiently be evaluated nu-
merically. The short algorithm I have developed for this purpose first searches for the “abyss”
in an exponentially increasing interval, then identifies the respective cut-off by bisections, thus
converging exponentially fast.
Using these cut-offs, the integration borders in the expressions for P(litigation),
P(valid, litigation) and the corresponding expected patented invention values are modified
to ∫ ∞
0
dv
∫ imaxd (v)
−∞
did (...)→
∫ ∞
v∞0
dv
∫ min{imaxd (v), i∞d (v)}
−∞
did (...) . (C.59)
For better convergence of the quadrature algorithm, the id -integration is split at i0 in the
numerical implementation. For P(valid, no entry), the numerical integration over v in Eq.
(C.50) can be carried out without adjusting integration borders.
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C.2 Figures
Figure C.1: Two-dimensional fitness landscape at Rlit = 0
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Notes: Value of the objective function g defined in Eq. (3.10) as a function of the model parameters µi and σi . The
litigation reputation parameter is set to Rlit = 0, the remaining parameters are set the baseline values indicated in
Table 3.1.
Figure C.2: Two-dimensional fitness landscape at Rlit = 4
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Notes: Analogous to Figure C.1, but for Rlit = 4.
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Figure C.3: Joint probability density f (i, v)
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Notes: Joint probability density function f (i, v) of inventive step ıˆ and patented invention value vˆ for the patent
population in the baseline calibration. By definition, ıˆ and vˆ are independent and hence uncorrelated.
Figure C.4: Conditional joint probability density f (i, v | litigation)
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Notes: Joint probability density function f (i, v | litigation) of inventive step ıˆ and patented invention value vˆ for
litigated patents in the baseline calibration. Although ıˆ and vˆ are independent random variables, among litigated
patents they are positively correlated due to selection.
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Figure C.5: Analytical results vs Monte-Carlo simulations
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Notes: Analytical results (dashed vertical lines) vs Monte-Carlo simulations (histograms, based on 5,000 sim-
ulations of 105 patents each). The three columns represent the three outcomes “no entry”, “settlement”, and
“litigation”. The rows indicate (i) the overall outcome rates, (ii) the invalidity rates conditional on the respective
outcome, and (iii) the average patented invention values. In all cases, the simulations perfectly reproduce the
exact results obtained through analytical and numerical integration within their respective precision. Due to the
large simulated sample sizes, the integration results can be reproduced with an accuracy of less than 1% (no entry
outcome rate) to less than 10% (value of litigated patented inventions).
173

List of Figures
1.1 Annual rate of examiner participation in opposition proceeding . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2 Annual number of opposed patents and sample rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.3 Time trends in oppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4 Timing of the invalidation effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.1 Timeline for the average opposed patent in our sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2 Inventor patenting around the outcome of opposition, by examiner participation 59
2.3 Reduced form effect of examiner participation on the number of applications . 60
2.4 Effect of invalidation on the number of applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.5 Effect of invalidation on number of applications: Applicant heterogeneity . . . . 68
2.6 Effect of invalidation on number of applications: Inventor heterogeneity . . . . 69
3.1 Model structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2 Expected profits (potential infringer) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.3 Expected validity (potential infringer) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4 Expected validity (patent holder) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.5 Outcomes – Interaction of patented invention value and inventive step obser-
vations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.6 Fit of the patent value distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.7 Outcome distribution (baseline calibration) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.8 Patented invention values (baseline calibration) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.9 Outcome probabilities as a function of patented invention value . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.10 Patented invention value distribution by outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.11 Calibration sensitivity – Reputation parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.12 Calibration sensitivity – Settlement cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.13 Calibration sensitivity – Distribution of patented invention value . . . . . . . . . 100
3.14 Outcome probabilities under changes of court strictness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.15 Outcome probabilities under changes of total legal cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A.1 Timeline for the average opposed patent in our sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
A.2 Distribution of patent age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
175
LIST OF FIGURES
A.3 Distribution of examiner-specific participation rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A.4 Quantile-Quantile Plot: EP/WO examiner citations vs US citations . . . . . . . . 113
A.5 Timing of the invalidation effect – Chemistry subsample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
A.6 Timing of the invalidation effect – Electr. Engineering / Instruments subsample 114
B.1 Effect of invalidation on the propensity to file for a patent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
C.1 Two-dimensional fitness landscape at Rlit = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
C.2 Two-dimensional fitness landscape at Rlit = 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
C.3 Joint probability density f (i, v) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
C.4 Conditional joint probability density f (i, v | litigation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
C.5 Analytical results vs Monte-Carlo simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
176
List of Tables
1.1 Prior empirical studies on patent rights and cumulative innovation . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Patent and procedural characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3 Characteristics of patent holder and opponent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4 Characteristics of EP/WO forward citations by relationship to cited patent . . . 29
1.5 Examiner participation and opposition outcome (EP/WO citations) . . . . . . . . 32
1.6 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.7 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – technology main areas . . . . . . . 35
1.8 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – technology and size . . . . . . . . . 36
1.9 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – sizes of focal and citing patent
holders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.10 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent thickets and patent fences . 40
1.11 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent age and value . . . . . . . . 41
2.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.2 First stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3 Effect of invalidation: Number of applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4 Effect of invalidation: Quality of applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5 Effect of invalidation: Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.1 Determination of (baseline) model parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.1 Overview and definition of subsamples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
A.2 Opposition outcomes and appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
A.3 Groups of control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A.4 Differences between patents by opposition outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A.5 Differences between patents by examiner participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A.6 Probit regressions of instrument on patent and examination characteristics . . . 119
A.7 LATE discussion – Complier shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A.8 LATE discussion – Complier characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A.9 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – sizes of focal and citing patent
holders – chemistry subsample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
177
LIST OF TABLES
A.10 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent thickets and patent fences
– chemistry subsample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A.11 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – sizes of focal and citing patent
holders – electrical engineering / instruments subsample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.12 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – patent thickets and patent fences
– electrical engineering / instruments subsample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.13 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – exclusion of particular cases . . . . 125
A.14 Baseline regressions with bootstrapped standard errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
A.15 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – extensive margin . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.16 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citation dummy variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
A.17 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – alternative treatment of
“amended” patents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
A.18 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – technology and size – alternative
treatment of “amended” patents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
A.19 Impact of invalidation on EP/WO citations – citations by non-focal examiners . 131
A.20 Characteristics of US forward citations by relationship to cited patent . . . . . . 132
A.21 Examiner participation and opposition outcome (US citations) . . . . . . . . . . . 133
A.22 Impact of invalidation on US citations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
A.23 Impact of invalidation on US citations – technology main areas . . . . . . . . . . 135
A.24 Impact of invalidation on US citations – technology and size . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A.25 Impact of invalidation on US citations – sizes of focal and citing patent holders 137
A.26 Impact of invalidation on US citations – patent thickets and patent fences . . . . 138
B.1 Regressions of instrumental variable on application and inventor characteristics 143
B.2 LATE discussion – Complier shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
B.3 LATE discussion – Complier application characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
B.4 LATE discussion – Complier inventor characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
B.5 Effect of invalidation on number of applications: Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
B.6 Effect of invalidation: Number of app. (Morrison et al. (2017) inventor disamb.)147
B.7 Effect of invalidation: Number of app. (European inventors) . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
B.8 Effect of invalidation: Number of app. (foreign inventors) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
B.9 Effect of invalidation: Quality of app. (Morrison et al. (2017) inventor disamb.)150
B.10 Effect of invalidation: Quality of app. (European inventors) . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
B.11 Effect of invalidation: Quality of app. (foreign inventors) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
B.12 Effect of invalidation: Direction (Morrison et al. (2017) inventor disamb.) . . . 153
B.13 Effect of invalidation: Direction (European inventors) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
B.14 Effect of invalidation: Direction (foreign inventors) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
B.15 Effect of invalidation on number of applications: Applicant heterogeneity . . . . 156
B.16 Effect of invalidation on number of applications: Inventor heterogeneity . . . . 157
178
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. and U. Akcigit (2012). Intellectual Property Rights Policy, Competition and
Innovation. Journal of the European Economic Association 10(1), 1–42.
Agarwal, R., M. Ganco, and R. H. Ziedonis (2009). Reputations for Toughness in Patent En-
forcement: Implications for Knowledge Spillovers via Inventor Mobility. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal 30(13), 1349–1374.
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992). A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction. Economet-
rica 60(2), 323–351.
Alcacer, J., M. Gittelmann, and B. Sampat (2009). Applicant and Examiner Citations in US
Patents: An Overview and Analysis. Research Policy 38(2), 415–427.
Allison, J. R., M. A. Lemley, K. A. Moore, and R. D. Trunkey (2004). Valuable Patents. George-
town Law Journal 92(3), 435–480.
Allison, J. R., M. A. Lemley, and J. Walker (2009). Extreme Value or Trolls on Top – The
Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 158(1),
1–38.
American Intellectual Property Law Association (2017). Report of the Economic Survey. Wash-
ington, D.C.: AIPLA.
Angrist, J. D. and J.-S. Pischke (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Compan-
ion. Princeton University Press.
Anton, J. J. and D. A. Yao (2004). Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Prop-
erty. RAND Journal of Economics 35(1), 1–22.
Azoulay, P., A. Bonatti, and J. L. Krieger (2017). The Career Effects of Scandal: Evidence from
Scientific Retractions. Research Policy 46(9), 1552–1569.
Azoulay, P., J. L. Furman, J. L. Krieger, and F. Murray (2015). Retractions. Review of Economics
and Statistics 97(5), 1118–1136.
Baten, J., N. Bianchi, and P. Moser (2015). Does Compulsory Licensing Discourage Invention?
Evidence From German Patents After WWI. NBER Working Paper No. 21442.
179
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baum, C., M. Schaffer, and S. . Stillman (2010). ivreg2: Stata module for extended instru-
mental variables/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression.
Bebchuk, L. A. (1984). Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information. RAND Journal
of Economics 15(3), 404–415.
Bessen, J. and E. Maskin (2009). Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation. RAND Journal
of Economics 40(4), 611–635.
Bessen, J. and M. J. Meurer (2005). Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on
Patent Litigation. Lewis & Clark Law Review 9, 1–27.
Bessen, J. and M. J. Meurer (2008). Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put
Innovators at Risk. Princeton University Press.
Bessen, J. and M. J. Meurer (2012). The Private Costs of Patent Litigation. Journal of Law,
Economics & Policy 9, 59–95.
Bessen, J. and M. J. Meurer (2013). The Patent Litigation Explosion. Loyola University Chicago
Law Journal 45(2), 401–440.
Bessen, J. E. and M. J. Meurer (2006). Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes. American
Economic Review 96(2), 77–81.
Bhaskarabhatla, A., D. Hegde, and T. Peeters (2017). Human Capital, Firm Capabilities, and
Innovation. Mimeo.
Breschi, S. and F. Lissoni (2004). Handbook of Quantitative Science and Technology Research,
Chapter Knowledge Networks from Patent Data, pp. 613–643. Springer Netherlands.
Bronstein, I. N., K. A. Semendjajew, G. Musiol, and H. Muehlig (2008). Taschenbuch der Math-
ematik. 7., vollständig überarbeitete und ergänzte Auflage. Europa Lehrmittel, Edition Harry
Deutsch.
Burke, P. F. and M. Reitzig (2007). Measuring Patent Assessment Quality – Analyzing the
Degree and Kind of (In)consistency in Patent Offices’ DecisionMaking. Research Policy 36(9),
1404–1430.
Byrd, R. H., P. Lu, J. Nocedal, and C. Zhu (1995). A Limited Memory Algorithm for Bound
Constrained Optimization. SIAM Journal on Scientific Computing 16(5), 1190–1208.
Chan, H. F., B. S. Frey, J. Gallus, and B. Torgler (2014). Academic Honors and Performance.
Labour Economics 31, 188–204.
Choi, J. P. (1998). Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission Mechanism. American
Economic Review 88(5), 1249–1263.
180
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cockburn, I. M., M. J. MacGarvie, and E. Mueller (2010). Patent Thickets, Licensing and
Innovative Performance. Industrial and Corporate Change 19(3), 899–925.
Cohen, W. M., R. R. Nelson, and J. P. Walsh (2000). Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Ap-
propriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not). NBER Working
Paper No. 7552. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Crampes, C. and C. Langinier (2002). Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases.
RAND Journal of Economics 33(2), 258–274.
Cremers, K., M. Ernicke, F. Gaessler, D. Harhoff, C. Helmers, L. McDonagh, P. Schliessler, and
N. van Zeebroeck (2017, Aug). Patent Litigation in Europe. European Journal of Law and
Economics 44(1), 1–44.
Cremers, K., F. Gaessler, D. Harhoff, C. Helmers, and Y. Lefouili (2016). Invalid but Infringed?
An Analysis of the Bifurcated Patent Litigation System. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization 131, 218–242.
Criscuolo, P. and B. Verspagen (2008). Does it Matter Where Patent Citations Come from?
Inventor vs. Examiner Citations in European Patents. Research Policy 37(10), 1892–1908.
Darts-ip (2018). NPE Litigation in the European Union. Report.
de Rassenfosse, G., A. B. Jaffe, and E. Webster (2016). Low-Quality Patents in the Eye of the
Beholder: Evidence from Multiple Examiners. NBER Working Paper No. 22244.
ECB (2016). Euro/USD Exchange Rates. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/
eurofxref/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html, accessed July 19th, 2016.
Eckert, A. and C. Langinier (2013). A Survey of the Economics of Patent Systems and Proce-
dures. Journal of Economic Surveys 28(5), 996–1015.
EPO (1973). The European Patent Convention.
EPO (2017). Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office.
EPO Case Law of the Boards of Appeal (2018). I.E.1.1. Invention and Industrial Application.
European Commission (2014). Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union to Technology Transfer Agreements. Official Journal
of the European Union (2014/C 89/03).
Farre-Mensa, J., D. Hegde, and A. Ljungqvist (2017). What is a Patent Worth? Evidence from
the U.S. Patent “Lottery”. NBER Working Paper No. 23268.
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (2008). How Strong Are Weak Patents? American Economic Re-
view 98(4), 1347–1369.
181
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Federal Trade Commission (2003). To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition
and Patent Law and Policy. A Report by the Federal Trade Commission.
Fischer, T. and J. Leidinger (2014). Testing Patent Value Indicators on Directly Observed Patent
Value – An Empirical Analysis of Ocean Tomo Patent Auctions. Research Policy 43(3), 519 –
529.
Gaessler, F., D. Harhoff, and S. Sorg (2017). Patents and Cumulative Innovation – Evidence
from Post-Grant Patent Oppositions. Mimeo.
Gaessler, F. and Y. Lefouili (2017, March). What to Buy When Forum Shopping? Analyzing
Court Selection in Patent Litigation. TSE Working Paper 17(775).
Galasso, A. and M. Schankerman (2010). Patent Thickets, Courts, and the Market for Innova-
tion. RAND Journal of Economics 41(3), 472–503.
Galasso, A. andM. Schankerman (2015). Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence
from the Courts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(1), 317–369.
Galasso, A. and M. Schankerman (2018). Patent Rights, Innovation, and Firm Exit. RAND
Journal of Economics 49(1), 64–86.
Gallini, N. and S. Scotchmer (2002). Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2, Chapter
Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, pp. 51–77. MIT Press.
Gambardella, A. and M. S. Giarratana (2013). General Technological Capabilities, Product
Market Fragmentation, and Markets for Technology. Research Policy 42(2), 315–325.
Gambardella, A., D. Harhoff, and B. Verspagen (2010). The Value of European Patents. Euro-
pean Management Review 5(2), 69–84.
Gaulé, P. (2018). Patents and the Success of Venture-Capital Backed Startups: Using Examiner
Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects. Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming.
Graham, S. J. and D. Harhoff (2014). Separating Patent Wheat from Chaff: Would the US
Benefit from Adopting Patent Post-Grant Review? Research Policy 43(9), 1649–1659.
Green, J. R. and S. Scotchmer (1995). On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation.
RAND Journal of Economics 26(1), 20–33.
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1991). Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth. Review of
Economic Studies 58(1), 43–61.
Hall, B., C. Helmers, M. Rogers, and V. Sena (2014, June). The Choice between Formal and
Informal Intellectual Property: A Review. Journal of Economic Literature 52(2), 375–423.
182
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hall, B. H., S. J. Graham, D. Harhoff, and D. C. Mowery (2004). Prospects for Improving
U.S. Patent Quality via Post-Grant Opposition. In A. B. Jaffe, J. Lerner, and S. Stern (Eds.),
Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 4.
Hall, B. H. and D. Harhoff (2004). Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System – Design
Choices and Expected Impact. Berkeley Technology Law Journal 19(3), 989–1015.
Hall, B. H. and D. Harhoff (2012). Recent Research on the Economics of Patents. Annual
Review of Economics 4(1), 541–565.
Harhoff, D. (2009). Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Unified and Integrated Euro-
pean Patent Litigation System. Final Report to the European Commission, Tender No.
MARKT/2008/06/D.
Harhoff, D. (2014). Patent Similarity - An Analysis Tool and Applications. http://www.oecd.
org/site/stipatents/1_2_Harhoff.pdf. [accessed: 22 October 2016].
Harhoff, D., B. Hall, G. von Graevenitz, K. Hoisl, and S. Wagner (2007). The Strategic Use
of Patents and its Implications for Enterprise and Competition Policies. Final Report to the
European Commision, Tender No ENTR/05/82.
Harhoff, D. and K. Hoisl (2007). Institutionalized Incentives for Ingenuity – Patent Value and
the German Employees’ Inventions Act. Research Policy 36(8), 1143–1162.
Harhoff, D., F. Narin, F. M. Scherer, and K. Vopel (1999). Citation Frequency and the Value of
Patented Inventions. Review of Economics and Statistics 81(3), 511–515.
Harhoff, D. and M. Reitzig (2004). Determinants of Opposition Against EPO Patent Grants –
The Case of Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals. International Journal of Industrial Organi-
zation 22(4), 443–480.
Harhoff, D., I. Rudyk, and S. Stoll (2015). Deferred Patent Examination. Mimeo.
Harhoff, D., F. M. Scherer, and K. Vopel (2003a). Citations, Family Size, Opposition and the
Value of Patent Rights. Research Policy 32(8), 1343–1363.
Harhoff, D., F. M. Scherer, and K. Vopel (2003b). Exploring the Tail of Patented Invention Value
Distributions. In O. Granstrand (Ed.), Economics, Law and Intellectual Property: Seeking
Strategies for Research and Teaching in a Developing Field, Boston, MA, pp. 279–309. Springer
US.
Harhoff, D. and S. Stoll (2015). Exploring the Opaqueness of the Patent System – Evidence
from a Natural Experiment. Mimeo.
Harhoff, D., G. von Graevenitz, and S. Wagner (2016). Conflict Resolution, Public Goods and
Patent Thickets. Management Science 62(3), 704–721.
183
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Harhoff, D. and S. Wagner (2009). The Duration of Patent Examination at the European Patent
Office. Management Science 55(12), 1969–1984.
Heller, M. A. and R. S. Eisenberg (1998, May). Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticom-
mons in Biomedical Research. Science 280(5364), 698–701.
Henkel, J. and H. Zischka (2016). How Many Patents are Truly Valid? Extent, Causes, and
Remedies for Latent Patent Invalidity. Mimeo.
Hess, P., T. Müller-Stoy, and M. Wintermeier (2014). Sind Patente nur “Papiertiger”? In
Mitteilungen der deutschen Patentanwälte, Number 10, pp. 439–452.
Hilty, R. (2009). The Role of Patent Quality in Europe. Max Planck Institute for Intellectual
Property and Competition Law Research Paper Series (11-11).
Hoisl, K. (2007). Tracing Mobile Inventors The Causality between Inventor Mobility and
Inventor Productivity. Research Policy 36(5), 619–636.
Hoisl, K. (2009). Does Mobility Increase the Productivity of Inventors? Journal of Technology
Transfer 34(2), 212–225.
Huang, K. G. and F. E. Murray (2009). Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-Run Supply of
Public? Knowledge Evidence from Human Genetics. Academy of Management Journal 52(6),
1193–1221.
Imbens, G. W. and J. D. Angrist (1994). Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treat-
ment Effects. Econometrica 62(2), 467–475.
Jaffe, A. B. and J. Lerner (2007). Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System
is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It. Princeton University Press.
Jones, B. F. (2010). Age and Great Invention. Review of Economics and Statistics 92(1), 1–14.
Kelly, B., D. Papanikolaou, A. Seru, and M. Taddy (2017). Measuring Technological Innovation
over the Long Run. Mimeo.
Kühnen, T. (2013). Bifurcation – Experiences in Different European Litigation Systems. In Spe-
cial Edition of the Official Journal of the European Patent Office: 16th Symposium of European
Patent Judges.
Kleibergen, F. and R. Paap (2006). Generalized Reduced Rank Tests Using the Singular Value
Decomposition. Journal of Econometrics 133(1), 97 – 126.
Kogan, L., D. Papanikolaou, A. Seru, and N. Stoffman (2017). Technological Innovation, Re-
source Allocation, and Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 132(2), 665–712.
184
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lanjouw, J. O. (1998). Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estima-
tions of Patent Value. Review of Economic Studies 65(4), 671–710.
Lanjouw, J. O. and J. Lerner (2000). The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey
of the Empirical Literature. In D. Encaoua, B. H. Hall, F. Laisney, and J. Mairesse (Eds.), The
Economics and Econometrics of Innovation, Boston, MA, pp. 201–224. Springer US.
Lanjouw, J. O. and M. Schankerman (2001). Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window
on Competition. RAND Journal of Economics 32(1), 129–151.
Lanjouw, J. O. andM. Schankerman (2003). Enforcement of Patent Rights in the United States.
In W. M. Cohen and S. A. Merrill (Eds.), Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy, pp. 145–
179. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
Lanjouw, J. O. and M. Schankerman (2004). Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small
Firms Handicapped? Journal of Law and Economics 47(1), 45–74.
Lemley, M., D. Lichtman, and B. Sampat (2005). What to Do About Bad Patents. Regula-
tion 28(4), 10–13.
Lemley, M. A. (2001). Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office. Northwestern University Law
Review 95, 1495.
Lemley, M. A. (2010). Where to File Your Patent Case. AIPLA Quarterly Journal 38, 401.
Lemley, M. A. and C. Shapiro (2005). Probabilistic Patents. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 19(2), 75–98.
Lemley, M. A. and C. Shapiro (2007). Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking. Texas Law Re-
view 85, 1991–2048.
Lerner, J. (1994). The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis. RAND Journal of
Economics 25(2), 319–333.
Lichtman, D. and M. A. Lemley (2007). Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity.
Stanford Law Review 60(1), 45–72.
Love, B. J., S. P. Miller, and S. Ambwani (2018). Determinants of Patent Quality: Evidence
from Inter Partes Review Proceedings. University of Colorado Law Review.
MacDougall, A. and C. Hamer (2009). Opposition at the European Patent Office. In A. Jolly
(Ed.), The Handbook of European Intellectual Property Management, pp. 407–412. Kogan.
Mann, R. J. and M. Underweiser (2012). A New Look at Patent Quality: Relating Patent
Prosecution to Validity. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 9(1), 1–32.
185
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Marco, A. C. (2004). The Selection Effects (and Lack Thereof) in Patent Litigation: Evidence
from Trials. Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy 4(1).
Marco, A. C. and K. Walsh (2006). Bargaining in the Shadow of Precedent: The Surprising
Irrelevance of Asymmetric Stakes. Faculty Research and Reports 67.
Mejer, M. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2012). Economic Incongruities in the Euro-
pean Patent System. European Journal of Law and Economics 34(1), 215–234.
Melero, E., N. Palomeras, and D. Wehrheim (2017). The Effect of Patent Protection on Inventor
Mobility. Mimeo.
Merges, R. P. and R. R. Nelson (1990). On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope. Columbia
Law Review 90(4), 839–916.
Meurer, M. J. (1989). The Settlement of Patent Litigation. RAND Journal of Economics 20(1),
77–91.
Mokyr, J. (2002). The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy. Princeton
University Press.
Morrison, G., M. Riccaboni, and F. Pammolli (2017). Disambiguation of Patent Inventors and
Assignees Using High-Resolution Geolocation Data. Scientific Data 4(170064).
Moser, P. and A. Voena (2012). Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the
Enemy Act. American Economic Review 102(1), 396–427.
Murray, F. E. and S. Stern (2007). Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free
Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 63(4), 648–687.
Nagler, M. and S. Sorg (2018). Marginal Patents and the Supply of Ideas. Mimeo.
Nocedal, J. and S. J. Wright (2006). Numerical Optimization (Second ed.). Springer New York.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1969). Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Techno-
logical Change. M.I.T. Monographs in Economics. M.I.T. Press.
Owen, D. B. (1980). A Table of Normal Integrals. Communications in Statistics - Simulation
and Computation 9(4), 389–419.
Priest, G. L. and B. Klein (1984). The Selection of Disputes for Litigation. Journal of Legal
Studies 13(1), 1–55.
Righi, C. and T. Simcoe (2017). Patent Examiner Specialization. NBER Working Paper No.
23913.
186
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Romer, P. M. (1986). Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 94(5), 1002–1037.
Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Economy 98(5,
Part 2), S71–S102.
Sampat, B. and H. L. Williams (2018). How Do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence
from the Human Genome. American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Sampat, B. N. (2010). When do Applicants Search for Prior Art? Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics 53(2), 399–416.
Schaffer, M. E. (2010). xtivreg2: Stata Module to Perform Extended IV/2SLS, GMM and
AC/HAC, LIML and K-Class Regression for Panel Data Models.
Schankerman, M. (1998). How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field.
The RAND Journal of Economics 29(1), 77–107.
Schankerman, M. and A. Pakes (1986). Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European
Countries During the Post-1950 Period. Economic Journal 96(384), 1052–1076.
Schankerman, M. A. and F. Schuett (2016). Screening for Patent Quality: Examination, Fees,
and the Courts. CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2016-046, TILEC Discussion Paper No.
2016-036.
Schmoch, U. (2008). Concept of a Technology Classification for Country Comparisons. Final
Report to the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 100(7), 309–315.
Schneider, C. (2011). The Battle for Patent Rights in Plant Biotechnology: Evidence from
Opposition Filings. Journal of Technology Transfer 36(5), 565–579.
Scotchmer, S. (1991). Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1), 29–41.
Scotchmer, S. and J. Green (1990). Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law. RAND Journal of
Economics 21(1), 131–146.
Shane, S. (2009). Problems to be Expected from Expanded Administrative Challenges to U.S.
Patents. Mimeo.
Shapiro, C. (2001). Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licensing, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting, pp. 119–150. MIT Press.
Siegelman, P. and J. Waldfogel (1999). Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New Evidence
through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model. Journal of Legal Studies 28(1), 101–130.
187
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Somaya, D. (2003). Strategic Determinants of Decisions Not to Settle Patent Litigation. Strate-
gic Management Journal 24(1), 17–38.
Stock, J. H. and M. Yogo (2005). Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression. Iden-
tification and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg.
Teece, D. J. (1986). Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration,
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy. Research Policy 15(1), 285–305.
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press.
Toivanen, O. and L. Väänänen (2012). Returns to Inventors. Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 94(4), 1173–1190.
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (2017, January). Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property.
von Graevenitz, G., S. Wagner, and D. Harhoff (2011). How to Measure Patent Thickets – A
Novel Approach. Economics Letters 111(1), 6 – 9.
von Graevenitz, G., S. Wagner, and D. Harhoff (2013). Incidence and Growth of Patent Thick-
ets: The Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity. Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 61(3), 521–563.
Wagner, S. and I. Cockburn (2010). Patents and the Survival of Internet-Related IPOs. Research
Policy 39(2), 214–228.
Waldfogel, J. (1998). Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theo-
ries of Litigation. Journal of Law and Economics 41(2), 451–476.
Watzinger, M., T. Fackler, M. Nagler, and M. Schnitzer (2017). How Antitrust Enforcement Can
Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 11793.
Weatherall, K. and E. Webster (2014). Patent Enforcement: A Review of the Literature. Journal
of Economic Surveys 28(2), 312–343.
Williams, H. L. (2013). Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human
Genome. Journal of Political Economy 121(1), 1–27.
Williams, H. L. (2017). How Do Patents Affect Research Investments? Annual Review of
Economics 9(1), 441–469.
Williamson, S. H. (2016). Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount,
1774 to Present. MeasuringWorth. www.measuringworth.com/uscompare, accessed July
19th, 2016.
188
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Second ed.).
MIT press.
Zaby, A. K. (2010). Losing the Lead: The Patenting Decision in the Light of the Disclosure
Requirement. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 19(2), 147–164.
Ziedonis, R. H. (2003). Patent Litigation in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry. In W. M. Cohen
and S. A. Merrill (Eds.), Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy, pp. 180–216. Washington,
DC: The National Academies Press.
Ziedonis, R. H. (2004). Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent
Acquisition Strategies of Firms. Management Science 50(6), 804–820.
189
